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From the Editor in Chief
Our Spring issue opens with a Special Commentary entitled
“#FakeNews in #NatSec: Handling Misinformation,” by Amanda
Cronkhite, Wenshuo Zhang, and Leslie Caughell. The authors use an
agent-based modeling method to achieve a better understanding of how
misinformation spreads in different types of networks. Policies that
promote increased media literacy or other preemptive measures, they
argue, are more effective than those that address misinformation after
the fact, such as fact-checking or labeling fake news.
This issue’s first forum, Civil-Military Relations, features two articles.
John Binkley’s “Revisiting the 2006 Revolt of the Generals” examines
public criticism of the Bush Administration’s handling of the Iraq War in
the summer of 2006 by retired general/flag officers. This criticism, Binkley
claims, constitutes a new era in civil-military relations that permits active
involvement in public debate by retired senior military officers. Zachary
Griffiths’s “Are Retired Flag Officers Overparticipating in the Political
Process?” contends the active participation of retired generals and
admirals does little harm to US democratic institutions or to the
nonpartisan reputation of the US military.
Our second forum, Adapting to Adaptive Adversaries, includes two
contributions. In “Missiles, Drones, and the Houthis in Yemen”
Jean-Loup Samaan describes how, during the war in Yemen in 2015, the
Houthis transformed from a local insurgent group to a nonstate actor able
to defy regional powers. The conflict offers important lessons regarding
the growing accessibility and affordability of sophisticated weapons’
systems and their usefulness to violent extremist groups. In “Defense
Institution Building in Africa,” Ashley Neese-Bybee, Paul Clarke, and
Alexander Noyes discuss tools and processes for developing successful
defense institutions in low-capacity, high-threat African states.
The final forum, Strategic Lieutenants (Part II), adds substantively to
the debate regarding how strategically sensitive company-grade officers
must be. If the need for strategic-minded officers has indeed increased
since the end of the Cold War, it is worth asking how the West’s military
academies have adjusted to the demand. Carsten Roennfeldt’s “Norway’s
Strategic Lieutenants” maintains the Norwegian Military Academy has
achieved success with a method of instruction that fuses the Lykke
model of military strategy with the Toulmin model of argumentation. In
“Denmark’s Strategic Lieutenants,” Dorthe Bach Nyemann and Jørgen
Staun describe how the training curriculum of the Royal Danish Military
Academy routinely produces lieutenants capable of bearing complex
leadership responsibilities in fluid operating environments. ~AJE
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Special Commentary

#FakeNews in #NatSec:
Handling Misinformation
Amanda B. Cronkhite, Wenshuo Zhang, and Leslie
Caughell
©2020 Amanda B. Cronkhite, Wenshuo Zhang, and Leslie Caughell

ABSTRACT: Adapting an epidemiological model for studying the
spread of viral infections, we use agent-based modeling (ABM) to
simulate how misinformation spreads in different network types.
Our results indicate policies that address misinformation after the
fact, such as fact-checking or labeling fake news, will not be as useful
as policies promoting increased media literacy or other preemptive
measures.

S

ome people are more susceptible to misinformation than
others, and some social environments are more conducive to
the spread of misinformation than others.1 We tested how a
so-called mind virus—the Russian term for misinformation—moves
through different populations. Our simulations found the propagation of
misinformation is facilitated by individuals who believe in and transmit
false but appealing information, and who live in a social environment
characterized by strong relationships with like-minded individuals. When
these conditions are met, misinformation spreads widely and rapidly. In
other words, neither the type of network nor the characteristics of the
populace alone account for information spread; it is the combination of
susceptible individuals and network structures that most facilitates the
spread of falsehoods.
This finding suggests strategies for combating the spread of
misinformation must account for network configuration as well
as the strength of social ties between the individuals spreading
misinformation, particularly the level of trust between a transmitter
and recipient. Policies that fail to consider these two factors jointly
will have, at best, very limited success. Nonetheless, most government
proposals focus on stopping the circulation of existing misinformation.2
More surgical approaches may be necessary, including identifying and
inoculating those most susceptible to misinformation by increasing their
media literacy, and tailoring literacy campaigns to the network structure
through which misinformation is spreading. Though this tactic is
1     We would like to thank anonymous reviewers and those who commented on this work at the
annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 2015. This manuscript is stronger for
their feedback. All code and data necessary to reproduce this analysis is available from https://github
.com/ZhangWS/mpsa2015.
2     Daniel Funke and Daniela Flamini, “A Guide to Anti-misinformation Actions around the
World,” Poynter, updated August 13, 2019.
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already being deployed in other parts of the world, it would represent a
substantial change in domestic policy.3
This article first draws from democratic theory to explain why
misinformation is more dangerous than mere ignorance of facts.
Current discussion of the spread of misinformation often invokes a
viral infection metaphor, and the article evaluates the comparability of
information and contagious disease transmission. Given the similarities,
the article discusses the application of epidemiological methods to
simulate the transmission and virulence of misinformation with agentbased modeling (ABM). It then provides the findings of computer
simulations that collected data on how misinformation moves through
different types of communities. The article’s analysis demonstrates
the difficulty of halting misinformation once it has begun to spread.
The article concludes by addressing the normative implications of the
findings and recommends policymakers rethink their approaches to
combating misinformation.

Misinformation and Fake News

While misinformation is not a new phenomenon, discussions
about misinformation have taken on greater urgency following Russian
interference in American and European elections in 2016 and 2017. In a
review of “97 elections and 31 referendums” between November 2016
and April 2019, researchers found “foreign interference” in the elections
of “20 countries.”4 Ahead of the US elections in 2020, concerns about
information warfare are widespread, with intelligence officials stating
multiple foreign adversaries are already attempting to subvert US
electoral protocols.5 The director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Christopher Wray, even called the interference in the 2018 midterms a
“dress rehearsal for the big show in 2020.”6
Politicians, governments, and intergovernmental organizations
now face a complicated technological challenge–stopping the spread
of fake news generated by actors operating largely outside of their
legal jurisdictions. Prominent proposals include changing regulations
governing social media, imposing fines for intentionally spreading
falsehoods, and implementing mass education initiatives to increase
digital literacy.
In 2018, the European Union outlined a plan to counter
misinformation, focusing on detecting misinformation, coordinating
responses to misinformation campaigns, legally regulating social
3     Jadranka Milanovic, “Digital Literacy - Basic Children Right in the 21st Century,” UNICEF:
Serbia, October 11, 2018; Eliza Mackintosh, Special Report: Finland is Winning the War on Fake News.
What It’s Learned May Be Crucial to Western Democracy, with video by Edward Kiernan, CNN, accessed
May 21, 2019; and Funke and Flamini, “Guide to Anti-misinformation.”
4     Fergus Hanson and Elise Thomas, “Cyber-Enabled Election Interference Occurs in One-Fifth
of Democracies,” Real Clear Defense, May 17, 2019.
5     Martin Matishak, “Intelligence Heads Warn of More Aggressive Election Meddling in 2020,”
Politico, January 29, 2019.
6     Christopher A. Wray and Richard N. Haass, “A Conversation with Christopher Wray,”
(Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, April 26, 2019).
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media platforms, and empowering citizens to recognize and reject false
content.7 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through its Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, has also committed resources
to teaching its members to fight misinformation campaigns.8 But
these solutions are often developed without adequately considering the
conditions under which misinformation spreads through a population,
information vital to understanding how misinformation may be stopped.

Do Facts Matter?

Prominent democratic theorists suggest a well-functioning
democracy rests on the existence of citizens who possess and use
accurate information to form political preferences.9 For decades, political
scientists have been assessing how the political knowledge of citizens
affects their political preferences.10 They find many people lack basic
political information, which distorts the policy preferences they express
relative to what they say is their actual preferred policy.11
Growing evidence suggests the use of inaccurate information may
pose an even greater problem for democracy than the lack or uneven
distribution of political information.12 Misinformation “can distort
public debate, undermine trust in political leaders, and warp the process
by which people form and update policy preferences.”13 In addition,
citizens who use inaccurate information to make judgments behave
in a systematically different manner than people who possess accurate
information.14 To use a recent example, people who do not believe
in the utility of vaccines—anti-vaxxers—not only put themselves
at risk because of misinformed beliefs but have endangered the herd
immunity of whole cities and even the assessment that the United

7     Naja Bentzen, Online Disinformation and the EU’s Response (Brussels: European Parliamentary
Research Service, February 2019).
8     Jente Althuis and Leonie Haiden, eds., Fake News: A Roadmap (Riga, Latvia: NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, 2018).
9     Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. William Smith, Philadelphia, PA, February 19, 1791, in The Works
of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, vol. 6, Correspondence 1789-1792, (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,
1904), 6:205–8; and John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, rev. ed., (1859; repr., Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
1978).
10     Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why It
Matters (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1996); Larry M. Bartels, “Uninformed
Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1
(February 1996): 194–230; Paul M. Sniderman, Philip E. Tetlock, and Laurel Elms, “Public Opinion
and Democratic Politics: The Problem of Nonattitudes and the Social Construction of Political
Judgment,” in Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology, ed. James H. Kuklinski (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 254–88; and John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass
Opinion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
11     Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know; and Scott L. Althaus, Collective Preferences in
Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and the Will of the People (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003).
12     Jennifer Hochschild and Katherine Levine Einstein, “‘It Isn’t What We Don’t Know that
Gives Us Trouble, It’s What We Know that Ain’t So:’ Misinformation and Democratic Politics,”
British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 3 (2015): 467–75.
13     Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “Blank Slates or Closed Minds? The Role of Information
Deficits and Identity Threat in the Prevalence of Misperceptions,” (unpublished paper, 2014).
14     Hochschild and Einstein, “‘What We Don’t Know.’”
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States has eliminated measles nationwide.15 The most pressing problem
for advanced industrialized democracies may not be the ignorant and
inactive citizen, but the ignorant and “active” citizen.16
These findings give greater urgency to understanding how
misinformation spreads and how it might be stopped. Methods used
by epidemiologists to study viral transmission may provide a powerful
tool in understanding the spread of misinformation by incorporating
three factors: individual susceptibility, the likelihood of transmission,
and network structure. Each plays a distinct role in facilitating a
virus’s spread. The bulk of the social science literature on information
transmission focuses on similar concepts.

Susceptibility: Transmission and Updating

Individual susceptibility, or inborn immunity, conditions human
responses to pathogens be they microbes or viruses. Some individuals
are extremely susceptible to sickness while others possess more resistance
due to inoculation or prior exposure. Susceptibility to misinformation
depends on a number of individual-level factors such as education,
attention to news, and partisanship. Inherent or learned immunity, such
as higher media literacy, may buffer against the spread of misinformation.
Just as some people exposed to the chickenpox virus do not develop
symptoms, some people exposed to misinformation will never believe it.
Pathogens are spread through either direct contact or via an
intermediate host. Pathogen characteristics, such as its infectivity—
the ability to enter, survive, and multiply in a biological host—and
infectiousness—the ease with which pathogens can be transmitted
between hosts—determine the rate at which a group falls sick. Diseases
that sicken victims quickly but with high mortality rates like Ebola
are generally limited in geographic scope or density. Diseases like the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) have lower mortality rates
and sicken victims over years, often yielding much larger areas of
infection. Increasingly, scholars are studying how interactions and social
embeddedness facilitate the spread of disease.17
Internalizing misinformation requires not just exposure but
also belief. The incorporation of misinformation as fact is known as
updating in social science.18 “Transmission requires that two agents
interact with each other, with one conveying a belief to the other,” while
updating occurs only when the receiver accepts the new information.19
15     Gabriella Borter, “U.S. Retains Measles-Elimination Status Despite Worst Outbreak in
Quarter Century,” Reuters, October 4, 2019.
16     Hochschild and Einstein, “‘What We Don’t Know.’”
17     Leon Danon et al., “Networks and the Epidemiology of Infectious Disease,” Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on Infectious Diseases 2011, art. no. 284909 (2011).
18     Abhijit V. Banerjee, “The Economics of Rumours,” Review of Economic Studies 60, no. 2 (April
1993): 309–27; and Michael Kosfeld, “Rumours and Markets,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 41,
no. 6 (September 2005): 646–64.
19     Ravi Bhavnani, Michael G. Findley, and James H. Kuklinski, “Rumor Dynamics in Ethnic
Violence,” Journal of Politics 71, no. 3 (July 2009): 878.
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Transmission can happen without updating, but the reverse is usually
not true.20
Existing literature suggests updating is caused by a combination of
individual-level and community factors such as partisanship and trust
in the media, among others.21 This article focuses on the importance of
interpersonal trust for misinformation transmission. Trust acts similarly
to physical proximity to an infected person—the closer or more trusted
one is, the greater the likelihood of contagion.

Network Configuration

In epidemiological research, network structure defines the pathways a pathogen must travel to reach different individuals, with
physical proximity between two people determining the likelihood of
infection. Similarly, social network structure defines the paths through
which misinformation could possibly reach all of the individuals in
a community, as well as how citizens receive and interpret political
information and misinformation.22 Social network analysis has found
real-world networks often share enough attributes to be grouped into
ideal types.23 This article considers two types of networks—small-world
and scale-free—as they represent how information most commonly
moves.24
As figure 1 shows, small-world networks have high clustering
coefficients—someone’s friends also tend to be friends with each other,
and short average path-lengths—a person need only go through a
few acquaintances of acquaintances before connecting with someone
unknown.25 In real life, these connections are neighborhoods, churches,
or clubs in which almost everyone knows each other and interacts
regularly. The modern social media environment is much like this:
barriers to connecting with others, like the costs of transmitting

20     Not unless the person updating in isolation is the instigator of the rumor.
21     Leslie Caughell, “When Playing the Woman Card is Playing Trump: Assessing the Efficacy of
Framing Campaigns as Historic,” in “Elections in Focus,” special issue, PS: Political Science & Politics
49, no. 4 (October 2016): 736–42; Robert N. Lupton and Christopher Hare, “Conservatives Are
More Likely to Believe That Vaccines Cause Autism,” Monkey Cage (blog), Washington Post, March 1,
2015; Patrick W. Kraft, Milton Lodge, and Charles S. Taber, “Why People ‘Don’t Trust the Evidence’:
Motivated Reasoning and Scientific Beliefs,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 658, no. 1 (2015): 121–33; and Briony Swire et al., “Processing Political Misinformation:
Comprehending the Trump Phenomenon,” Royal Society Open Science 4, no. 3 (March 2017).
22     Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague, “Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political
Information,” American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December 1987): 1197–216; Scott D.
McClurg, “Political Disagreement in Context: The Conditional Effect of Neighborhood Context,
Disagreement and Political Talk on Electoral Participation,” Political Behavior 28, no. 4 (December
2006): 349–66; and Diana C. Mutz, Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
23     David A. Siegel, “Social Networks and Collective Action,” American Journal of Political Science
53, no. 1 (January 2009): 132.
24     Meng Liu et al., “Epidemics in Interconnected Small-World Networks,” PLoS ONE 10, no.
3 (2015): e0120701.
25     Gunes Ertan Yenigun, “Social Networks and Collective Action Outcomes: Do Mobilization
and Alliance Structures Matter?” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2013), 33.

TOC

10

Parameters 50(1) Spring 2020

information, are low and most people’s social media friends are still
relatively geographically proximate.26

Figure 1. A small-world network

Scale-free networks, as shown in figure 2, are characterized by a
small number of hyperconnected individuals, a majority of which
maintain very few links to fellow members.27 These links are based
on preferential attachment in “which a small number of high-degree
actors are responsible for connecting the network, which puts them in
a uniquely powerful position for influencing” the rest of the network.28
The most commonly employed analogy for a scale-free network is
the hub-and-spoke airport system: major airports such as O’Hare
or Heathrow serve as essential transit points through which most
passengers must travel in order to reach smaller airports. This network
most resembles the traditional gatekeeper news model dominant in the
broadcast age (approximately the 1950s through the 1990s) when people
26     Emily Badger and Quoctrung Bui, “How Connected Is Your Community to Everywhere Else
in America?” Upshot (website), New York Times, September 19, 2018.
27     Yenigun, “Social Networks,” 31.
28     James Moody, “The Structure of a Social Science Collaboration Network: Disciplinary
Cohesion from 1963 to 1999,” American Sociological Review 69, no. 2 (2004): 228.
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received their news from a very limited number of news outlets, such as
a daily newspaper and one of three major television networks.

Figure 2. A scale-free network

An important difference between the two models is that members
of small-world networks are most likely acquainted with each other
through intermediaries whereas members of scale-free networks are
much less likely to know each other. Put colloquially, friends of friends
are likely friends in small-world networks, but friends of friends in scalefree networks are much less likely to be acquainted.

Modeling Misinformation

The similarities between virus transmission and information
transmission offer researchers a powerful analogy for understanding
the spreading of misinformation. But it is difficult to track the spread
of misinformation through a population in real time. Studies of
misinformation frequently use surveys, which provide only a snapshot in
time and often fail to capture information on the role of social networks
in transmission. Studies of Twitter are also becoming popular but there
are three important limitations to such research: Twitter represents a
skewed version of America; research is limited to cases where rumors
TOC
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take off and fail to study instances in which they do not; and sampling
via hashtags is limited to relevance samples that often do not capture
the full universe of related tweets. From the perspective of information
warfare, it is important to know the full range of possibilities of what
might be effective in spreading misinformation, not just what happens
to go viral.29
Epidemiologists use computational models that incorporate
information about individuals and social networks to simulate the
transmission of contagious diseases. The most commonly used contagion
model is the modified susceptible, infected, and recovered (SIR) model.30
SIR stands for the three states a subject can take on as a disease moves
through a population. “Susceptible” denotes vulnerable individuals who
have not yet been exposed to the pathogen; the “infected” are actively
sick individuals who can infect others; the “recovered” are individuals
who have acquired immunity. The modified SIR model adds a “carrier”
state for individuals who are infectious regardless of their own health.31
The central assumption of the SIR model is that individual
characteristics condition human responses to infection, in turn
determining whether that person will transmit the disease to others.
With regard to misinformation, the categories overlay as follows:
• “susceptible” persons who have not yet been exposed to misinformation but may believe it if exposed;
• “infected” persons who have been exposed and believe the
misinformation;
• “removed” persons who recognize misinformation as false or incorrect
and refuse to pass on the misinformation for any combination of
individually motivated reasons; and
• “carriers” who may be skeptical or reject the misinformation outright
but nonetheless pass it on. One example would be a journalist who
repeats a falsehood while providing a correction. (This passive
misinformation transmission commonly occurs on social media.
There is theoretically a subset of those who believe misinformation
but opt not to pass it on. In that case, those agents in our model act
as if removed.)32
Mind viruses, like other diseases, are nothing more than long strands
of information seeking to reproduce to ensure survival. To stretch the
metaphor, a rumor seeks to survive by infecting as many people as

29     Stefan Wojcik and Adam Hughes, “Sizing Up Twitter Users,” Pew Research Center: Internet
& Technology, April 24, 2019.
30     William Ogilvy Kermack and Anderson Gray McKendrick, “A Contribution to the
Mathematical Theory of Epidemics,” Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and
Engineering Sciences 115, no. 772 (1927): 700–721.
31    John T. Kemper, “The Effects of Asymptotic Attacks on the Spread of Infectious Disease: A
Deterministic Model,” Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 40, no. 6 (1978): 707–18.
32     Matt Gertz and Rob Savillo, “Study: Major Media Outlets’ Twitter Accounts Amplify False
Trump Claims on Average 19 Times a Day,” Media Matters for America, accessed May 6, 2019.
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possible with belief in its credibility. In this view, the SIR model seems
appropriate to model rumor emergence.
Because belief in misinformation is not equally likely, we define the
probability of belief as a function of a person’s trust in the source as well
as the person’s trust in her political institutions. Trust in the source of
a rumor incorporates cues about credibility into the model. People are
more likely to believe a rumor when they believe the transmitter is a
credible source of information, and they are more likely to trust people
with whom they regularly or closely associate.33 In the age of social
media, individuals can splice up their networks to control who sees
what (for example, designating friends, close friends, and acquaintances
on Facebook, or into a circle of friends for WeChat). Interpersonal
trust becomes an important factor in determining to accept, use, and
transmit misinformation.
The second component, trust in political institutions, considers the
information environment in which a person resides. Institutional trust
is highly correlated with a person’s propensity to adopt a conspiratorial
orientation as well as with pessimism about politics and political
processes.34 People who distrust institutions also tend to believe
conspiracy theories.35 People with lower institutional trust are also more
open to believing a rumor or information from unofficial channels in
general, for example with samizdat during the Soviet era.36
Though individuals can change their beliefs, this model does not
incorporate a mechanism or timeline for recovery. Once a person believes
a piece of misinformation, said person remains persuaded. This modeling
choice reflects an important reality of information transmission, namely,
most believers will have transmitted misinformation to others even if
they change their minds later. Those who received the information may
continue acting as agents of transmission.

The Model’s Parameters

The ABM used in this paper requires parameters to be set at the
level of the network as well as the individual agent.37 Besides specifying
the network type as discussed earlier, other network-level parameters
include size, the average level of institutional trust, and average level
of interpersonal trust. Possible network size parameter N was derived
from R. I. M. Dunbar’s work on sustainable social group size, with small
group size set to 100 members (number of people most of us call friends),

33     Swire et al, “Processing Political Misinformation”; Jennifer Ann Golbeck, “Computing and
Applying Trust in Web-Based Social Networks” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2005), 76–77.
34     Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003).
35     Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy.
36     Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler, Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social
Networks and How They Shape Our Lives (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2009).
37     We use the term “agents” because it is standard terminology in the ABM literature.
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medium group size set to 500 (acquaintances), and large group size set to
1500 (upper limit for whom one person can put faces to names).38
As discussed in the previous section, people are differently
susceptible to believing in misinformation. We adopt Adam Berinsky’s
typology of rumor susceptibility for agent assignment and incorporate
his experimental findings about the frequency of occurrence for each
type of susceptibility.39 The typology, distribution, and our assumptions
about the probability of misinformation transmission are as follows:
• “susceptible” agents are capable of believing a rumor and they will
pass on a rumor if they believe it: 65 percent;
• “gullible” agents will always believe the rumor and they will always
pass it on: 5 percent;
• “skeptics” reject the misinformation as being wrong and they will not
tell anyone else: 5 percent; and
• “ambivalents” do not internalize the misinformation but will always
pass it on: 25 percent.
The average level of institutional trust in the network can be set
to low (widespread distrust in government), medium, or high. Though
the average level of interpersonal trust might similarly be varied from
negligible to significant, we held average interpersonal trust levels to
be uniformly high in order to capture contemporary concerns about
echo chambers, which suggest people tend to hear news from those
they agree with and are unlikely to hear or want to hear information that
challenges them.40
We calculate an individual’s trust in political institutions as
T institutions ~N (average level of institutional trust, 10), T institutions
[0, 100], with lower scores meaning lower trust. Agent i’s trust in agent j,
T personal, is calculated as the average of the strength of the connection
with her general level of interpersonal trust ~N (average level of personal
trust, 1), T personal [0, 100], with lower scores meaning lower trust.
During initial setup for each simulation run, the model generates
agents and connections according to the parameters of the network type,
either small-world or scale-free. Each agent is assigned membership
according to Berinsky’s typology and the probability of membership
discussed above. At every timestep t, “infected” (misinformed) agents

38     R. I. M. Dunbar, “Coevolution of Neocortical Size, Group Size and Language in Humans,”
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no. 4 (1993): 681–735; and Maria Konnikova, “The Limits of
Friendship,” New Yorker, October 7, 2014.
39     Adam J. Berinsky, “Rumors, Truths, and Reality: A Study of Political Misinformation,”
version 3.1 (working paper, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, May 22, 2012).
40     Golbeck, “Computing and Applying Social Trust,” 76-77.
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and skeptical “carrier” agents expose all connected acquaintances with
misinformation:
• “removed” agents who receive the misinformation will reject it and
will not pass it on at time t+1;
• “carrier” agents who receive the misinformation will reject it but will
pass it on at time t+1; and
• “susceptible” agents who receive the misinformation have probability
P infection = T institutions + T personal of becoming infected agents,
with threshold infection A set at 0.50. If P infection > A, the agent
transmits the misinformation at time t+1.
A simulation run ends when all agents have been exposed to the
misinformation or when a prespecified time limit has been reached.41

Current Findings

In all simulations, misinformation spread most quickly through
small-world networks, characterized by high levels of trust and regular
interactions between individuals. This suggests that in neighborhoods,
schools, or friend groups where many people know each other,
believability of misinformation and the susceptibility of individuals is
less critical because its members are closely connected and are more
likely to trust each other. This trust means misinformation tends
to infect most of the community very quickly. Because of heavy
interconnectedness between all individuals, almost everyone will be
exposed to misinformation regardless of the number of rejectors.
In scale-free networks featuring weaker as well as fewer bonds
between members, the structure plays a much more dominant role in
determining the extent of penetration by misinformation than network
size or how closely agents are connected. Individuals who occupy central
hub positions are instrumental in the spread of misinformation. Political
scientists might refer to these critical nodes as opinion leaders. On
social media, these nodes would be known as influencers. As depicted
in figure 3, just as cancelations at O’Hare International Airport will
affect flight schedules at smaller airports all over the country, influential
individuals who reject the misinformation and refuse to discuss it may
affect whether their connections will ever hear it. Conversely, believers
in hub positions are capable of quickly and efficiently infecting an entire
network by getting misinformation out to their followers.

41     The model run ends when all agents have heard the rumor. But this may not occur due to the
randomized configurations of agents and connections. Thus, in repeated simulations, we specified
the model would end regardless of its state after 500 ticks.
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Figure 3. A scale-free network weighted to show the influence of different hubs

Our data suggest activating these influencers is the best way to
stop the spread of misinformation. When persons occupying critical
nodes hear a piece of misinformation early in its life cycle, recognize
it as inaccurate, and fail to pass it on, the spread of misinformation
halts. This contrasts with previous findings indicating the initial
number of opinion leaders, not their location, explains how widely
misinformation spreads.42
People have “a strong tendency to connect and bond with people who
are like” themselves (homophily).43 People also tend to live among those
similar to themselves, and are less and less likely to interact with people
with different viewpoints than their own.44 In other words, Americans
42     Duncan J. Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2004); Duncan J. Watts and Peter Sheridan Dodds, “Influentials, Networks, and Public
Opinion Formation,” Journal of Consumer Research 34, no. 4 (December 2007): 441–58.
43     Cass R. Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2017), 1.
44     Olivia Campbell, “Liberals and Conservatives Are Equally Likely to Seek Out Political
Bubbles,” New York Magazine, May 9, 2017; and Jeremy A. Frimer, Linda J. Skitka, and Matt
Motyl, “Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Avoid Exposure to One Another’s
Opinions,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 72 (2017): 1–12.
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are becoming members of smaller and more densely connected smallworld networks, and they are more rarely getting information from
sources outside of those with whom they agree. We are hearing less
discordant or challenging information than we did in the broadcast
media age.45
Humans living in polarized, disconnected clusters constitute
particularly conducive environments for the spread of misinformation.
This means attempts to stop the spread of misinformation must focus
on the conditions under which misinformation originates and begins to
spread rather than tactics to halt that information once it gains traction.

Political and Societal Prescriptions

From a policy perspective, expecting influential persons not to
repeat misinformation or creating legal restrictions that penalize them
for doing so (rightly) raises concerns about encroaching on free speech.
Expecting social media platforms to take down offending accounts, as
happened in 2018, further inflames concerns about censorship without
effectively stopping the spread of misinformation.46 Fact-checking
or correcting efforts like those supported by Facebook and Google
pervade research and policy recommendations but have shown limited
effectiveness.47 Our results suggest why fact-checking may not prove
a panacea—even the mere transmission of a rumor, for example by a
journalist fact-checking it, further infects the community. And once
misinformation begins to spread, it becomes incredibly difficult to
stop. The key to combating misinformation likely rests on preventing
misinformation from beginning to spread rather than halting it after
the fact.
Given this finding, we next consider what may be effective in
stopping the spread of misinformation. Extrapolating from our model
and recent successful endeavors by other researchers, we recommend
a two-pronged approach to making future policy. First, government
should focus on developing digital literacy campaigns to prevent people
from believing and subsequently sharing misinformation. Second,
government and interested organizations should incorporate structural
information into those digital literacy strategies, decreasing susceptibility
to falsehoods by targeting education efforts at citizens who are most
likely to spread misinformation (“carriers” or “ambivalents”).

45     Matthew Mendelsohn and Richard Nadeau, “The Magnification and Minimization of Social
Cleavages by the Broadcast and Narrowcast News Media,” International Journal of Public Opinion
Research 8, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 374–89.
46     Dan Tynan, “Facebook Accused of Censorship after Hundreds of US Political Pages
Purged,” Guardian, October 16, 2018.
47     David M. J. Lazer et al., “The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a
Multidisciplinary Effort,” Science, March 9, 2018, 1094–96; and Damian Tambini, Fake News: Public
Policy Responses, Media Policy Brief 20 (London: Media Policy Project, London School of Economics
and Political Science, 2017).
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Digital Literacy

Digital literacy scholars have identified five generally successful
approaches to improving people’s ability to detect falsehoods:
• teach individuals to check for fact-checking articles about a news story;
• trace the source of information;
• read laterally, that is, check other sources’ evaluations of the
story’s source;
• recognize the emotions they feel in response to the story; and
• identify common structural characteristics of fake news stories.48
Lateral reading has even been shown to be effective among digital
natives, which includes many millennials (born 1981–96) and all of
Generation Z (1997–2015).49 As such, it has the largest chance of success
among current students and newly enfranchised voters.
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has declared
digital literacy a basic right of children.50 Digital literacy training is
most effective when taught to young children. Because US states are
responsible for setting educational curriculum, campaigns for increasing
digital literacy should focus their lobbying to encourage adoption at the
level of the school district. Librarians and teachers have been especially
entrepreneurial in brainstorming ways of raising awareness in their
communities.51 This policy approach would not necessarily require many
resources to implement and can draw on the work of nongovernmental
organizations. If such endeavors prevent at least some people from
believing and sharing misinformation, they may prove more successful
in the long-term in fighting the reach of misinformation.
Many US allies and partners already utilize these proactive
approaches. Finland, which borders Russia, launched a multisectoral
initiative to combat misinformation and disinformation, especially
on hot button issues such as immigration.52 Countries such as Italy
and Germany have integrated digital literacy education into school
curricula.53 Public education campaigns and wargaming against fake
news have shown to be effective in recent small-n studies. Specifically,
borrowing from inoculation theory, researchers found that educating
students on the production of disinformation and having them practice
creating disinformation raised awareness of and attention to on the
48     Leslie Caughell, Politics in the Era of #FakeNews: The Damaging Effects of Misinformation and What
We Can Do To Stop It (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
49     Sam Wineburg and Sarah McGrew, “Lateral Reading: Reading Less and Learning More When
Evaluating Digital Information” (Stanford History Education Group Working Paper No. 2017-A1,
Stanford University, CA, October 6, 2017).
50     Milanovic, “Digital Literacy.”
51     Erica Hodgin and Joseph Kahne, “Misinformation in the Information Age: What Teachers
Can Do to Support Students,” Social Education 82, no. 4 (2018): 208–12.
52     Mackintosh, “Finland is Winning.”
53     Jason Horowitz, “In Italian Schools, Reading, Writing and Recognizing Fake News,” New York
Times, October 18, 2017; and Tahra Boutaleb and Luisa Gaburova, “Media Literacy in Germany and
Italy,” Stamp Media, November 20, 2018.
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veracity of news stories in real life.54 All of this appears to be a specific
effort to protect each country’s national security from the informational
equivalent of yelling “fire” in a crowded theater.55
The knowledge that some individuals are more susceptible to
misinformation than others allows policymakers to target information
literacy campaigns where they might be most effective. An analysis
of consumption of fake news online during the 2016 presidential
election showed that while a relatively small proportion of news was
untrustworthy, a plurality (44.3 percent) of US adults was exposed to
some disinformation in 2016, and those exposed were highly concentrated
in certain subpopulations, such as those with the most conservative
news diets.56 In fact, one study showed that 1 percent of the population
may have been exposed to 80 percent of disinformation in the 2016
election.57 Research has also shown older Americans are much more
likely to believe and to share fake news.58 Highly concentrated clusters of
misinformation consumption presents an opportunity for policymakers
to utilize resources more efficiently, such as by leveraging algorithms
already being employed to train artificial intelligence in social networks.
As Tim Hwang wrote recently, “Algorithms may also point the way to
identifying specific individuals who will be most effective in helping to
contain the spread of disinformation.”59
The private sector can also encourage digital literacy. Just as social
media outlets may push clickbait quizzes for attention, they can also
promote digital literacy. In some countries, this has already been done
as a tradeoff to forestall government regulation. Social media platforms
can demonstrate their commitment to digital literacy by sharing the cost
and targeting those individuals who share the most misinformation.
After all, once misinformation is identified, Facebook, Twitter and other
platforms can easily backtrack to see who has shared it and how widely
it has gone.

Fighting Misinformation

Military personnel engage with civilians on social networks
frequently, often becoming trusted sources of information for their
connections, and relationships between military individuals are often
characterized by high degrees of trust. Thus, military personnel passing
on misinformation or disinformation may be particularly powerful in
infecting others. This makes it imperative for organizations, including
54     Jon Roozenbeek and Sander van der Linden, “The Fake News Game: Actively Inoculating
against the Risk of Misinformation,” Journal of Risk Research 22, no. 5 (2018).
55     We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this analogy to us.
56     Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler, “Selective Exposure to Misinformation:
Evidence from the Consumption of Fake News during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign”
(working paper, Brussels: European Research Council, January 9, 2018).
57     Nir Grinberg et al., “Fake News on Twitter During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election,”
Science 363, no. 6425 (January 2019): 374–78.
58     Laura Hazard Owen, “Old People Are Most Likely to Share Fake News on Facebook. They’re
Also Facebook’s Fastest-Growing U.S. Audience,” Nieman Lab, January 11, 2019.
59     Tim Hwang, Maneuver and Manipulation: On the Military Strategy of Online Information Warfare
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2019), 55.
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the US military, to become more proactive in educating their members
to avoid passing on misinformation.
Large organizations such as the US military or the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization already engage in some digital literacy training
for new recruits. NATO recently focused on providing educational
materials to raise cross-cultural competence for their members, ensuring
troops were more effective when operating outside their own cultural
milieu. A similar strategy could be used to disseminate strategies for
combating misinformation.
In the US military, just as classes about terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 have recently been integrated into basic training for enlistees
born after the event or were too young to remember it, the Department
of Defense can include digital literacy classes into its training.60 This
recommendation goes back as least as far as 2011, when a commissioned
study by Army Training and Doctrine Command found very low
levels of digital literacy among soldiers, a situation that has likely not
improved in the age of #FakeNews.61 Even then, the benefits from small
investments in digital literacy had larger-than-expected payoffs, making
them resource-efficient for the military and other organizations.
Incorporating network structure into this training should also be
low cost. Social networks, for example, know which of their members
self-declare as military. The Department of Defense could work with
social networks to find out which among its ranks have spread the most
misinformation. Identifying patterns in misinformation spread among
soldiers (be they geographic, among specializations, or at certain ranks)
would allow for better allocation of funding aimed at digital literacy
efforts and would identify where the military might be vulnerable to
disinformation campaigns ahead of the 2020 elections.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, Internet and
social media companies made changes aimed at reducing the prevalence
of fake news on their platforms.62 Facebook implemented artificial
intelligence to identify and prevent clickbait and fake news from gaining
popularity or trending and contracted with journalists to combat fake
news.63 Google launched its own tool that prioritized fact-checking
articles in its results when a user searched for information about a fake
news topic.64
60     Michael M. Phillips, “Marine Recruits Learn an Important Lesson: What Happened on 9/11,”
Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2019.
61     Jane Mobley, Study to Establish Levels of Digital Literacy for Soldiers and Leaders in the U.S. Army
(Kansas City, MO: Jane Mobley Associates, February 28, 2011).
62     Alan Yuhas, “Facebook Announces New Push against Fake News after Obama Comments,”
The Guardian, November 29, 2016.
63     Garett Sloane, “Facebook Trains AI to Identify False News Spam Sites,” Advertising Age, May
10, 2017; and Daniel Funke, “Facebook Releases an Update on its Project to Combat Fake News
and Support Journalists,” Poynter, July 20, 2017.
64     Mark Wyciślik-Wilson, “Google News Benefits from a Major Redesign and Fact-Checking,”
Beta News, June 28, 2017.

TOC

Special Commentary

Cronkhite, Zhang, and Caughell 21

Nonetheless, since the 2016 election, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
WhatsApp, WeChat, and other social networks remain “awash in fake
news.”65 The problem has spread to other countries, clearly impacting
recent elections in Mexico and Brazil.66 Our analysis shows a person may
be individually susceptible and enmeshed in networks on social media
that increase their likelihood of becoming infected by misinformation.
Yet these realities have not guided our efforts to combat misinformation.
The odds of misinformation diminishing in quantity seem low.
For example, deepfakes—videos produced or altered to present content
that never occurred in real life—will make it even harder to identify
real news, and the technology to produce videos has evolved so quickly
that now it can be done from a single image. The cost of producing
deepfakes has also dropped dramatically making them increasingly a
reality in politics, and numerous technologists worry that deepfakes of
political leaders will be used to sow discord and even incite revolution.67
A recent Pentagon-funded study by the RAND Corporation found
misinformation could be an important factor in the possibility of
conflict between NATO and Russia.68
Perhaps the largest takeaway from our simulations of misinformation
spread is that misinformation diffuses rapidly and widely in networks
like those created on social media platforms.69 The increasing ease
with which individuals or groups can create highly plausible online
misinformation or disinformation likely exacerbates this problem.70
This proves particularly true if such misinformation is pushed out by a
trusted and well-connected source.
Our findings do not prescribe what works to stop misinformation but
rather what likely will not work. Our simulations suggest it is incredibly
difficult to stop a piece of misinformation once it has begun to spread.
We therefore suggest media literacy and civic education programs that
educate citizens to recognize falsehoods and therefore not repeat or
spread them are more likely to be effective against the dissemination of
misinformation. Other countries are actively and publicly formulating
strategies to combat misinformation. The insistence by the United States
to rely on private efforts to counter misinformation leaves us vulnerable
to foreign adversaries who want to disrupt our political system. As
another presidential election cycle ramps up, our unwillingness to face
the problem head-on poses an important threat to democratic stability.
65     Jason Schwartz, “Twitter Still Awash in Fake News, study finds,” Politico, October 4, 2018.
66     Ciara Long, “How False News Haunted the Brazilian Elections: Misinformation and Social
Networks Have Sullied the Country’s Politics since at Least 2010. This Time, It Was Worse Than
Ever,” Slate, October 30, 2018; and Mia Armstrong, “Mexico’s Chapter in the Saga of Election
Disinformation: Much of the Fake News That Infiltrated Mexico’s Recent Presidential Election
Wasn’t Imported,” Slate, August 2, 2018.
67     Emily Zendt, Deepfake Videos Are Getting Terrifyingly Real, PBS Nova, television and online,
April 4, 2019.
68     Klye Rempfer, “How Russian Motorcycle Gangs, Fake News and Cyberattacks Could
Threaten NATO, and How US Forces Can Help,” Military Times, April 23, 2019.
69     Jieun Shin et al., “Political Rumoring on Twitter during the 2012 US Presidential Election:
Rumor Diffusion and Correction,” New Media & Society 19, no. 8 (2017): 1214–35.
70     Christopher Elliot, “Here Are All the Real Fake News Sites,” Forbes, February 21, 2019.
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ABSTRACT: This article examines the public criticism of the Bush
Administration’s handling of the Iraq War in the summer of 2006 by
recently retired general/flag officers. This criticism constitutes a new
era in civil-military relations, which includes the active involvement
in public debate by retired senior military officers.

T

he so-called revolt of the generals in the summer of 2006 is
not an aberration but an example of the changing nature of
the involvement of the military in public discourse. The military
profession itself must confront the reality that the nature of military
professionalism may be in a transitional period and, consequently, the
expected role of the military might be changing. Thus, understanding the
history and the possible future impact of the revolt is something military
officers need to address, not merely as an historical footnote in the study
of civil-military relations, but also as a possible model for the future of
military professionalism.
Between March 19, 2006, and April 19, 2006, three recently retired
Army and Marine general officers—Army Major General Paul Eaton,
Marine Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, and Army Major General
John Batiste—publicly criticized the Bush administration and, in
particular, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, for mismanaging the war in
Iraq. Within a short period of time, three additional retired generals—
Marine Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, Army Major General John
Riggs, and Army Major General Charles Swannack—were interviewed
by the press and concurred with the criticisms levied by Eaton, Newbold,
and Batiste. Collectively these public attacks became known as the
“Revolt of the Generals.”1 Later that same year, the editorial board of
the Military Times wrote:
Rumsfeld has lost credibility with the uniformed leadership, with the troops,
with Congress and with the public at large. His strategy has failed, and his
ability to lead is compromised. And although the blame for our failures in
Iraq rests with the secretary, it will be the troops who bear its brunt. . . .
Donald Rumsfeld must go.2

1     Martin L. Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics,” Parameters 38,
no. 1 (Spring 2008); Paul D. Eaton, “A Top-Down Review for the Pentagon,” New York Times, March
19, 2006; John Batiste, “A Case for Accountability,” Washington Post, April 19, 2006; Greg Newbold,
“Why Iraq Was a Mistake,” Time, April 9, 2006; Richard Whalen, “Revolt of the Generals,” The
Nation, September 28, 2006; Michael Duffy, “The Revolt of the Generals,” CNN (April 17, 2006);
and David Margolick, “The Night of the Generals,” Vanity Fair, April 2007.
2     “Time for Rumsfeld to Go,” editorial, Army Times, Air Force Times, Navy Times, and Marine Corps
Times, November 4, 2006.
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Eaton was the first to assail the administration in a March 19, 2006
op-ed in the New York Times. In charge of training the Iraqi military
until 2004, Eaton called for the resignation of Rumsfeld, labeling him
“strategically, operationally, and tactically” incompetent and placing
primary responsibility for the problems in Iraq on the secretary. Eaton’s
opening shot was followed by an April 9, 2006 article in Time magazine
by Newbold, entitled “Why Iraq Was a Mistake,” and an April 19, 2006
op-ed in the Washington Post entitled “A Case for Accountability,” by
Batiste. Newbold, who retired in 2002, was the director of operations for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Batiste, who had commanded the 1st Infantry
Division in Iraq, retired in 2005 after turning down promotion to
three stars.
Retired and, in rare cases, active duty officers will sometimes enter a
debate over a particular peacetime policy or budget issue.3 But for such
a debate to occur during wartime is extremely rare. The goal of this
article is to explain the scope of the revolt of the generals, illuminate
its underlying causes, place the revolt within the main contours of
American civil-military relations, and indicate how it may affect
American civil-military relations in the future. This article will not offer
an ethical proscriptive model as to when the military should enter into
the public debate; George Clifford, a Naval War College researcher, and
Don Snider, Leonard Wong, and Douglas Lovelace, Army War College
researchers, have already written on that topic.4

Civil-Military Contours

Within the contours of civil-military relations theory, the revolt
raised two separate but related issues. The first was the quintessential
debate regarding objective and subjective civilian control of the military
articulated by Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal work The Soldier
and the State.5 The second was how the military communicates in either
an advisory capacity with the civilian leadership or by participating in
public discourse. This communication is generally referred to as the
military’s voice.
As many readers are aware, objective and subjective civilian control
are not absolute typologies but are heuristic models reflecting two sets
of general characteristics regarding the nature of civil-military relations.
Most officers display characteristics of both models. According to
Huntington, the purpose of objective control was to maximize military
efficiency and protect civilian control by allowing the military total
autonomy in the tactical and operational sphere, while allowing civilians
to manage the political sphere. In order to effectuate this, the military
3     Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 (Washington:
Naval Historical Center, 1994).
4     George M. Clifford III, “Duty at all Costs,” Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007):
103; Don M. Snider, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions,” Orbis 52, no. 2
(Spring 2008): 256–77; and Leonard Wong and Douglas Lovelace, “Knowing When to Salute,” Orbis
52, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 278–88.
5     Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).
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was expected to be apolitical in its actions and exclude non-military
factors from its considerations when fulfilling its advisory function.6
Like objective control, subjective control is a normative model
for civil-military relations. Huntington rejected subjective control
because he feared it would degrade military efficiency and destroy
the military’s political neutrality. Several years after Huntington
published The Soldier and the State, University of Chicago sociologist
Morris Janowitz utilized subjective control as his normative model
in the publication of The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political
Portrait.7 Janowitz argued, operating effectively within the ambiguous
zone of limited war, required military officers to appreciate
nonmilitary factors.
Both Huntington and Janowitz assumed civilian control meant
the military should follow civilian direction. Nevertheless, the degree
to which the military appreciates nonmilitary factors is a distinction
with a profound impact on military advice, as well as the analysis of
the revolt. As military officers became more conversant with political
considerations, Janowitz believed they would be less reticent to speak
openly on issues traditionally outside the professional military sphere.
In reality, military officers do not divide their advice between military
and nonmilitary factors. Instead, officers recognize their advisory role
required them to consider nonmilitary factors when offering advice.
Incorporating nonmilitary factors, however, creates tension with the
military’s professional ethos. In spite of the impossibility of having a
binary approach to objective and subjective civilian control, this article
employs the heuristic characteristics that differentiate objective and
subjective civil-military relations as a starting point for the analysis.
With regard to military voice, there are two distinct types.8 The
first is advisory voice in which the military officer, usually on active
duty, participates in the decision process; the second is public dialogue
voice (discussed later). The traditional American approach to advisory
voice was articulated succinctly by former Army Chief of Staff General
Matthew Ridgway when he explained to his civilian superiors they
could expect fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective
professional opinion up to the moment when they themselves, the civilian
commanders, announced their decisions. Thereafter, they could expect
completely loyal and diligent execution of those decisions.9
6     Christopher P. Gibson, “Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military: A
Madisonian Approach,” in American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, ed.
Suzanne C. Nielson and Don M. Snider (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 242; and
John Binkley, “Flawed, But Not by Design: The Organizational Evolution of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in National Security Policy Making, 1947–1960” (paper presented at the 2004 Conference of
the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, June 24-26, 2006, Austin TX).
7     Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press,
1960).
8     John Garofano, “Effective Advice in Decisions of War: Beyond Objective Control,” Orbis 52,
no. 2 (Spring 2008): 238–54.
9     Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway as Told to Harold H. Martin (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 270.
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Typically, when the military discusses the concept of “voice,” it
is within the context of giving advice to civilian leadership in private.
The military expects the advice will receive a respectful hearing, but
understands it may be rejected.10 Advisory voice concerns the extent
to which military professionals consider nonmilitary factors in the
advisory process.
A different aspect of voice and the one most pertinent to our
discussion of the revolt of the generals relates to what I call the public
dialogue voice. The question in this case is to what extent the military
should publicly participate in the discourse regarding policy. One of the
first writers to confront this question was Sam Sarkesian in 1998:
The military profession dare not withdraw into an ethical cocoon. . . . Instead
it must make a prudent and positive response to the travails imposed on it
and not shrink from articulating its views in the public square. . . . senior
military officers must reshape the very notion of military professionalism
by candidly admitting the impact of politics on the military’s ability to do
its job and daring to practice constructive political engagement. This would
appear to violate the sacred code of silence by which the U.S. military is
strictly apolitical, offers technical advice only.11

Inasmuch as Sarkesian believed professional officers should consider
and discuss nonmilitary factors, his model was predicated on subjective
control and the reality that military policy was inextricably tied to political
policy. He carefully distinguishes his “constructive engagement,” or the
public dialogue voice, from shrill partisan conversation. As Sarkesian
noted, the “military must not remain passive and allow misjudgments
and misguided policies and strategies to emerge from the political arena
absent an airing of the military perspective,” nor should the military be
“a silent order of monks isolated from the political realm.”12
This position is the heart of the debate over the legitimacy of the
revolt. While the military understands the theoretical possibility of
utilizing its public dialogue voice, becoming involved in public discussion
has negative consequences. Sarkesian does not differentiate between
active duty officers and retired offices and, in point of fact, there is a
question under the notions of military professionalism whether there is
a distinction.13 As former Commandant of the US Army War College
Major General William E. Rapp noted, the “most difficult question about
fostering a culture of candor and voice involves the appropriateness
of public expression of military voice.”14 From the perspective of the
dissenting general officers, this was exactly what occurred.
10     William E. Rapp, “Ensuring Effective Military Voice,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016–17):
13–25; and Charles D. Allen and Breena E. Coates, “The Engagement of Military Voice,” Parameters
39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10): 73–87.
11     Sam C. Sarkesian, “The U.S. Military Must Find Its Voice,” Orbis 42, no. 3 (Summer 1998):
423–37; Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., The Military Profession into the 21st Century: War,
Peace and Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006); and James H. Webb Jr., “The Silence of the
Admirals,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 125 (January 1999): 29–34.
12     Sarkesian, “The U.S. Military Must Find Its Voice,” 426, 428.
13     Rick Houghton, “The Law of Retired Military Officers and Political Endorsements: A
Primer,” Lawfare (blog), October 3, 2016.
14     Rapp, “Ensuring Effective Military Voice,” 23.
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The revolt confirmed Janowitz’s belief that as the military became
more cognizant of nonmilitary factors, its servicemembers were more
willing to speak out and assert their voice. Subjective control and public
dialogue voice were inextricably intertwined in this transitional process.
The latter could not exist without the former, which is not to suggest
the revolt precipitated this transition. Instead, Janowitz argued this
transition has been slowly developing over the post-World War II era.
But the military, for a number of reasons, saw the events leading to the
Iraq War as an existential threat to the United States, which led to a large
number of retired officers finding their public dialogue voice.
The actions of the six officers described at the outset of this article
portray the broader and deeper nature of the revolt. The revolt began as
the debate over whether to invade Iraq unfolded, and increased in tempo
regarding the strategic direction of American involvement in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and the
Bush administration’s detention policies. The publication of the abovereferenced editorial in the Army Times, Air Force Times, Navy Times, and
Marine Corps Times on the eve of the 2006 midterm elections reflected
the breadth of the revolt.
The difficulty in examining this particular event is determining
whom to include in our analysis as a dissenting general. Retired General
James Jones, for example, publicly distanced himself from the revolt
even though his critical comments about the Bush administration were
quoted by Bob Woodward in State of Denial.15 The large number of retired
military officers acting as consultants to the various news networks only
muddied the issue.16
The form of public involvement also varied. The typical avenues
of involvement were opinion pieces or media interviews. Congressional
testimony was another major avenue of access.17 Some officers associated
themselves with public interest groups while others signed open letters
to Congress.18 A number of retired four-star officers joined “Diplomats
and Military Commanders for Change,” which stated the administration
had “failed in the primary responsibilities of preserving national
security,” and failed to maintain America’s “responsibilities of world
leadership.”19 In any event, the number of officers, the scope of their
15     Tom Regan, Christian Science Monitor, “Roadside, Car Bomb Attacks in Iraq at ‘All-Time
High,’” October 5, 2006 www.csmonitor.com/2006/1005/dailyUpdate.html; and Bob Woodward,
State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 403–4.
16     Don M. Snider, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of Military Professions,” Orbis 52, No. 2
(Spring 2008): 256–77.
17     U.S. Policy on Iraq: Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 107th Cong. 122–8
(September 23, 2002) (statements of General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Wesley K. Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, and General Joseph Hoar, former Commander, US Central Command).
18     Lieutenant. Generals Robert Gard and William Odom, Major General Mel Montano
(USANG), Brigadier General John Johns (USA), et al. to Congress; and “Retired Military Officers
Supporting Immediate Action to Protect Our Troops,” National Security Network, March 16, 2007.
19     Diplomats and Military Commanders for Change, Official Position, June 16, 2004 (signed by
Admiral William Crowe, former CJCS, General Hoar, General McPeak, former Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, General William Y. Smith, and Admiral Stansfield Turner).
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public involvement, and the breadth of their complaints far exceeded
the original six dissenters.
The difficulty in defining the precise scope of the revolt has also
resulted in senior officers being included in the perception of dissenting
officers even if dissent was not their intention. A case in point is the
statement of then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki before the
Senate Armed Services Committee in 2003, that the Army’s occupation
force requirements for Iraq would be “something on the order of several
hundred thousand soldiers.”20 After his opinion was widely repudiated
by Pentagon officials, the story goes, Shinseki was forced from office
and senior administration officials snubbed his retirement ceremony.21
Another active duty officer dragged into the revolt was Admiral
William “Fox” Fallon, Commander, US Central Command. Admiral
Fallon resigned after the April 2008 publication of an interview in
Esquire portraying him as holding the administration back from more
aggressive action regarding Iran.22 The previous February, the admiral
had also opposed increasing the number of carrier strike groups in
the Persian Gulf and had vowed privately that war with Iran “will not
happen on my watch.”23 The admiral also argued with General David
Petraeus over the general’s requests for increased forces in Iraq. An
unanticipated perceived consequence of the revolt was the belief that
the Bush administration retaliated against both Shinseki and Fallon for
speaking truth to power.
These public attacks upon the military’s civilian leadership, either
real or imagined, for the apparent purpose of affecting public opinion
and the direction of policy caused great consternation regarding the
nature of American civil-military relations. These attacks triggered a
scholarly debate regarding two of the basic premises of civilian control
and the military’s advisory role: the civilian leadership’s right to be
wrong and the military’s obligation simply to “salute and obey” after a
decision is made even though they may disagree.24
Because the revolt seems to violate the traditional Ridgway model,
it has become the most visible example of what has been characterized
as a crisis in American civil-military relations. The “crisis” school in the
Persian Gulf context had its origin in a 1994 article written by Richard
Kohn, an expert in US civil-military relations. Kohn’s article, entitled
“Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” was reinforced

20     Lawrence Di Rita, “Gen. Shinseki’s Silence,” Washington Post, December 15, 2008.
21     Lawrence Di Rita, “Gen. Shinseki’s Silence.”
22     Thomas P.M. Barnett, “The Man Between War and Peace,” Esquire, April 1, 2008, 144–53;
ThinkProgress, “CentCom Commander Fallon: Attack on Iran ‘Will Not Happen On My Watch,’” by
Faiz Shakir, May 16, 2007; Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 342–3; and Woodward, The War Within, 408–9.
23     Barnett, “The Man Between War and Peace.”
24     Michael C. Desch, “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3 (May/June 2007): 97;
Richard B. Meyers et al., “Salute and Disobey?” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (September/October 2007):
147, 149, 152, 153; and Orbis 52, no. 2 (Spring 2008).
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by his subsequent articles.25 Kohn observed a slow erosion in the relations
between the military and its civilian leadership during the Cold War
exacerbated during the Clinton administration by the administration’s
antimilitary bias and policies such as “don’t ask, don’t tell.”
The relevant portion of analysis of crisis is the apparent increased
intrusion of the military into what historically has been the civilian
decision-making sphere, in particular, the decision to use military force.
The tremendous influence of General Colin Powell, a former chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in particular his New York Times op-ed
opposing military intervention in Bosnia, epitomized reaction to this
intrusion.26 Mackubin Thomas Owens, an expert in the field of civilmilitary relations, has argued an underlying assumption among the
dissenting officers was that they had “a right to a voice regarding the
use of the military instrument” and a “right to insist that their views be
adopted.”27 From Owens’s viewpoint such an expectation clearly violates
the American principle of civilian control. But Owens is conflating two
issues, the military’s right to a voice and the expectation its advice had
to be accepted. These are separate issues and need to be viewed as such.
Consequently, the revolt was seen as an illegitimate act of political
interference on the part of the military, undermining the nature of
civilian control and calling into question the very nature of the civilmilitary contract upon which America’s democracy rests. For scholars
such as Kohn, Owens, and Snider, the revolt was an aberration from
the traditional norm of American civil-military relations, and therefore
a violation of the officers’ “professional ethic.”28 Charles Krauthammer,
a Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist and television commentator,
characterized the generals’ actions as “alien to America.”29 Damon
Coletta, a professor of political science at the US Air Force Academy,
roundly criticized Shinseki for violating the civil-military bargain by
publicly opining on force levels that were “beyond his official purview”
and in a public forum. The implication was that even by responding to
Congress’s constitutional mandate for oversight, General Shinseki was

25     Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” National Interest,
no. 35 (Spring, 1994): 3–17; Kohn, “An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations: Four reactions to
Kohn’s article in our Spring 1994 issue, together with a response from the author,” National Interest,
no. 36 (Summer 1994), 23–31; Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United
States Today,” Naval War College Review 55, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 7–59; Kohn. “Coming Soon: A
Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” World Affairs 170, no. 3 (Winter 2008): 69–80; “Rummy & His
Generals: An AFJ Roundtable on the State of American Civil-Military Relations.”
26     Colin Powell, “Why Generals Get Nervous,” New York Times, October 8, 1992; and Kohn,
“Erosion,” 19.
27     Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Rumsfeld, the Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military
Relations,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 71.
28     Owens, “Rumsfeld,” 68; Don M. Snider, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military
Professions,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 8, 2008, 4; Don M. Snider,
“E-Notes Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, February 2008.
29     Charles Krauthammer, “The Generals’ Dangerous Whispers,” Washington Post, April 21, 2006.
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“shirking” as defined by Peter Feaver, a professor of political science at
Duke University.30
Owens laid out the case against the dissenting officers:
Uniformed officers have an obligation to stand up to civilian leaders if
they think a policy is flawed. They convey their concerns to civilian policy
makers forcefully and truthfully. If they believe the door is closed to them
at the Pentagon or the White House, they have access to Congress. But the
American tradition of civil-military relations requires that they not engage in
public debate over matters of foreign policy, including the decision to go to
war. . . . The idea that a general or admiral—including those on the retired
list—should publicly attack government policy and its civilian authors,
especially in time of war, is dangerous.31

Other scholars rejected this description of danger and saw the revolt
as a long overdue opportunity to discuss the nature of American civilmilitary relations and reexamine the proper role of the military in the
development of political/military policy.32
Once the revolt erupted in 2006, members of the officer corps and
academic community debated several questions. First, was the Ridgway
model still the standard of professional conduct? Second, to what extent
did the revolt constitute an aberration from the traditional professional
ethic? If one assumes the traditional Ridgway model has always been and
still is the standard, then the revolt must be, by definition, an aberration
from that norm.
We do, however, have to consider whether the traditional model
is being replaced by a new standard of conduct. Feaver believed we
may be in the midst of a transition with the “emergence of a norm
among American military officers that civilian control does not mean
that civilians have the right to be wrong.”33 Finally, what exactly was
the nature of the revolt and how did it fit within the contours of civilrelations theory?

Nature of the Revolt

The allegations levied as a result of the revolt by the generals fall into
two categories, and each relate to a typology of civil-military relations.
The first, and the one that has received the most attention and criticism
30     Damon Coletta, “Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki’s
Testimony before the Iraq War,” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 1 (October 2007): 109; Paul R.
Camacho and William Locke Hauser, “Civil-Military Relations—Who are the Real Principals? A
Response to ‘Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki’s Testimony before
the Iraq War,’” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 1 (October 2007): 122; Matthew Moten, “‘The Stuff
of Tragedy,’ Shinseki’s Reply to Levin,” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 3 (April 2008): 509; Mackubin
Thomas Owens, “The General Choice: Shinseki returns,” National Review (accessed August 13,
2009); Tom Ricks, “Scolding Donald Rumsfeld,” Washington Post, July 30, 2008; and Peter D. Feaver,
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2003), 59, 68.
31     Owens, “Rumsfeld,” 79.
32     Martin L. Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics,” Parameters 37,
no. 1 (Spring 2008): 4–15; John Garofano, “Effective Advice in Decision for War: Beyond Objective
Control,” Orbis 52, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 238–54.
33     Feaver, Armed Servants, 300.
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from commentators, claims the Defense Department’s civilian leaders
substituted their own preferences for those of the military experts
while ignoring “the advice of seasoned officers [and] denying [military]
subordinates a chance for input.”34 To accomplish this, senior military
officers were so intimidated they acquiesced in the administration’s
decisions.35 As Batiste wrote, the country “deserve[s] competent leaders
who do not lead by intimidation, who understand that respect is a two-way
street, and who do not dismiss sound military advice.”36 This first set
of allegations arises out of objective civilian control. The second set
of allegations addresses the administration’s failure to consider broader
aspects of the war’s political/military environment and raises issues not
normally considered military in nature.
The principal claim that the Bush administration rejected the
advice of the military experts was related to the military perception
that the civilians lacked experience or expertise in those areas. Former
commander of US Central Command General Norman Schwartzkopf’s
concern was decisions, contrary to professional military advice,
were made by “somebody who doesn’t have any of that training [or
experience].”37 A former US Central Command commander, Joseph
P. Hoar, probably spoke for many of the dissenting officers when he
described Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz as “a very bright
guy, but he doesn’t know anything about war-fighting, and I suspect less
about counterinsurgency operations.”38
To gain agreement for their policy preferences, the civilians forced
acquiescence on the military. This heavy handedness is not a new issue.
Administrations since the end of World War II have attempted to impose
policy preferences on the military, and the military has consistently
resisted. From the military’s perspective, such forced acquiescence
prevented its leaders from “generating independent military advice as
they had a legal obligation to do.”39
Implicitly, the retired general officers were responding to the
administration’s acceptance of Eliot Cohen’s normative model of civilian
intrusive management outlined in his 2002 book Supreme Command:
Soldiers, Statesman and Leadership in Wartime.40 Cohen, a professor at Johns
Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS),
rejects Huntington’s argument for operational autonomy for the military
on two grounds: it violates Clausewitz’s maxim that war is an extension
34     Eaton, “Top-Down Review.”
35     Newbold, “Why Iraq Was a Mistake.”
36     Batiste, “A Case for Accountability.” Interview with Joseph P. Hoar, Frontline, August 9, 2004.
37     Thomas Ricks, “Desert Caution,” Washington Post, January 28, 2003.
38     Joseph P. Hoar, “The Neo-Cons Have Had Their Day; Now It’s Time for a Clean Sweep,”
interview, Executive Intelligence Review 31, no. 20 (May 21, 2004): 14–19; and Joseph P. Hoar, “Press
Roundtable,” interview by Philip J. Crowley, September 23, 2005, ThinkProgress (blog).
39     Woodward, State of Denial, 403–4, 470; and General Batiste in Margolick, “Night of the
Generals.”
40     Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesman and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free
Press, 2002); and Anthony Zinni, “The Obligation to Speak the Truth” (lecture, William E. Simon
Center for the Professional Military Ethic, US Naval War College, Spring 2003).
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of policy, and the military’s professionalism does not necessarily result
in better policy decisions. Since wars are fought so rarely, Cohen argues,
a military professional has had no more actual practice leading large
armies in combat and making strategic decisions during wartime than
the civilian leaders.
Moreover, civilian leaders access different types of information and
have different views of the situation.41 Thus, civilian leadership should
actively intervene in the military’s operational decisions to guarantee
they are compatible with the state’s political aims and the civilian’s
operational goals. While Cohen’s approach supplied a rationale for the
administration’s involvement in military matters, the retired officers saw
it differently.
The difficulty is when you have civilian leadership who are professionally
unschooled. . . . [Secretaries such as McNamara and Rumsfeld are] ignorant
of military operations, of strategy and policy. The effect is normally they’re
disdainful of those they lead. And then, as they begin to increase their
power, they become arrogant, and they’re unwilling to accept advice, even
though they claim they are willing to accept the advice . . . at some point they
reach where they think they’re above the law. . . . And I believe in the case of
Mr. Rumsfeld, we’ve reached that.42

A series of specific allegations flowed from the claim that the
administration rejected professional military advice. The first was that
the civilians micromanaged the war. Eaton figuratively referred to the
“8,000-mile screwdriver” that allowed the Pentagon to intrude into a
variety of decisional processes, especially prewar planning and decisions
regarding resource allocation for postcombat stabilization operations.43
Batiste stated the administration’s micromanagement “radically
alter[ed] . . . 12 years of deliberate and continuous planning.”44 A number
of retired general/flag officers, including Eaton and Newbold, refer
to Shinseki’s testimony and his subsequent treatment. For them, the
testimony not only epitomized Ridgway’s obligation to speak fearlessly
and honestly but reflected the administration’s desire to stifle such
discussion even though it was constitutionally required.45
Micromanagement is also linked to a separate set of allegations—
the Bush administration failed to understand the nature of the
counterinsurgency in Iraq and intruded into the military’s operational
decisions once the insurgency began. According to Eaton, Rumsfeld’s
decisions and the Quadrennial Defense Review reflected a lack of
41     Richard B. Meyers and Richard H. Kohn, “The Military’s Place,” response to Desch, “Salute
and Obey,” Foreign Affairs, 86 no. 5 (Sept/Oct 2007), 147.
42     Paul Van Riper, Frontline, “Rumsfeld’s War;” the page for interviews; the page for military
officers; the page for Paul Van Riper” interview by Frontline, Frontline, PBS, July 8, 2004.
43     Eaton, “Top-Down Review”; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2006); and, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The
Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).
44     Batiste, “A Case for Accountability”; the website for NBC News, Meet the Press, “MTP
Transcript for April 15, 2007,” interview of Tony Zinni by Tim Russert, MSNBC, April 15, 2007;
and Van Riper, “Rumsfeld’s War.”
45     Eaton, “Top-Down Review”; and Newbold, “Why Iraq was a Mistake.”
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understanding of “the nature of protracted counterinsurgency warfare
in Iraq and the demands it places on the ground forces.”46 Former
commander of the Coalition Ground Forces Lieutenant General Ricardo
Sanchez described in his memoir how political decisions intruded into
operations in Fallujah to widespread dismay.47
A final military-related set of allegations claimed the administration
took its eye off the ball by going into Iraq and allowed the insurgency to
break the United States military. A former chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Henry “Hugh” Shelton reflected the concerns of many officers
when he said “it will be hard to sustain the momentum in the war on
terrorism” while simultaneously fighting in Iraq.48 As units redeployed
again and again to Iraq or Afghanistan, the administration’s apparent
disregard of the danger to military effectiveness became a focal point.
One group of retired officers expressed concern in an open letter
to Congress.
The situation in Iraq, grave and deteriorating, is troubling to us both as
former military commanders and as American citizens. Top military officials
have consistently acknowledged that the repeated and lengthy deployments
are straining the [military] forces and are taking a heavy toll on critical
warfighting equipment.49

The claim of micromanagement echoes the military’s criticism
of the McNamara Defense Department during the Vietnam War and
the belief that civilian intrusion into the military’s operational arena
during that conflict was a classic violation of Huntington’s normative
model. For the officer corps, the error of the Vietnam War was more
than micromanagement and civilian intrusion. Instead, the war also
revealed a failure on the part of senior officers to stand up and deliver
the “fearless and forthright expressions of honest, objective professional
opinion” that Ridgway demanded. Colin Powell spoke for them when
he recalled:
Our senior officers knew the war was going badly. Yet they bowed to
groupthink pressure and kept up pretenses. . . . As a corporate entity, the
military failed to talk straight to its political superiors or to itself. . . . Many
in my generation . . . seasoned in that war, vowed that when our turn came
to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for
half-baked reasons the American people could not understand.50

Thus, Powell’s great regret was not McNamara’s graduated approach
to the war, nor Washington’s micromanagement, but that the military
46     Eaton, “Top-Down Review.”
47     Ricardo S. Sanchez and Donald T. Phillips, A Soldier’s Story: Wiser in Battle (New York: Harper,
2009), 347–75.
48     Bradley Graham, “Officers: Iraq could Drain Terror War,” Washington Post, September 1,
2004, A01.
49     Army Lieutenant Generals Robert Gard and William Odom to Congress, March 16, 2007;
Barry McCaffrey quoted in Allison Kent, “U.S. Ground Forces, Broken or Just Bent?” Jewish
Institute of America, October 13, 2007; Jim Lobe, “Retired Generals: Bush is ‘Breaking the Army,’”
Inter Press Service, April 12, 2007; and Mark Thompson, “America’s Broken-Down Army,” Time,
April 5, 2007.
50     Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine, 1995), 149.
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did not stand up to the civilian leadership and articulate their concerns
over whether the war was winnable, especially in the absence of clearly
defined goals and public support.51
The problem for the dissenting officers was that once Rumsfeld had,
in the words of Jones, “systematically emasculated” the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, no institutional entity could supply those fearless and forthright
professional opinions and halt the civilians’ intrusion.52 Newbold
complained, “Never again, we thought, would our military’s senior
leaders remain silent as American troops were marched off to an illconsidered engagement.”53 Historically, the key for any administration
to impose its preferences on the military was the selection of compliant
officers at the top of the organizational chart. According to Eaton,
General Peter Pace, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave
the “impression that our senior man in uniform is just as intimidated by
Rumsfeld as was his predecessor, General Richard Meyers.”54
Related to civilian intrusion into the area of military expertise and
the military’s failure to speak truth to power was the administration’s
tendency to use the military as political cover for its unilateral decisions.
Retired Brigadier General John Johns complained that active duty
officers were being used as “props to make it appear that the military is
united behind [Rumsfeld’s] policy.”55
This resentment that the military was silent during the Vietnam War
in the face of perceived civilian intrusion and strategic incompetence was
encapsulated in H. R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty. For many military
readers, McMaster clearly suggested senior military officers were derelict
in not articulating their concerns about the failing strategy in Vietnam
more forcefully, and if necessary, making those arguments publicly.56
During a 2003 ethics lecture at the United States Naval Academy,
General Anthony Zinni recalled that in 1997 then chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shelton required every service chief and
combatant commander to read Dereliction of Duty so that they would
never “forget what happened in Vietnam and the need to speak out.”
Zinni went on to recall his own lessons from Vietnam in words that
were almost identical to Powell’s.
The generals and admirals that I grew up with and I knew that went through
Vietnam swore to themselves that we wouldn’t let it happen again, that we
would question, that we would comment, that we would take positions
above our own benefit and our own careers.57
51     Powell and Persico, My American Journey, 200, 421.
52     Woodward, State of Denial, 404 (quoting General James Jones).
53     Newbold, “Why Iraq Was a Mistake”; Hoar, “U.S. Policy Toward Iraq”; and Amanda
Carpenter, Human Events, “Reid Gathers Generals to Blast Surge,” Human Events, April 17, 2007.
54     Eaton, “Top Down Review.”
55     Carpenter, “Reid Gathers Generals.”
56     H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998); and Frank G. Hoffman, “Dereliction
of Duty Redux?: Post-Iraq American Civil-Military Relations,” Orbis 52, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 217–35.
57     Zinni, “Obligation.”

TOC

Civil-Military Relations

Binkley

35

The scope of McMaster’s argument is central to understanding the
revolt. Michael Desch believed the “implicit message [in Dereliction of
Duty] is that unqualified allegiance to the commander in chief needs to
be rethought.”58 For critics of the revolt, the retired officers’ reliance
on McMaster’s book was based on a mistaken reading of the book
as was the argument that military leaders had an obligation to voice
their concerns.59 The issue, however, was not what McMaster wanted
to teach the military but instead what the officer corps took from the
book. According to then Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling in his “A
Failure in Generalship” article, “if the general remains silent while the
statesman commits the nation to a war with insufficient means, he shares
culpability for the results.”60
The officers involved in the revolt saw themselves as disregarded
experts with catastrophic results for the nation. But unlike the ideal
objective control model, the officers concluded, based on their own
Vietnam experience and legitimized by McMaster’s research, they had
an obligation to go to the next step and publicize their differences with
the administration.
Subsequently, the retired general officers castigated the
administration on a number of concerns that one would generally
characterize as non-military in nature. One allegation was the failure
of the administration to develop an overall strategy for the war and to
articulate clearly defined political and military goals.
Retired General Jack Sheehan acknowledged he declined the White
House’s offer to take the position of Implementation Manager for the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because there was no overall strategy. As
he put succinctly, “They don’t know where the hell they are going.”61 He
saw no decision-making structure that linked “short-term operations and
strategic objectives that represent long-term US and regional interests.”62
This view is indicative of the military’s belief that the civilians in the
Bush administration did not understand the Clauswitzian relationship
of the military instrument to foreign policy. Sheehan and other retired
general officers felt comfortable critiquing the administration on
this point.
In addition to failing to articulate a war strategy, the administration
was also criticized for destroying the coalition. The destruction of a
coalition that had worked so effectively during the first Gulf War was
problematic to the general officers because, as Newbold noted, those
disenchanted allies “could have helped in a more robust way to rebuild

58     Desch, “Bush and the Generals.”
59     Desch, “Bush and His Generals”; and Meyers et al., “Salute,” 98.
60     Paul Yingling, Armed Forces Journal; “A failure in Generalship,” May 1, 2007; and Andrew
R. Milburn, “Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional,” Joint Force Quarterly 59, no. 4
(October 2010): 101–7.
61     Peter Baker and Thomas Ricks, “3 Generals Spurn the Position of War Czar,” Washington
Post, April 11, 2007.
62     John J. Sheehan, “Why I Declined to Serve,” Washington Post, April 16, 2007.
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Iraq.”63 But the destruction of the coalition also represented a moral
failure in international leadership. In place of that moral leadership,
the administration showed insensitivity “to the concerns of traditional
friends and allies and [distain toward] the United Nations.”64 The
administration’s policies on enhanced interrogation techniques, the
existence of Guantanamo Bay, the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and the
apparent manipulation of intelligence not only negatively affected the
military operations but undermined America’s international position.65
The third major allegation is the administration failed to understand
the internal dynamics of Iraq and to utilize all the resources available to
the US government. Sanchez, in an address before the Military Reporters
and Editors Association in 2007, roundly criticized the administration
failing to “employ and synchronize [the nation’s political power].”
Instead of mobilizing US economic and political power, America relied
solely upon the military alone to achieve victory.66 During Vietnam the
military had identified the same problem—the inability of civilians to
make the hard decisions to mobilize resources necessary to fight the war,
with the primary example of not mobilizing the reserves. To avoid this
problem in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated the reserves
into the total force concept.67 Again, a lesson from Vietnam is reflected
in the concerns of the retired general officers.68

Concluding Thoughts

As Janowitz wrote, as the military begins to consider nonmilitary
factors, it will take a more robust role in policy formulation. Sarkesian
built upon Janowitz’s model of subjective control to argue for a public
voice. Both Janowitz and Sarkesian assumed that as the officer corps
received more exposure to nonmilitary factors through education,
graduate programs, and assignments requiring the internalization of
such factors, it would be only natural for officers to want to participate
in the public policy debate.
The revolt of the generals epitomized both Janowitz’s hypothetical
transformation to subjective control and Sarkesian’s call for a more
robust political discourse on the part of the military. The revolt reflected
two primary concerns. The first focused on traditionally narrow
military issues associated with civilian intrusion into the military sphere
of interest. The second was the failure of the Bush administration to
consider fully nonmilitary factors in its strategic decisions. In both cases,
63     Newbold, Why Iraq was a Mistake”; Batiste, A Case for Accountability”; Ricardo S. Sanchez,
“Military Reporters and Editors Luncheon Address” (address to the Military Reporters and Editors
Association, Washington, DC, October 12, 2007).
64     Diplomats and Military Commander for Change, Official Position, June 16, 2004.
65     Van Riper, “Rumsfeld’s War”; letter to Senator McCain dated October 3, 2005, supporting his
proposed amendment regarding torture which was signed by 26 retired generals and admirals; and
Newbold, “Why Iraq was a Mistake.”
66     Sanchez, “Military Reporters and Editors Luncheon Address.”
67     Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt, From the Battle of the Bulge to Vietnam and Beyond: General Creighton
Abrams and the Army of his Times (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 361–5.
68     Zinni, “Obligation.”
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senior military members found voice in expressing their concern over
the failure of the administration’s policies.
The dissent of senior military members was triggered in 2006 by
the convergence of historical factors. These factors included the senior
officers’ confrontation with their perceived professional failure during
the Vietnam War in light of the decision-making failures of the Bush
administration. Collectively, these factors accelerated the transformation
that Janowitz hypothesized. The result was a broad swath of military
leaders, albeit retired, found their voice and demanded to be heard.
Questions left to consider include: to what extent was the revolt
an aberration from the American model of civil-military relations?
Does the dissent portend the future engagement of the military in the
public decision-making arena? While Kohn and others saw the revolt in
aberrational terms, Feaver is correct to suggest a new norm has emerged,
one that replaces the traditional norm that civilians have the right to be
wrong and the military, without commenting publicly, merely salutes
and implements disastrous policies.
The dissenting officers did expect their voices to be heard. But that
differed little from the traditional notion of advisory voice that Ridgway
personified. The primary difference was the public nature of this voice.
The dissenting officers did not expect their policy preferences would
always be agreed to. During the revolt, a particular group of experts
added its voice to the policy debate hoping its arguments would be
persuasive.
The movement toward Janowitz’s transition has accelerated as
a result of the military’s failure to find its voice during the Vietnam
War and the military’s belief it needed to express its voice during the
Iraq War. A fundamental change in the attitude of the military toward
participating in public dialogue has taken place. The effect will be more
constructive military criticism of civilian leadership, which will have
the positive effect of making available to the public a clearer expression
of military expertise. This result was what Sarkesian called for in 1998.
Such a practice will improve America’s civil-military relations and the
concomitant decision-making process.
Currently serving senior officers and senior officers of the future,
whether active duty or retired, can learn from recent history and current
events that constructive dissent can save lives. Revisiting past instances
of active duty and retired military officers voicing constructive criticism
of US foreign policy can help maintain healthy civil-military relations.
Dissention does not have to be a revolt. Constructive criticism within
the channels and contours of civilian control and military responsiveness
can improve readiness without sacrificing diplomacy and peaceful
human relations. Tragic wars can be shortened and better understood
with engaged discourse.
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Are Retired Flag Officers Overparticipating
in the Political Process?
Zachary E. Griffiths
ABSTRACT: Retired United States general and flag officers
participate politically as individuals and in groups. Purportedly,
participation damages civil-military relations. But this article argues
these activities, including but not limited to endorsements of
candidates, do little harm to US democratic institutions and to the
nonpartisan reputation of the military institution.

W

ith every presidential election, the public turns toward retired
general and flag officers to see whom they will endorse. Senior
leaders such as Retired General Martin E. Dempsey and
Retired Admiral Michael G. Mullen have criticized these endorsements
despite also participating in the political process themselves. This article
presents the first holistic description of retired flag officer participation
in politics. Drawing on the participation typology of Joakim Ekman
and Erik Amnå, this research finds retired general officers participate
politically in nearly every manner, individually and collectively.1 It also
finds, in contrast with other scholarship, that current levels of political
participation by retired general officers do not significantly harm civilmilitary relations.
In 2016, Dempsey penned an op-ed in USA TODAY, encouraging
professional athletes to “stand and pay it forward for what you think
America should do” instead of kneeling to protest police brutality.2 A
month earlier, however, he wrote, “retired generals and admirals can
but should not become part of the public political landscape.”3 Dempsey
aimed his criticism solely at participation by retired flag officers in
formal partisan politics, while he himself participates politically in many
other ways.
Political participation is more than just voting. It includes a
range of activities such as “voting, persuading, campaigning, giving,
contacting, attending, and signing.”4 In one guide for servicemembers,
the Department of Defense authorizes “voting and making a personal

1     Joakim Ekman and Erik Amnå, “Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a New
Typology,” Human Affairs 22, no. 3 (January 1, 2012): 283–300.
2     Martin E. Dempsey, “Why We Stand for the Flag: Gen. Dempsey,” USA TODAY, September
18, 2016.
3     Martin E. Dempsey, “Keep Your Politics Private, My Fellow Generals and Admirals,” Defense
One, August 1, 2016.
4     Steven J. Rosenstone, John Mark Hansen, and Keith Reeves, Mobilization, Participation, and
Democracy in America (New York: Longman, 2003), 5.
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monetary donation” but prohibits partisan political activities.5 In the
framework chosen for this article, even engagement in civic life and
abstention from politics are characterized as political activities because
of the resulting political impact.
In Dempsey’s case, his wide-ranging civic and political participation
certainly has political consequences. Dempsey sits on boards of nonprofits
and leads the youth participation program of the National Basketball
Association (NBA), the Jr. NBA. The NBA pursues political interests—
new basketball stadiums, favorable regulations, and tax breaks—by
donating and meeting with politicians. During the same election cycle
in which Dempsey criticized his peers, the NBA contributed $190,010
to candidates.6 Several authors agree “Dempsey’s Twitter feed, which
never mentions [Donald] Trump specifically, seems to be a continuing
sub-tweet of the president, hashtagged under ‘#Leadership.’” 7 Through
his political participation, Dempsey seeks change.
Other retired general and flag officers participate politically as
well. But does their political participation harm civil-military relations?
Beyond just endorsing candidates for public office, the manifest political
activities of general and flag officers, their participation in civil society,
and even their disengagement from public affairs have some impact
on government policy and civil-military relations. The first obligation
of military professionals is “to do no harm to the state’s democratic
institutions.”8 Such harm might take three forms. First, political leaders
may lose trust in the advice of military leaders. Second, increased public
expressions of partisan views may undermine trust by political leaders
in the military. Finally, the public may lose trust in the military as a
nonpartisan entity.
The impact of retired general officer political participation is
inconsequential—neither negative nor significant—in our large
and diverse republic. Dempsey and other writers on civil-military
relations scarcely mention retired flag officer voting, donations, board
memberships, or abstention from politics. But they do comment on
their endorsements of presidential candidates every four years.9 Despite
these criticisms of endorsement, current retired general officer political
participation does not significantly harm civil-military relations.
Retired flag officers are exceptional and ambitious former military
officers. They clear at least six promotion hurdles to reach the summit
5     US Department of Defense (DoD), “FAQs Social Media and Political Activities-Guidance for
Members of the Armed Forces,” Standards of Conduct Office, August 31, 2017, 1.
6     Center for Responsible Politics, “Influence & Lobbying/Lobbying/Clients/
ClientProfile:National Basketball Assn: 2018,” OpenSecrets, accessed May 27, 2.
7     Tom Nichols, “Trump Escalates His Assault on Civil-Military Relations,” Atlantic, January 2,
2019; Carol Giacomo, “This General Doesn’t Mention Trump, but His Tweets Speak Volumes,” New
York Times, February 1, 2019; and Paul Szoldra, “Former Joint Chiefs Chairman: Sending Troops To
The Border Is ‘A Wasteful Deployment’,” Task & Purpose, November 2, 2018.
8     Marybeth P. Ulrich and Martin L. Cook, “US Civil Military Relations since 9/11: Issues in
Ethics and Policy Development,” Journal of Military Ethics 5, no. 3 (November 1, 2006): 165.
9     Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, “‘Cashing In’ Stars: Does the Professional Ethic Apply in
Retirement?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015).
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of the Department of Defense’s “up-or-out” system. The military’s
promotion process culls between 6 and 45 percent at each rank between
O-4 and O-6.10 The services promote only about 3.4 percent of O-6s
to O-7—the first general and flag officer rank.11 About 82 general and
flag officers retire each year with 28 to 35 years of service. This body is
small: in 2017, there were 7,428 living retired officers in the O-7 to O-10
pay grade compared to 109,920 officers who retired in the pay grade of
O-6. Despite receiving a comfortable pension at an average of $91,432
per year, general officers often begin a second career in government,
academia, or business.12
After leaving senior positions in the military, flag officers face
frequent criticism for their employment and political decisions after
retiring. Despite the variety of potential paths for retired officers, Retired
Major General Paul D. Eaton suggested about “80 percent of his peers
took ‘less honorable’ jobs in the military-industrial complex.”13 Some
experts criticize this revolving door because of “conflicts of interests
that may arise in such a second act.”14 Beyond defense-related conflicts
of interest, retired general officers may influence the opinions of active
duty personnel or the general public.15
The influence of retired flag officers on the military and general
public concerns many commentators. Of the scholarly articles surveyed
for this article, all but one criticized these endorsements.16 Arguments
critical of candidate endorsements by retired general officers suggest a
slippery slope from such endorsements to three outcomes.17 First, partisan
activities such as endorsements may cause elected leaders to lose trust
in the military’s advice.18 Second, they may increase the politicization of
the active duty force.19 Finally, they may undermine popular perceptions
of the military as nonpartisan.20 The next section explores how retired
10     Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), “Promotion,” Decision Paper
(Arlington, VA: MLDC, February 2011).
11     MLDC, “Promotion.”
12     For the source of the author’s calculations, see DoD “Statistical Report on the Military
Retirement System, Fiscal Year 2017” (Alexandria, VA: Office of the Actuary, 2017), 144; and Ulrich,
“‘Cashing in’ Stars,” 102.
13     Paul Eaton (retired major general), interview by Zachary Griffiths, July 19, 2018.
14     Ulrich, “‘Cashing in’ Stars,” 105.
15     James Golby, Peter Feaver, and Kyle Dropp, “Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion about
the Use of Military Force,” Armed Forces & Society 44, no. 1 (January 2018): 44–71; and, Kori Schake,
“Why Donald Trump’s Endorsement by 88 Generals Is So Dangerous,” Foreign Policy, September
6, 2016.
16     Clifford M. Bayne, “From Stars to Stumps: How Retired Flag Officer Political Endorsements
Effect Civil Military Relations” (master’s thesis, Air University, School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2016); Steve Corbett and Michael J. Davidson, “The Role of the Military in Presidential
Politics,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10): 58–72; Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Military Officers
Political without Partisanship,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 88–101; Richard H.
Kohn, “Tarnished Brass: Is the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?,” World Affairs 171, no. 4 (2009):
73–83; and Richard Swain, “The Obligations of Military Professionalism: Service Unsullied by
Partisanship” (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2010).
17     Martin L. Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics,” Parameters 38,
no. 1 (Spring 2008); and Corbett and Davidson, “Role of the Military,” 58–59, 67–69.
18     Owens, “Military Officers,” 97–99.
19     Swain, “Obligations of Military Professionalism,” 16.
20     Golby, Feaver, and Dropp, “Elite Military Cues,” 60.
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flag officers participate politically and reviews recent political science
research to see whether these concerns are legitimate.

Political Participation

Of all the ways retired flag officers participate in politics, only
endorsing draws negative attention. For example, Dempsey participates
broadly: voting, writing op-eds, leading for-profit and not-forprofit enterprises, and actively not endorsing. Other retired general
officers participate differently, but they all participate. But, negative
commentary focuses overwhelmingly on endorsement, despite the
broad range of activities highlighted. Table 1 details retired flag
officer political and civic participation using Ekman and Amnå’s
participation typology.21
Table 1. General and flag officer participation in politics22

Nonparticipation Civic Participation
Political Participation
Active Passive Social
Civic
Formal
Informal23
Illegal
Individual
X
X
X
X
X
X
Collective
X
X
X
X
X
(X indicates some general and flag officers participate in a specific way)

Previous typographies of political participation focused primarily
on formal and informal political participation. Ekman and Amnå
recognize civil engagement and nonparticipation can be political acts,
and they also recognize people participate as individuals and collectively.
In total, their typology includes three forms of political engagement:
nonparticipation, civic participation, and political participation
(see table 1).
Nonparticipation: Some retired general officers choose not to engage
in politics after retiring because they adhere to the military’s nonpartisan
ethic. The Army Profession reflects this ethic when it states “senior
Army leaders have a direct stewardship responsibility . . . to political
nonpartisanship in the execution of their duty.”24 Nonparticipation can
be active or passive. Dempsey’s op-ed criticizing endorsement is an
example of active nonparticipation—a public statement against political
participation by retired military members. Passive nonparticipation
takes place out of the public eye. “The overwhelming majority of

21     Ekman and Amnå, “Political Participation.”
22     I coded retired general and flag officers as participating in a specific activity if I found any
evidence of that form of participation. I coupled this research with eight interviews focused around
general and flag officer decisions to endorse partisan presidential candidates.
23     Ekman and Amnå describe this category as “extralegal” but “informal participation” better
describes retired general and flag officer participation in this arena.
24     Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), The Army Profession, Army Doctrine
Reference Publication 1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2015), 45.
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retired officers” refrain from politics to avoid politicizing the military.25
Others may leave the military and not participate out of indifference
toward politics. But they still participate passively—even those who
eschew voting are likely to engage in civil society activities, which have
political effects.
Civil engagement: Civil engagement takes two forms. The first form is
social participation. As individuals, retired general and flag officers bring
attention to issues important to them in their interactions with others.
For example, Retired Major General John Batiste hosted a fundraiser
to raise awareness about veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder.26 Others participate socially by joining advocacy groups or
identifying with a political party. According to the Boston Globe, 3 of 39
flag officers retiring in 2007 joined the boards of directors for nonprofit
organizations.27 The other form, civic participation, requires more
personal effort than social participation. Civic-minded retired general
officers attempt to persuade others of their views. Retired General
Stanley McChrystal drew on his status as a “34-year combat veteran”
when he argued in support of the Public Broadcasting Service as a
“small public investment that pays huge dividends for Americans.”28
Collectively, civic-minded individuals volunteer their time with social,
faith-based, or other organizations.
Political participation: In the final category, political participation,
individual retired flag officers engage formally and informally. In their
formal participation, retired general officers individually vote, donate
money to candidates, and lobby. Retired General Colin Powell first
donated money to candidates in 1994, only one year after he retired,
and has since donated 55 times (as of January 2020).29 Research reveals
nearly 80 percent of officers with greater than 21 years of service voted.30
Likewise, 18 percent of officers reported donating money to political
campaigns.31 Beyond voting and donating, at least seven retired admirals
registered as lobbyists between 2000 and 2014 and lobbied on defense
and transportation-related issues.32
Retired flag officers also participate collectively through
organizations. The Flag and General Officer’s Network, established
in 1995 as a social club, is now a 501.C.19 organization “authorized
25     Richard H. Kohn, “Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security,”
in American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and
Don M. Snider (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 283.
26     Robin Kaminski, “Retired U.S. Army General to Head ‘Stand for the Troops’ Fundraiser
Tonight at Mitchells of Westport,” Hour, May 7, 2012.
27     Bryan Bender, “The 2007 Class of Retiring Generals,” Boston Globe, December 26, 2019.
28     Stanley McChrystal, “Stanley McChrystal: Save PBS. It Makes Us Safer,” New York Times,
April 5, 2017.
29     Center for Responsible Politics, “Search/Donor/Colin Powell,” OpenSecrets, accessed May
27, 2018.
30     Jason K. Dempsey, Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 135.
31     Dempsey, Our Army, 133.
32     Center for Responsible Politics, “Official Position Lookup for ‘Admiral,’” OpenSecrets,
August 1, 2018.
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to engage in active participation with the U.S. Congress and federal
government” on military issues.33 Other retired general officers lead
or join the boards of directors for large nonprofit organizations that
lobby the government. After Retired Admiral Patrick M. Walsh left the
Navy in 2012, he joined the board of the Veterans of Foreign Wars
Foundation. That foundation employs a full-time lobbyist and donated
an average of $85,000 a year between 2014 and 2018.34 Historically, the
predecessors of veterans’ organizations, like the Society of the Cincinnati
in the post-Revolutionary War period, have drawn negative attention.
But today, veterans organizations are broadly accepted as part of the
political process.
Informal participation, the next category of political participation,
includes legal efforts to persuade political leaders. When retired flag
officers endorse as individuals, they fall into this category. An individual
endorser in the 2014 elections, McChrystal spoke carefully for only
himself when he endorsed Representative Seth Moulton of Massachusetts
and Retired Major General Irving L. Halter Jr. of Colorado.35 Other
retired general and flag officers endorse collectively.
Following a political endorsement by Retired General Paul X.
Kelley in 1988, collective endorsements exploded, reaching their peak
when 501 retired flag officers endorsed Governor Mitt Romney in
2012.36 By matching endorsements with campaign contribution data,
researchers found retired general officers endorse largely because of
their social connections, suggesting interpersonal connections play a
more important role in endorsements than political preferences or desire
for material advancement.37 This work built on a 2012 survey that found
a significant though small impact of retired flag officer endorsements
on low-information and independent voters.38 Beyond presidential
candidates, retired general officers collectively endorse around issues,
such as higher physical education standards, support for the State
Department, gun control, and nuclear missile defense.39
The final category of political participation is illegal participation
including political violence or terrorism. There were no examples of
retired flag officer participation in these behaviors.
33     “About Us,” Flag and General Officers’ Network, “About Us,” accessed January 15, 2020.
34     Center for Responsible Politics, “Influence&Lobbying/Clients/Veterans of Foreign
Wars/2018,” OpenSecrets, accessed August 1, 2018.
35     Martin Matishak, “McChrystal Wades into Midterm Races,” The Hill, August 28, 2014.
36     Campaigns recruit retired general and flag officers from all ranks to support their candidates.
Between 2004 and 2016, 110 O-10, 278 O-9, and 952 O-8 and O-7 retired officers made
endorsements. Author’s calculations.
37     Zachary Griffiths and Olivia Simon, “Not Putting Their Money Where Their Mouth Is:
Retired Flag Officers and Presidential Endorsements,” Armed Forces & Society, December 9, 2019.
38     James Golby, Kyle Dropp, and Peter Feaver,, “Military Campaigns: Veterans Endorsements
and Presidential Elections,” (Washington DC: Center for New American Security, October 2012).
39     Tom Lisi, “Retired Generals Oppose Grand Bargain’s Lower Phys Ed Standards,” NPR
Illinois, February 22, 2017; US Global Leadership Coalition, “Over 120 Retired Generals, Admirals,
on State and USAID Budget: ‘Now Is Not the Time To Retreat: The Letter,’” February 27, 2017;
Veterans Coalition for Common Sense to Mitch McConnell et al., letter, March 14, 2017; and “Read:
An Open Letter from Retired Generals and Admirals Opposing the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Open
Letter, August 25, 2015.
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Retired general officers are citizens with interests. No one should
be surprised when such officers engage in politics across the entire
typography, both individually and collectively. Of the 11 forms of
participation retired flag officers engage in, only collective endorsements
garner significant criticism from military professionals and scholars of
civil-military relations (see table 2). This criticism may occur because
it is hard to distinguish retired flag officer private political action from
political positions taken based on military expertise. The collective
nature of these endorsements, with headlines focused on the number of
retired general officers involved, make differentiation even harder and
at least partly explains the negative reception.
Table 2. Criticism for retired general and flag officer endorsements of presidential
candidates by military professionals and scholars of civil-military relations

Nonparticipation Civic Participation
Political Participation
Active Passive Social
Civic
Formal
Informal
Illegal
Individual
X
X
X
X
X
X
Collective
X
X
X
C
X
(X indicates some general and flag officers participate in a specific way; C indicates the activity is
widely criticized)

Endorsement is distasteful to those familiar with Samuel P.
Huntington’s theory of objective control, which expresses concern about
the state of civil-military relations. In his op-ed criticizing retired flag
officer endorsements, Dempsey argued endorsing a candidate is different
than running for office because elected officials are accountable to the
voter.40 Also, individual endorsements from retired general officers open
each individual to public criticism as their names appear in the media.
This critique of political stances weighs on some retired flag officers.
In an interview, Retired Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman
expressed concerns his endorsements might undermine his position at
the US Chamber of Commerce.41
Unfortunately, the media rarely highlights individual retired general
or flag officer endorsements because these officers are not well known.42
Retired officers from the reserve component may be known in their
state, but active duty officers move frequently, removing their familiarity
with hometown issues. Without connection to specific places, such
endorsements are most valuable on national security issues. But these
individuals are not well enough known to be picked up by the media as
influential individuals. (Even Dempsey, a former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, leveraged his title in his op-ed on kneeling professional
athletes.)
40     Dempsey, “Keep Your Politics Private.”
41     Daniel W. Christman (retired lieutenant general, US Army; senior counselor for international
affairs at the US Chamber of Commerce), interview by Zachary Griffiths, February 14, 2018.
42     For a rare exception, see McChrystal, “Save PBS.”
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Impact on Civil-Military Relations

Notwithstanding the relatively rare cases of political endorsements
by individual retired general officers, concerns have been raised about the
effects of these individual and collective endorsements. This article will
now evaluate three theorized harms to civil-military relations resulting
from endorsements. First, elected leaders may lose trust in military advice
if retired flag officers endorse candidates.43 Second, endorsements may
lead the active duty force to assert increasingly political views.44 Finally,
endorsements may undermine the confidence in the military that is
rooted in the view of the military as nonpartisan.45
The concern that a president may lose trust in his military advisors is
reasonable. Presidents nominate the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
from a small pool of existing senior military officers. Some evidence
exists indicating presidents nominate politically sympathetic officers for
senior posts when their copartisans control Congress, making it less
likely a president will distrust the chairman.46 However, if the president
loses trust in the chairman, the National Security Council might make
worse decisions or miss important military considerations.
Unfortunately for this theory, case-based research presents
limited evidence that retired general officer endorsements undermine
relationships between senior active duty military members and political
leaders. In a study on the impact of high-profile individual endorsements
on civil-military relations, of six cases considered, only Admiral William
Crowe’s endorsement of then Governor Bill Clinton undermined trust
between the military and then President George H. W. Bush.47 Crowe
retired as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Bush in 1989
and joined Clinton’s campaign in 1992. After Crowe’s endorsement of
Clinton, Bush said, “I was pretty disappointed in Bill Crowe.”48 The study
concluded that personal relationships between the president and senior
military officers exacerbate or reduce trust concerns, but broader impacts
on civil-military relations by endorsements are limited by the public’s
ability to “distinguish between the individual and the organization.”49
With the increasing number of endorsements since Kelley’s
groundbreaking first endorsement, military members may have taken
a cue from retired flag officers to participate more. As previously
mentioned, political activity of active-duty servicemembers is restricted
by the Department of Defense.50 After retiring, however, the political
activities of flag officers may set an example of increased partisanship
43     Owens, “Military Officers,” 97–99.
44     Swain, “Obligations of Military Professionalism,” 16.
45     Golby, Feaver, and Dropp, “Elite Military Cues,” 60.
46     James Golby, “Duty, Honor . . . Party? Ideology, Institutions, and the Use of Military Force”
(PhD diss., Stanford University, 2011), 129.
47     Bayne, “Stars to Stumps,” 57.
48     Bayne, “Stars to Stumps,” 58.
49     Bayne, “Stars to Stumps,” 59.
50     DoD, Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces on Active Duty, Directive 1344.10
(Washington, DC: DoD, 2008), 1.
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or participation for those still in the ranks. As more retired general
officers endorse political candidates, some would expect active duty
servicemembers also to participate more.
In surveys of military members’ political participation in 2004 and
2009, some scholars found limited evidence that participation changed
during the period when endorsing became more common.51 These years
align closely with the 2004 and 2008 presidential election cycles where
343 and 311 retired flag officers endorsed presidential candidates, the
second- and third-largest number of endorsing general officers.52
Despite the increasingly prominent role of retired flag officers in
presidential politics, however, officer corps’ political activities remained
remarkably stable over time. On the subject of donations and public
partisan displays, 2010 survey results “closely mirror [ Jason] Dempsey’s
findings” from 2005.53 These findings indicate “Army officers’ political
views remained intact and largely unaffected by combat deployments”
and their active duty service in general.54
Although the negative effects of political participation by retired flag
officers are limited with regard to high-level civil-military relations or as
this participation influences active-duty servicemembers, such activities
by prominent military experts might still undermine public trust in the
military as a nonpartisan institution. Researchers proposed and tested a
similar idea: cues from military endorsers about the use of force could
influence a public with low interest in foreign affairs. Based on a series of
surveys of 12,000 respondents, some research concludes endorsements
can move public opinion, especially if an individual is Republican or the
military recommends against the use of force.55
A similar mechanism could work with public confidence in the
military overall. Visibly increased political participation by retired
general and flag officers might reduce public confidence in a nonpartisan
military for those who disagree with these officers’ positions. Fortunately,
national polls have collected data on confidence in the military since
retired general officers started endorsing presidential candidates in 1988.
Surprisingly, the rise of retired general and flag officer endorsements
corresponded with increased confidence in the military as an institution.
Between 1988 and 2016, Gallup surveys report a 15 percent increase
in the public reporting a great deal or quite a lot of confidence
in the military.56
Over the same period, the total retired flag officer endorsements
in presidential election cycles increased from 1 to 180, with a peak of
506 endorsements in 2012.57 Increased general officer endorsements are
51     Dempsey, Our Army; and Heidi A. Urben, “Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party,
Politics, and the Profession of Arms” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2010).
52     Griffiths and Simon, “Retired Flag Officers,” 2.
53     Urben, “Civil-Military Relations,” 93.
54     Urben, “Civil-Military Relations,” 152.
55     Golby, Feaver, and Dropp, “Elite Military Cues,” 54.
56     “Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup, accessed August 2, 2018.
57     Griffiths and Simons, “Retired Flag Officers,” 2.
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strongly correlated with confidence in the military. Though oversimplified
and omitting other possible explanatory variables, a linear model with
the count of retired flag officer endorsements on public opinion finds
that each endorsement is associated with a 2.67 percent increase in public
opinion.58 While a causal relationship between retired general and flag
officer political endorsements and public confidence in the military is
unlikely, this provides evidence increased participation by these officers
has not significantly undermined public trust.
In short, the impacts of political participation by retired general
officers appears very limited and perhaps is constrained to cases where
participation undermined trust in personal relationships between
politicians and flag officers. As previously discussed, in only one of six
cases did endorsement undermine trust with politicians.59 Active duty
officers maintained a constant level of political participation throughout
the period of increased participation by retired general officers. Finally,
increased participation by flag officers did not undermine confidence in
the military but is associated with a period of increased trust.

Conclusion

Like other people, retired general officers participate in politics in
a variety of ways for many reasons. Some of these officers retire and
then abstain from high-profile political participation. The nonpartisan
ethic inculcated through several decades of service pushes many in this
direction. Others choose to participate in civic life, either individually
or collectively. Leaning on their military experience, many retired
flag officers write op-eds to influence policy debates or on behalf of
organizations they support. Politically, general officers participate in
nearly every way. A few run for office while most vote and others chose
to endorse candidates either as individuals or collectively. A select few
register as lobbyists. None engage in violent or illegal protest. In short,
retired flag officers participate in political life like other civilians.
While the increase in political endorsements by general officers
has been a cause for concern, recent political science research
indicates the nature of current retired general and flag officer political
participation does limited harm to civil-military relations. Flag officers
are high-profile individuals who capture the attention of researchers of
civil-military relations and the general public when they participate in
collective political endorsements. Yet despite this participation, none of
the theorized harms to civil-military relations has occurred.
Relationships between serving general officers and politicians
remain firm. As of December 2019, the US Senate continues to confirm
general and flag officers by voice vote—hardly an indication of mistrust

58     Using r statistical software, the author calculated this linear regression coefficient with the
dependent variable being Gallup’s confidence in the military (great deal / quite a lot) from Note
57 and the number of endorsements as gathered by Griffiths and Simon between 1988 and 2019.
59     Bayne, “Stars to Stumps,” 61.
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in military officers by national political leaders.60 Likewise, the active
military is less partisan today than when party politics were pushed
out of the military “by ending the practice of electing officers.”61
Today’s troops vote in elections and abide by policies limiting political
expression. Finally, confidence in the military remains high, perhaps
because of its culture of selflessness, absence from domestic politics, or
its distance from the average citizen.62 Increased participation by retired
flag officers has not impacted this confidence. General officer political
participation has not undermined civil-military relations in at least these
three areas.
Although available evidence indicates few challenges to civil-military
relations, researchers must continue to investigate why civil-military
relations in the United States remain stable while other nations suffer
from military coups. Where Clifford M. Bayne focused on individual
endorsements, future research should consider how senior government
officials, the media, and the voters interpret endorsements and other
political participation. Comparative analyses involving other countries
could be especially illuminating.
Researchers could also consider why political participation is
different for these retired senior officers. As private citizens, they are free
to participate politically. However, discerning private political sentiments
from those expressed based on military expertise is challenging,
and retired general officers cannot escape their military credentials.
Deeper understanding of this tension could help us better understand
this participation.
Quantitative methods could also generate answers. As noted earlier,
confidence in the military increased from 1988 to 2016, suggesting the
public’s view of the military is not swayed by endorsements. But there may
be measurable changes in civil-military relations at lower levels. Textual
analysis of Congressional hearings could indicate whether collective
endorsements impact the policymaking or nomination processes.
Finally, surveys could unpack assumptions about the interpretations of
collective endorsements by the public.
Flag officers maintain high profiles after retiring, which may lead
civil-military researchers to overly focus on their behavior. In other
countries, retired general officers can wreak havoc. Fortunately for
the United States, retired flag officers participate in politics like other
citizens. This participation does not significantly harm civil-military
relations. Barring major shifts in American politics, political activities of
retired general officers are unlikely to significantly undermine political
and public trust or politicize active duty troops.

60     “PN1253 – Air Force,” United States Senate, 116th Congress (2019-2020), November 12,
2019; “PN1287 – Maj. Gen. Douglas M. Gabram – Army,” United States Senate, 116th Congress
(2019-2020), December 18, 2019; and “Nominations Confirmed (Non-Civilian),” United States
Senate, February 28, 2019.
61     Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative
Capacities, 1877–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 93.
62     Andrew A. Hill, Leonard Wong, and Stephen J. Gerras, “‘Self-Interest Well Understood’:
The Origins & Lessons of Public Confidence in the Military,” Daedalus 142, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 54.
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ABSTRACT: In response to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in
2015, the Houthis transformed quickly from a local insurgent group
to a nonstate actor able to defy regional powers. The Houthis’ ability
to lay the foundation for a nascent strategy of compellence provides
important lessons on the growing accessibility and affordability of
sophisticated weapons’ systems and the likelihood future violent
extremist groups will opt for this military posture as well.

S

ince the beginning of the war in Yemen in March 2015, Ansar
Allah (commonly known as the Houthis) have been using
missiles and drones against military targets belonging to the
Saudi-led coalition. The Houthis have also attacked civilian targets deep
inside Saudi Arabia and possibly inside the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The frequency of these attacks has become a common feature of the
conflict—in 2018, the Houthis reportedly launched one missile attack
nearly every week.1 In this context, this article considers the evolution of
the Houthi way of war from its first insurgency campaigns in 2004–11
to the ongoing conflict. It then assesses how the Houthis have built an
effective strategy of compellence against conventional armed forces using
missiles and drones, one explicitly inspired by Hezbollah’s strategy in
south Lebanon during the 1992–2000 period. This article concludes with
some implications of this emerging pattern of nonstate actor warfare.
Missile attacks are obviously not the only tactics employed by the
Houthis. Since the war started in 2015, the group has launched numerous
ground offensives and, in particular, raids at the Saudi Arabia border
that sometimes led to spectacular results.2 Moreover, it can be argued
the use of missiles and drones is nothing new and neither is its strategic
significance, especially in the Middle East.3 During the Second Lebanon
War (July 2006) Hezbollah in Lebanon was able to fire missiles at Israel
for 34 days despite a massive air campaign conducted by the Israeli Air
Force.4 Likewise, Hamas and other Palestinian groups have, over the

1     “Houthis,” Missile Threat and Proliferation: Today’s Missile Threat: Non-State Actors, Missile
Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessed January 7, 2020.
2     See as a recent illustration, Patrick Wintour, “Houthis Claim to Have Killed 500 Saudi Soldiers
in Major Attack,” Guardian, September 29, 2019.
3     Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
4     Stephen D. Biddle and Jeffrey Allan Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of
Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College, 2008).
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past decade, moved away from suicide bombings and now use rockets as
their primary means of attacking southern Israeli cities.
At the same time, the damages suffered by Saudi forces and some
of the country’s critical infrastructures (airports, oil fields) highlight
the difficulties of defending civilian and military targets against these
systematic attacks, leading to the question of the ability of missile
defense systems to secure troops on the battlefield as well as civilians
and infrastructures far away from the conflict.
The Yemeni case provides striking lessons for military planners.
The evolution of the conflict reflects a fast-paced escalation of missile
and drone attacks, underlining the gradual centrality of missile warfare
for the Houthis. Compared to Hezbollah or Hamas, the ability of the
Houthis to store a robust inventory of weapons and train their combatants
to use them effectively suggests significant acceleration in the strategic
and operational learning process of nonstate actors. Therefore, it is very
likely other groups will be tempted to emulate this strategy in the future.
While partly the creation of the Houthis, this nascent strategy was
made possible through the support of ex-officers from the Saleh regime
and the deployment of advisers and capabilities from Hezbollah and the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But these factors do not
render irrelevant the Houthis’ demonstrated ability to adapt.
A strategy of compellence is more than mere harassment and
differs from deterrence. In the words of Thomas Schelling, “There is
typically a difference between a threat intended to make an adversary do
something (or cease doing something) and a threat intended to keep him
from starting something.”5 Schelling adds, “The threat that compels
rather than deters, therefore, often takes the form of administering the
punishment until the other acts, rather than if he acts.”6 In this context,
the Houthis use missiles to hold their power and to force the Saudi
coalition into accepting the territorial status quo. As of this writing, it
remains to be seen if this strategy will be successful. Nonetheless, the
ability of the movement to prolong the war and deny the coalition any
breakthrough has been significant enough to consider its implications
for future warfare.

Houthi Military Education

The Houthis are not a new phenomenon in Yemen: the group
emerged in 1992, only two years after the unification of Yemen, in
Sa’dah governorate, one of the poorest northern areas of the country.
A Zaydi Shiite revivalist political movement under the leadership of the
Houthi family, the Houthis were part of the parliamentary system in
the country from 1993 to 1997.7 In the following years, the relationship
5     Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960),
195 (italics in the original).
6     Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 196 (italics in the original).
7     Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-liberalism and the Disintegration of a State (London:
Saqi Books, 2017), 147–67.
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between the Houthi leadership and the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh
steadily deteriorated. Saleh proved unable to administer much-needed
governance for the Sa’dah region in terms of infrastructure, social
welfare, education, and security. This lack of governance exacerbated
local feelings of marginalization and fueled the rising anti-regime
rhetoric of the Houthis that paved the way for open confrontation.8
Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis fought no less than six wars
against the regime of Saleh. These conflicts were short—usually a few
months—and ended with inconclusive military wins by the government
that temporarily ceased hostilities.9 At the outset, the Houthi mobilization
looked like a mere revolt designed to challenge the local authorities
in Sa’dah. The Saleh regime dismissed giving any social legitimacy to
insurgent demands, portraying the insurgents as mere proxies of Iran
and Lebanese Hezbollah. But the movement was able to gather forces
rapidly and expand to adjacent regions: by 2008, the revolt was already
getting close to the capital, Sanaa.
Throughout these conflicts, the Houthis morphed into an
insurgency that launched surprise attacks, used hit-and-run tactics,
and conducted ambushes against the Yemeni army. They used local
connections and illicit trafficking to wage a protracted war against state
authorities.10 The first rounds of the conflict involved demonstrations
and close fighting between Houthi combatants and government forces
in the Marran Mountains. Overall, the early Houthi way of war was
rudimentary. A RAND report published in 2010 described the Houthis
as a loose organization that relied on “unconnected fighting groups.”11
In response, the armed forces of the Saleh regime conducted
indiscriminate air strikes and shelling in the Sa’dah region, especially at
rebel camps and villages supporting the movement, and tried to change
local power plays by supporting its own proxies against the Houthis.12
Author Uzi Rabi described the evolution of the rebellion as one moving
from a “consistent nuisance” to an “existential threat” for the regime.13
The conflict between Saleh and the Houthis quickly became part of
the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. From 2004 onward,
Saudi Arabia supported the Yemeni state apparatus against the Houthi
insurgency.14 By 2009, as the latter started extending its operations into
southern Saudi Arabia, Saudi air and ground forces were deployed to the
8     Ginny Hill, Yemen Endures: Civil War, Saudi Adventurism and the Future of Arabia (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017), chap. 10.
9     For a detailed examination of the 2004–10 wars, see Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen:
A History of the Houthi Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
10     Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture,” CTC
Sentinel 11, no. 8, (September 2018): 16; and International Crisis Group, Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time
Bomb, Middle East Report 86 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 27, 2009).
11     Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen:
The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 238.
12     Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 9–10; Brandt, Tribes and Politics, 154.
13     Uzi Rabi, Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 159.
14     Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service
(CRS) Report R43960 (Washington, DC: CRS, September 17, 2019), 2.
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border, threatening to “clean out” the rebel camps.15 Meanwhile, despite
persistent claims from Saleh and his Saudi allies, the relations between
the Houthis and Iran were rather limited despite several visits to Tehran
between 1994 and 2011 by Badr al Din al Houthi, the founder of the
group, and his son Hussein. Likewise, Hezbollah military operatives
such as Khalil Yusif Harb and Abu Ali Tabatabai reportedly traveled
inside Yemen to meet Houthi leaders before the 2015 conflict started.16
The strategic environment changed dramatically after the Arab
Spring of 2011. Saleh left power in February 2012, replaced by his vice
president Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi who was backed by Saudi Arabia. It
is believed protests leading to the fall of Saleh triggered Iran’s provision
of military and financial assistance to the Houthis, and the shipping of
small arms grew in earnest.17 Meanwhile Saleh, no longer Saudi Arabia’s
partner inside Yemen, soon found common cause with the Houthis—
despite the fact the two fought six wars against each other—against the
Hadi government. This odd alliance would prove decisive in September
2014, enabling the Houthi takeover of Sanaa.
In retrospect, the fall of Sanaa can be read as the culmination of this
decade-long series of conflicts. It highlighted the disintegration of the
Yemeni state, both under Saleh and his successor Hadi, as well as the
growing ability of the Houthis to conquer and seize control of territories
beyond the initial stronghold in Sa’dah.
From 2004 to 2015, there was no record of the Houthis using missiles
against their opponents. In previous conflicts, Houthi combatants fought
in the mountains (in the Haydan district) or in urban areas (Sa’dah,
Kitaf). They used small-to-medium arms such as hand grenades and
usually ambushed or openly attacked government forces.18
The date of the first use of a missile by the Houthis in the conflict
is disputed. According to official Saudi sources, a Scud missile was
intercepted on June 6, 2015, on its way to Abha. But UN experts
mention another strike on June 29, 2015. In either case, the missile attack
occurred between two and three months after Saudi Arabia’s decision
to set up a military coalition to restore the Hadi government.19 In the
following weeks, Houthi attacks inside Saudi Arabia steadily increased
and focused on border areas. Cities including Jizan, Najran, and Khamis
Mushayt were repeatedly targeted.
The focus on border areas occurred simultaneously with the
evolving battle inside Yemen. After the initial conquest of Sanaa in
2014, the Houthis expanded southward to Aden and westward to Al
15     Hill, Yemen Endures, 194.
16     Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Pivot toward the Gulf,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 8 (August 2016).
17     International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East,
Strategic Dossier, (London: IISS, 2019), 162.
18     Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 137–39.
19     UN Security Council, 2140 Sanctions Committee Yemen, Final Report of the Panel of
Experts on Yemen, S/2018/594 (January 26, 2018), 29; and Jean Masson, Les missiles des Houthis:
Prolifération balistique et groupes armés non-étatiques, no. 11/2018 (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche
Stratégique), December 2018.
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Hudaydah. But by the summer of 2015, this momentum was curbed by
the intervention of the coalition and its local partners. A war of static
positions unfolded and coincided with the Houthis increasing reliance
on missile attacks targeting Saudi territory.
In 2016, the Houthis increased the frequency and extended the
range of missile attacks. The attacks in 2015 were conducted using
Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. Starting in February 2016, the Burkan-1
and Burkan-2H were reportedly introduced on the Yemeni battleground
allowing the Houthis to reach more distant targets.20 Moreover, the
missiles did not just target the forces of the coalition; they were also
aimed at Saudi territory and at ships crossing the Red Sea. By midOctober 2016, the Houthis started engaging targets further north in
Saudi Arabia: a ballistic missile was fired at the Taif military base and
later that month, the Saudi forces reported the interception of a missile
near Mecca.21 During that same period, the group also used an anti-ship
missile in the Red Sea to strike a UAE vessel.
The series of attacks in late 2016 clearly signaled the Houthis’
improvement in employment of missiles. Saudi military sites were the
initial priorities. But civilian infrastructures were soon in the line of
sight: in July 2017, oil facilities near the city of Yanbu were targeted.
In November of that same year, King Khaled International Airport in
Riyadh came under attack. Noticeably in this last case, the missile had to
travel about 900 km to reach the Saudi capital—a range clearly beyond
that of the missiles stored by the Saleh regime.
Soon the UAE, Saudi Arabia’s closest ally and biggest contributor to
the war, also became a target. In December 2017, the Houthis declared
they had launched a cruise missile at the Barakah nuclear reactor in
the emirate of Abu Dhabi. But no signs of destruction were visible or
reported, and Emirati authorities subsequently denied the claim. On
July 26, 2018, the Houthis announced they had attacked Abu Dhabi
International Airport with a drone named the Samad-3. The Emirati
government again denied the attack. It acknowledged an incident had
occurred at the airport but said there was no evidence the facilities had
suffered any damage. Moreover, air traffic management was operating at
a normal pace after the supposed attack. A month later, a similar claim
was made regarding a drone attack against the Dubai International
Airport, the third busiest airport in the world. But once again, no sign
of any destruction was visible.22
In addition to firing ballistic missiles, the Houthis have recently
employed other tactics. In January 2017, the Saudi frigate Al Madinah
was attacked by “suicide boats” near the Al Hudaydah port in the Red
20     Jean Masson, Les missiles des Houthis, 8.
21     US Institute of Peace, “Timeline of Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia,” Iran Primer (blog),
September 16, 2019.
22     “UAE Denies Report of Houthi Drone Attack on Dubai Airport,” Reuters, August 27, 2018;
and Khalil Dewan, “Investigating Houthi Claims of Drone Attacks on UAE Airports,” Bellingcat,
November 7, 2018.
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Sea.23 In June 2019, a cruise missile was launched against Abha Airport
in southern Saudi Arabia. And in early 2019, the Houthis began to
employ drones more frequently as part of their military strategy.
In the fall of 2016, the UAE Presidential Guard reportedly intercepted
unmanned aerial vehicles in the area of Aden International Airport. A
few months later, on February 26, 2017, the Houthis claimed to have
manufactured their own system, the Qasef-1, although independent
researchers strongly suspected the drone was in fact Iranian in origin,
given the similarities with the Iranian Ababil-2 drone.24 But in January
2019, Houthi fighters used a bomb-laden drone to attack Yemeni
military officials during a military parade at the Al Anad Air Base, near
Aden. The attack killed at least six people, including the head of military
intelligence, Major General Mohammad Saleh Tamah.25 In May, two oil
pumping stations in the province of Riyadh were damaged by a drone
attack. In the following weeks, drones were sent against airports in
Najran and Jizan and against urban areas in Khamis Mushait and Asir.
Most recently on September 14, 2019, Houthis claimed responsibility
for a drone attack on oil fields in Abqaiq. The effectiveness of the strike
and the distance between the target and Houthi-controlled territories
in Yemen would have made such an attack a major technological leap
forward. The US government expressed doubts, however, about the
Houthi claim and instead blamed the Iranian regime for the strike.26

A Strategy of Compellence

Although it may be tempting to dismiss Houthi tactics as mere
harassment, several interrelated indicators (selection of targets,
organizational changes, use of attacks in propaganda) suggest a strategy
of compellence. The timeline presented above reveals specifically how
missiles and drones have taken center stage in the conflict in Yemen. It
confirms these arsenals were integrated to the Houthi military posture
in a remarkably short period of time. This impressive pace of learning
has nurtured suspicions regarding external support the group has
received. Indeed, if the Houthis had no track record of previous use of
such arsenals, how could one explain the sudden extensive employment
of such weaponry?
Prior to the conflict, Saleh’s regime had no indigenous program of
missiles. It did, however, store a small amount of Scud-B missiles and
Hwasong-6 missiles purchased in the eighties and nineties from the
23     Ahmed Al Omran and Asa Fitch, “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Launch Rare Suicide Attack on
Saudi Frigate: The Red Sea Attack Killed Two Crew Members, According to a Saudi Arabia-led
Military Coalition,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2017.
24     Conflict Armament Research, Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen: “Kamikaze” Drones Used
by Houthi Forces to Attack Coalition Missile Defence Systems, Frontline Perspectives (London: Conflict
Armament Research, March 2017).
25     Ahmed Al-Haj, “Yemen Military Intel Chief Dies of Wounds From Drone Attack,”
Associated Press, January 13, 2019.
26     Summer Said, Jared Malsin, and Jessica Donati, “U.S. Blames Iran for Attack on Saudi Oil
Facilities; Saudi Arabia Shuts Down About Half Its Oil Output After Strikes,” Wall Street Journal,
September 15, 2019.
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Soviet Union and North Korea.27 It appears the first wave of missile
attacks in the summer of 2015 relied on this specific inventory. Given
the alliance between the Houthis and Saleh at that time, it is likely the
Houthis drew from the know-how of loyalist officers from the Saleh
regime to launch these missiles. Still, these first attacks were perceived
as ineffective by the Houthi leadership.28
The Burkan-1 and Burkan-2H missiles that appeared later—in early
2016 and 2017 respectively—were not stored by the former regime and
were in all likelihood obtained in the first months of the conflict. The
Burkan-1 may have been Scud missiles modified with external technical
support. But the similarity of the design of the Burkan-2H with Iranian
Qiam-1 missiles quickly led the international community to accuse Iran
of supplying them to the Houthis.29 Suspicions grew in earnest for most of
2016 and 2017. Noticeably, experts determined the missile that targeted
the UAE ship in October 2016 was a Chinese-made C-802 supplied by
Iran.30 It was the same type of missile Hezbollah used against the Israeli
Navy during the 2006 conflict.
As the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen noted, by May 2017, the
Houthis were firing extended-range ballistic missiles, demonstrating
both Iran’s decision to deepen its support of the Houthis and the
maturation of Houthi training. Hence, a few months later in December
2017, the US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, issued a strong
statement condemning Iran for transferring these weapons to the
Houthis.31 This statement was followed by several public assessments
from US intelligence agencies supporting the claim.32
In January 2018, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen recognized
that Iran, “failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or
indirect supply, sale or transfer” of such technology to the Houthi-Saleh
forces.33 The UN Panel of Experts also confirmed the drones the
Houthis had been using, such as the Qasef-1 UAVs, were similar “in
design, dimensions and capability” to the Iranian-made Ababil-T.34
But the most important component of the military evolution of
the Houthis was not Iran’s supply of weapons systems—overall very
modest in comparison to support provided by Tehran to Iraqi and
Lebanese partners. Rather, guidance provided by Iranian and Hezbollah
27     Noah Browning, “Houthi Missile Arsenal Holds a Key to Future Yemen Peace,” Reuters,
November 22, 2016.
28     UN Security Council, 2140 Sanctions Committee Yemen, Final Report of the Panel of
Experts on Yemen, S/2018/193 (January 31, 2017), 143.
29     UN Security Council, 2140 Sanctions Committee Yemen, Final Report (January 31, 2017), 28;
Jean Masson, Les missiles des Houthis, 18; and Jeremy Binnie, “Yemeni Rebels Enhance Ballistic Missile
Campaign,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 7, 2017.
30     Jeremy Binnie, “UAE’s Swift Hit by Anti-ship Missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 4, 2016.
31     John Ismay and Helene Cooper, “U.S. Accuses Iran of U.N. Violation, but Evidence Falls
Short,” New York Times, December 14, 2017.
32     Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearings before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the United States Senate, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of
National Intelligence).
33     UN Security Council, 2140 Sanctions Committee Yemen, Final Report (January 26, 2018), 32.
34     UN Security Council, Yemen, Final Report (2018), 32.
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advisers on the use of this technology played a key role in the Houthis’
military strategy designed to compel the Saudi-led coalition to accept the
territorial status quo.
In short, Iran helped the Houthis reinforce the arsenal they took
from the Yemeni government. More importantly, Iran may have helped
the Houthis make systematic use of it in order to move from a local
insurgency to a nonstate actor able to defy regional powers. The size of
that inventory matters less than the ways in which the Houthis have been
using it. This resonates with the classic debate on the role of technology
in warfare: as Michael Horowitz emphasizes, “it is the employment of
technologies by organizations, rather than the technologies themselves,
that most often makes the difference.”35
The strategic influence of Iran and Hezbollah is evident in the
evolving military structure of the Houthis. A key challenge seems to
have been organizational change required by the deployment of this
arsenal. During the 2004–14 conflicts, the Houthis largely remained a
militia based on tribal ties. But there are indications the movement is
developing into a more organized force. It now commands three missile
brigades under the leadership of Major-General Muhammad Nasser
Ahmed al-Atifi, the former commander of the missile brigades of the
Hadi regime who defected and joined the Houthis to become their
defense minister.36 The group also took control of the Yemeni military’s
Missile Research and Development Center, which the Houthis claimed
was developing missiles such as the Burkan.37
In the past five years, missiles and drones have been used by the
Houthis on the battlefield and in propaganda campaigns, with the media
outlets linked to the group issuing numerous threats against targets in
Saudi or Emirati territories and releasing video footage of past attacks.38
In January 2018, the Houthis publicly declared their goal to block Red Sea
shipping lanes by using anti-ship cruise missiles.39 In May 2019, Yemen
News Agency, the official news agency of the Yemeni government seized
by the Houthis in January 2015, quoted a rebel military source saying
they planned to strike 300 Saudi and UAE targets, including military
headquarters and bases in both countries and their bases in Yemen.40
Following the attack on the Saudi Aramco oil fields on September
14, 2019, missile threats were even more frequent. On September 26,
Houthi-affiliated Lieutenant-General Abed Al-Thour asserted on
35     Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2.
36     IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence, 165.
37     Tom Cooper, “How Did the Houthis Manage to Lob a Ballistic Missile at Mecca?,” War is
Boring, January 2, 2017.
38     For detailed coverage of the Houthi media campaign, see the clips made available by the
Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project.
39     UN Security Council, 2140 Sanctions Committee Yemen, Final Report of the Panel of
Experts on Yemen, S/2019/83 (January 25, 2019), 83.
40     “Yemen’s Houthi Group Says Will Target UAE, Saudi Vital Military Facilities,” Reuters, May
19, 2019.
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Al-Masirah television that “with its aerial strikes and missile force,
Yemen will send the UAE back to a time before its foundation.”41
An examination of this media rhetoric shows how the arsenal
became an instrument of pride for the Houthis. It also illustrates how it
is conceived as a means to compel the coalition, and in particular Saudi
Arabia, to remove their forces from disputed territories in Yemen.42 For
instance during an interview with the media website Al-Monitor, Abdul
Ghani al-Zubeidi, the editor in chief of the Houthi-affiliated Al-Jaish
magazine asserted: “the [Houthi] army command is adopting a strategy
of crippling movement in Jizan and Abha airports. . . . If strikes in
Yemen persist, we will move to the next stage, which is targeting more
distant airports in Riyadh and Jeddah.”43
This statement is striking as it shares rhetorical similarities with a
major speech given in 2010 by Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of
Lebanese Hezbollah. This famous speech of Nasrallah, called “Khitaab
al radaa’” (Speech of deterrence) posited: “You destroy a Dahiya building
and we will destroy buildings in Tel Aviv. . . . If you target Beirut’s
Rafik Hariri International Airport, we will strike Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion
International Airport. If you target our electricity stations, we will target
yours. If you target our plants, we will target yours.”44
The two quotes have a similar reasoning and show that, overall, the
Houthi message resonates with the Hezbollah posture against Israel. The
difference is that al-Zubeidi calls for the cessation of coalition strikes on
Yemen while Nasrallah threatens the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) not
to attack Lebanon. Using Schelling’s definition, the former is a case
of compellence while the latter is one of deterrence. This distinction
between compellence and deterrence explains why most comparisons
of the Houthis with Hezbollah are misleading: arguably, the Houthi way
of war mirrors the strategy of Hezbollah not as it is known today, but
rather as it was between 1992 and 2000.
In 1992, Hezbollah first used Katyusha rockets against the IDF
in south Lebanon and by June 2000, the last Israeli soldiers departed
the occupied area. During this period, Hezbollah revised its military
strategy toward the IDF by decreasing its reliance on suicide attacks
and training its combatants to employ rockets on the battlefield in a
systematic way.45 Following his nomination as secretary-general of
the Lebanese movement in February 1992, Nasrallah explained to the
41     “Houthi Military Expert Lieutenant-General Abed Al-Thour: UAE Like a Cave Full of Bats;
We Can Destroy It; UAE Soldiers Will Have No Place to Return to,” Middle East Media Research
Institute TV Monitor Project, clip no. 7524, September 26, 2019, accessed 30 November 2019.
42     For a discussion of compellence as a type of coercion, see Thomas Schelling, Arms and
Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 70–71.
43     Ammar al-Ashwal, “Houthis Taking Battle to Saudis with Upgraded Weapons Cache,” AlMonitor, July 8, 2019.
44     Hassan Nasrallah, “Khitaab al radaa’,” (speech) Beirut, Dar Al-Manar TV broadcast, 2010,
DVD copy.
45     Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel (New
York: Random House, 2011).
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newspaper As Safir that rockets were helping Hezbollah “work toward
creating a situation in which the enemy is subject to our conditions.”46
For Nasrallah, the architect of that revision, the logic was to compel
Israel to remove its forces from occupied Lebanon. While the causal link
between Hezbollah’s strategy and the IDF withdrawal of 2000 has been
contested, it definitely fueled Hezbollah’s narrative in the aftermath.47
This also explains why the Houthis have followed the same objective in
their current missile campaign against Saudi Arabia.
Concretely, the influence of Hezbollah has taken the form of
training of Yemeni fighters even before the takeover of Sanaa in 2014.48
Since then, there have also been reports of Hezbollah operatives on
the ground. (In September 2018, the Saudi coalition claimed it killed
Tariq Haydrah, a Hezbollah commander, in an airstrike.49) An analysis
of Houthi practices, such as concealing launchers, targeting locations in
Saudi Arabia, planning anti-shipping attacks, and designing influence
strategies through the use of media campaigns, suggests Hezbollah
cadres in Yemen have shared the lessons of their missile campaigns
against Israel.50 The Houthis have thus compelled the Saudi-led coalition
into withdrawing its forces from its controlled territories.
Today this posture aims to consolidate the Houthi foothold inside
northern Yemen and force countries belonging to the Gulf Cooperation
Council into accepting the status quo. The similarities between the
military postures of the Houthis and Hezbollah are noteworthy: both
nonstate actors defend an enclave with a vast arsenal of missiles and
drones, posing a direct threat to neighboring countries—in the case
of Hezbollah, the security predicament Israeli military commanders
have been facing since their withdrawal from southern Lebanon two
decades ago.
The difference, however, is the distinctly compressed timeframe
in which the Houthis achieved this position. This fact underlines not
only the accelerating diffusion of military technology to nonstate actors
but also, and more importantly, the ability of these groups to rapidly
reorganize and train their combatants. If this evolution is a prologue to
future conflicts involving nonstate actors, the Houthi military strategy
throughout the war in Yemen presents challenges worth exploring.

Future Houthi-Type Campaigns

From the outset, the Houthi missile campaign against Saudi
Arabia posed a fundamental conundrum—how to protect troops and
civilians in the midst of a military intervention. The gradual ability of
the Houthis to reach targets deep inside Saudi territory is a cautionary
46     Quoted in Nicholas Noe, ed., Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah
(London: Verso 2007), 62.
47     Dalia Dassa Kaye, “The Israeli Decision to Withdraw from Southern Lebanon: Political
Leadership and Security Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 4 (Winter 2002–3): 561–85.
48     IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence, 171.
49     IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence.
50     IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence; and Knights, “Houthi War Machine.”
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tale on what missile defense can do and cannot do, given the fact Saudi
Arabia and the UAE are among the biggest purchasers of missile defense
systems in the world. Both countries operate Patriot missile batteries.
The UAE also bought two terminal high altitude area defense missile
(THAAD) systems in 2012. Saudi Arabia is in the process of acquiring
the THAAD system as well. Both nations benefit from the deployment
of US capabilities under the umbrella of US Central Command.
According to authorities in Riyadh, since 2015 Saudia Arabia
has intercepted a large number of Houthi missiles, preventing heavy
casualties. The public domain lacks precise information regarding the
interception rate making it hard to assess the operational effectiveness
of the systems. But Saudi official statements have sometimes been
questioned by independent experts. When examining the missile attacks
of November and December 2017 against King Khaled Airport and Al
Yamamah Palace—both in the Riyadh area—Jeffrey Lewis, a research
director at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said
it was “very unlikely the missiles were shot down, despite officials’
statements to the contrary. . . . There is no evidence Saudi Arabia has
intercepted any Houthi missiles during the Yemen conflict.”51
Lewis’s suspicions follow a long list of critical studies challenging
the effectiveness of missile defense, and of Patriot missile batteries in
particular, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War (1990–91).52 In
substance, the discussion over the Patriots’ performance against Houthi
attacks is similar to traditional controversies over missile defense: it
emphasizes limitations regarding the territorial coverage, the difficulties
of early warning systems to detect incoming projectiles—particularly
cruise missiles and drones—and finally, the interception rate of batteries
deemed too low to truly rely on missile defense.
The Israeli experience may inform current predicaments of Saudi
Arabia and possibly other countries in the future. Like Saudi Arabia,
Israel faces a similar challenge with Hezbollah on its northern front and
has heavily invested in missile defense through weapon systems such as
Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow. In fact, Israeli military officials
have long warned against the illusion of considering missile defense
systems as a comprehensive shield against any foreign threat.
In 2010, then Major General Gadi Eisenkot, head of the IDF
Northern Command, stated: “the residents of Israel shouldn’t be under
the illusion that someone will open an umbrella over their heads. . . . The
systems are designed to protect military bases, even if this means that
citizens suffer discomfort during the first days of battle.”53 Eisenkot’s
statement remains valid today. Even in the case of Israel, approximately
98 times smaller than Saudi Arabia, the effectiveness of missile defense
51     Jeffrey Lewis, “Patriot Missiles Are Made in America and Fail Everywhere,” Foreign Policy,
March 28, 2018.
52     Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot,” International Security
16, no. 3 (Winter 1991–92): 119–71.
53     “Eizenkot: Rocket Defenses Designed for IDF, Not Citizens,” Jerusalem Post, December 1,
2010.
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is admittedly limited. That fact calls for modest expectations regarding
territorial coverage of these systems.
Additionally, the proliferation of advanced military technologies
to nonstate actors means ballistic missiles and drones are increasingly
accessible and affordable. On the other side, missile defense systems still
demand substantial funding and advanced training for their operators.
The comparative investment costs between missiles and missile defense
still favors the former over the latter, and is likely to do so even more in
the future. Such a trend obviously reduces the deterrent value of missile
defense, though it does not eliminate it entirely.54
These issues do not call for a complete dismissal of missile defense
systems but rather a more balanced military strategy. In 2011, the IDF
created a new special military unit named the Depth Corps Force to
coordinate and conduct clandestine operations in enemy territory against
missile and rocket launcher sites. Tellingly, despite the deployment of
Iron Dome batteries across Israel during that period, the IDF retained
the option of preemptive strikes.55
The activities of Depth Corps Force also echoed efforts of US
and British Special Forces to locate Scud missiles inside western Iraq
during Operation Desert Storm in 1991—a mission with only modest
successes.56 The Israeli experience vis-à-vis Hezbollah or the American
experience with the regime of Saddam Hussein may provide important
lessons for Persian Gulf countries, such as strengthening intelligence
collection on rocket, drone, and missile locations and preparing forces
for preemptive operations.
At the same time, as the case of the Houthis demonstrates,
nonstate actors still rely heavily on the support of external powers
to achieve significant results in missile warfare and in compelling
conventional armed forces. In short, without the Iranian supply of
missiles and drones and without the training provided either by the
IRGC or Hezbollah, the Houthis would very likely have been unable
to adapt the way they did. At the regional level, preventing state
sponsorship is essential to curbing ongoing proliferation of these
technologies to militias.
Unfortunately, arms control mechanisms in the Middle East and
the Persian Gulf have traditionally failed: no country in the region is a
member of the Missile Technology Control Regime and only three—
Iraq, Jordan, and Libya—adhere to the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Moreover, the Missile Technology
Control Regime was originally designed to prevent the proliferation of
54     Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Miranda Priebe, “A Crude Threat: The Limits of an
Iranian Missile Campaign against Saudi Arabian Oil,” International Security 36, no.1 (Summer 2011):
167–201.
55     Anshel Pfeffer, “Israel Announces New ‘Depth’ Command for Long-Range Military
Operations,” Haaretz, December 15, 2011.
56     See William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from
Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), 29–43.

TOC

Adapting to Adaptive Adversaries

Samaan

63

nuclear-capable missiles and therefore it only covers systems traveling at
least 300 kilometers.
Consequently, even if regional actors were to comply with the current
regime, they could technically still transfer to nonstate actors a large
portion of the low-range inventories similar to those the Houthis use in
Yemen. Given the limitations of diplomatic initiatives, the definition of
a tailored code of conduct calling on all Middle Eastern states to refrain
from transferring missiles and drones to nonstate actors is a modest but
critical step to mitigate risks associated with this new pattern of warfare.

Implications for Policymakers

Revising existing international frameworks to prevent further missile
and drone proliferation to nonstate actors may degrade the firepower of
groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis. But it will not entirely destroy
them. Given long-term trends in the diffusion of military power—such
as the exponential progress in missile technologies, the expansion of
proliferation networks, and the capacity of armed groups to assemble
indigenous arsenals—these movements will eventually find ways
to acquire weapons systems, enabling them to maintain their grip of
conquered territories and heightening the risks of external interventions.
Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia may well have to cope with
a Houthi threat on its southern flank for the time being, accepting a
certain amount of vulnerability at its borders in the same way Israel
persistently contends with the Hezbollah threat from the north.
This trend—nonstate actors emulating the posture of Hezbollah and
the Houthis—may adversely affect the ability of US forces to intervene
in regional crises. Conventional armed forces such as the United States
military may increasingly face entities using missiles and drones as a
rudimentary and low-cost means of an emerging anti-access strategy.
Practically, it may increase casualties and could constitute a kind of
insurance policy for those terrorist organizations.
For US partners in the region, this phenomenon may call for a
redefinition of military options vis-à-vis nonstate actors. If the complete
destruction of these organizations becomes an unrealistic end state,
designing a posture of conventional deterrence against nonstate actors
like the Houthis may need to be considered.
Such a discussion is unlikely to please decisionmakers in the
Middle East who might read it as a show of weakness. But given
the evolving security environment, it may be necessary to rethink
strategies. In particular, it may be necessary to question the relevance
of counterinsurgency campaigns toward groups seeking, through this
process of fait accompli, to secure a new status quo. All in all, the case
study of the Houthis allows us to comprehend brewing trends in nonstate
actors’ tactics. In the future, a broader examination comparing different
trajectories (such as that of Hezbollah or Hamas) and identifying key
parameters would allow us to deepen our understanding and contemplate
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future military scenarios that may unfold for the United States
and its allies.57

57     Jean-Loup Samaan, Nonstate Actors and Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies: The Coming Challenge,
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, February 2020).
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ABSTRACT: This article discusses tools and processes for
developing successful defense institution building efforts in lowcapacity, high-threat African states. The authors recommend
activities for increasing engagement with interior security or police
forces in addition to partner militaries.

D

efense institution building (DIB) is a practical discipline aimed
at building or reorienting a nation’s defense sector to be more
effective, affordable, and accountable. Originally focused on
Eastern Europe, DIB programs are now being implemented in regions
far less developed, in countries with significantly less capacity, and
where partners are either actively combating an adversary or are highly
vulnerable to looming threats. Africa, for example, has seen a surge in
DIB programs over the last five years. African states differ from those
in Eastern Europe: they face a relatively higher threat, have significantly
less capacity, and have a unique colonial legacy. Further, the United States
has a growing constellation of security interests on the African continent.
In an effort to reduce regional instability and to build partner
capacity for mitigating regional threats, the American government
spends billions of dollars each year on security assistance to Africa.1
America’s 2017 National Security Strateg y directed the US government to
“continue to work with partners to improve the ability of their security
services to counter terrorism” and other threats in Africa.2 According to
this guidance, US forces are not a kinetic solution in Africa; rather, they
provide security assistance to enhance the ability of African security
sectors to defeat their adversaries. The 2018 National Defense Strateg y
likewise stated:
We will bolster existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships and develop
new relationships to address significant terrorist threats that threaten U.S.
interests and contribute to challenges in Europe and the Middle East. We
will focus on working by, with, and through local partners and the European
Union to degrade terrorists; build the capability required to counter violent
extremism, human trafficking, trans-national criminal activity, and illegal
arms trade with limited outside assistance; and limit the malign influence of
non-African powers.3
1     “Africa,” Security Assistance Monitor, June 27, 2019.
2     Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017), 53.
3     Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DoD], 2018), 10.
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From an operational perspective, General Thomas D. Waldhauser,
former commander of the US Africa Command, noted in his posture
statement before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services on
February 7, 2019 that enhancing partner capability is one aspect of
the command’s approach on the continent, and DIB is an important
tool applied to achieve this. Together these foundational documents
demonstrate the importance the Department of Defense (DoD) places
on the effort as a means to enhance partner capabilities to respond
effectively to threats on the African continent.
Until quite recently, US security assistance globally, including
in Africa, consisted mainly of tactical-level training and equipping
of partner security forces. The 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act noted: “Security cooperation activities over the last 15 years have
emphasized building the capacity of partner forces at the tactical and
operational level. However . . . insufficient attention and resources have
been provided for building institutional capacity at higher echelons.”4
Indeed, the traditional train and equip (T&E) approach has proven
insufficient to enhance the effectiveness of some African militaries or
to help partners build effective, responsible, and sustainable defense
sectors.5 Mali is a prime example of the shortcomings of this traditional
approach. In 2012, despite tens of millions of dollars and years of
American intervention, Tuareg rebels with tenuous and temporary
but real links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib overran the Malian
military in the northern part of the country.6
In the southern capital of Bamako, soldiers displeased with
the government’s management of the rebellion cited institutional
deficiencies within the army as the reason for the military’s loss.
Specifically, the effort lacked a viable logistics system to deliver weapons,
food, and other necessary supplies to soldiers fighting on the front line.7
These events eventually led to a mutiny-turned-coup in Bamako and a
protracted conflict in Mali’s north.
Other examples illustrating the deficiencies of the traditional
T&E approach abound in Africa, including anecdotes of US-supplied
equipment rusting on runways due to neglect, investments being
swallowed by corruption, and militaries being used for government
repression.8 Such examples have led to the growing realization T&E
programs must be accompanied by institutional reforms that improve
partners’ ability to responsibly manage their security forces, including

4     National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 1198
(2017).
5     Stephen Watts et al., “Reforming Security Assistance for Africa,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2018).
6     “Mali,” Security Assistance Monitor, December 26, 2019.
7     “Mali Soldiers Attack Palace in ‘Coup Bid’,” Al Jazeera, March 22, 2012.
8     John Ismay, “The U.S. Spends Billions in Defense Aid. Is It Working?,” New York Times, June
13, 2018.
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the equipment, people, and fundamental management functions a
military must have to execute its missions.9

Defense Institution Building

The US Defense Department defines DIB as follows:
Security cooperation activities that empower partner nation defense
institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make
their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and
responsive to civilian control. DIB improves defense governance, increases
the sustainability of other DoD security cooperation programs, and is
carried out in cooperation with partner nations pursuant to appropriate and
available legal authority. It is typically conducted at the ministerial, general,
joint staff, military service headquarters, and related defense agency level,
and when appropriate, with other supporting defense entities.10

The notion that the United States provides foreign assistance to
enhance its partners’ ability to manage their external and internal security
has been part of America’s strategy for international development since
the Foreign Assistance Act was enacted in 1961. In 2010, former Secretary
of Defense M. Robert Gates advocated for more attention to be paid to
building the institutional capacity of partners’ defense ministries.11 This
view led to the creation of the Defense Institution and Reform Initiative
and Ministry of Defense Advisors programs, which are currently housed
within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.12
In 2016, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security
Cooperation Thomas Ross wrote, “Institutional capacity-building is
the most often neglected element of capability generation, yet it is the
element most vital to ensuring enduring capability.”13 Since then, the
emphasis on DIB as an essential component of security cooperation has
increased so significantly that the 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act mandated all T&E programming implemented by the Defense
Department include an institutional capacity-building component.14
Thus, DIB has emerged as an important means to help build
more effective, affordable, and accountable defense institutions while
concurrently ensuring the long-term maintenance and sustainment of
training, equipment, and other investments provided by the United
States. For its relatively modest cost, the program has the potential

9     United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Should Fully Address Security
Assistance Planning Elements in Global Train and Equip Project Proposals, GAO-18-449 (Washington, DC:
GAO, 2018).
10     Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Defense Institution Building (DIB),
Department of Defense Directive 5205.82 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2017), 13.
11     Robert M. Gates, “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates” (speech,
Nixon Center, Washington, DC, February 24, 2010).
12     “Defense Institution Reform Initiative,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA),
accessed December 27, 2019.
13     Thomas W. Ross, “Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness: A Model for Capability
Package Planning,” Joint Force Quarterly 80 (1st Quarter 2016): 32.
14     NDAA, 2017.
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to have a transformational impact on partners’ security sectors, if
properly applied.15
The poor practices associated with African defense institutions that
create challenges for DIB practitioners are well documented.16 Among
them are poor human resource management practices, which result
in suboptimal job performance and career development. Inadequate
planning results in inappropriate and unaffordable procurement
decisions. Likewise, overinvesting in new equipment at the expense of
readiness and an appropriate force structure results in capabilities that
cannot be sustained. This situation is exacerbated by the complex donor
environment, where well-meaning partners donate equipment that may
not be best suited to the country’s requirements, saddling recipients
with expensive assets while undermining efforts to plan for capabilities
within the country’s own means.
Lack of transparency regarding personnel and equipment is a result
of both antiquated or absent tools and processes for tracking as well as
deliberate efforts by senior officials to obfuscate information, allowing
them opportunities for personal enrichment. Notorious bureaucracies
that impede efficient decision-making and the relative weakness of
ministries of defense compared with the militaries presents another
challenge. Finally, institutional reform, which is difficult in all contexts,
is particularly thorny in highly factionalized militaries beset with ethnic,
regional, and religious differences and where endemic corruption offers
few appealing alternatives for senior officials who benefit from the
status quo.
There is an emerging field of literature on how to implement DIB
programs, mainly in relatively high-capacity regions and countries. But
DIB implementation in low-capacity, high-threat African states is not
well-documented.17 This article contributes to this literature by articulating
lessons learned from the authors’ experience working on such projects
in Africa, specifically Niger. Niger is a useful case to examine because
it is representative of many countries that receive substantial security
assistance from the United States. Moreover, through its participation
in the US Security Governance Initiative, Niger is experimenting
15     Alexandra Kerr and Michael Miklaucic, eds., Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense
Institution Building (Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University,
2017).
16     Michael J. McNerney et al., Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2016); Emile Ouédraogo, “Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa,”
Research Paper No. 6 (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2014), 3, 4, 11, and
18–20; and Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2001).
17     McNerney et al., Defense Institution Building; Frank L. Jones, ed., Building Partner Capacity in Africa:
Keys to Success (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2017); Martin Neill et al., Defense Governance and
Management: Improving the Defense Management Capabilities of Foreign Defense Institutions, Paper NS P-5350
(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), 2017); Wade P. Hinkle et al., Defense Planning
Scenarios: Best Practice and International Comparisons, Document D-5434 (Alexandria, VA: IDA, 2015);
and Lina M. Gonzalez, Aaron C. Taliaferro, and Wade P. Hinkle, Defense Governance and Management:
The Colombian Ministry of National Defense’s “Transformation and Future Initiative” Retrospective on a 9-Year
Cooperative Effort between the United States Department of Defense and the Colombian Ministry of National
Defense, Paper NS P-8588 (Alexandria, VA: IDA, 2017).
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with a new comprehensive model that has shown some initial, if still
unproven, successes.

Low-Capacity, High-Threat African States

Every country’s context is unique. This fact must be the foundation
of any program design. This article asserts that certain contextual
commonalties, however, may lend themselves to a particular approach. In
Africa, the threat posed by violent extremism and the low capacity of states
to respond are common challenges among many countries. Although
there is not one internationally accepted definition of terrorism, this model
includes in its definition of terrorism any intentional act of violence by
a nonstate actor, regardless of the source of the perpetrator’s grievance.
We therefore define the level of threat and capacity to respond using the
following criteria:
• High-threat states are those in the upper quartile of states threatened
by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index.18
• Low-threat states are those in the bottom two quartiles of states
threatened by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index.19 We further
dissect the definition of low threat to differentiate between postconflict
countries that have emerged from conflict in the last five years and are
therefore fragile, and countries with an otherwise low threat.
• High-capacity states are those valued as having medium to high
human development in the Human Development Index.20
• Low-capacity states are those valued as having low human development
in the Human Development Index.21
Most of sub-Saharan Africa falls in the category of low capacity,
but a much smaller number are both low capacity and high threat.
Low-capacity, high-threat countries are the most challenging to DIB
practitioners since they have the highest risk of state failure and lack the
means to respond to threats. This article asserts the most appropriate
18     Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the Impact of
Terrorism (Sydney, IEP, 2018). According to this index, the following African states are in the upper
quartile of states threatened by terrorism: Nigeria, Somalia, Libya, Egypt, South Sudan, Cameroon,
Sudan, Central African Republic, Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, Burundi, Chad, and Mozambique.
19     IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2018. According to this index, the following African states are
in the bottom two quartiles of states threatened by terrorism: Zambia, Togo, Eswatini, Namibia,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Gabon, Eritrea, Botswana, Benin,
Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Liberia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Guinea,
Djibouti, Senegal, and Rwanda.
20     United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Summary: Human Development Indices
and Indicators, 2018 Statistical Update (New York: UNDP, 2018). According to this index, the
following African States are in the medium to very high levels of human development: Kenya,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Zambia, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Namibia, Morocco, Cape
Verde, Republic of South Africa, Egypt, Gabon, Botswana, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritius, and
Seychelles.
21     “Table 1. Human Development Index and its components,” UNDP, 2018. According to
this index, the following African States have low human development: Eswatini, Angola, Tanzania,
Nigeria, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mauritania, Madagascar, Rwanda, Comoros, Lesotho, Senegal,
Uganda, Sudan, Togo, Benin, Malawi, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, the Gambia, Ethiopia, Mali,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Mozambique,
South Sudan, Guinea, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Central African Republic, and Somalia.
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application of DIB practices for low-capacity African states will differ
according to the threat level.
Low-capacity, low-threat countries can generally undertake
traditional DIB approaches since they have the freedom to reform
in peace, while states in this category that are in a postconflict state
have proven to benefit most from full-scale security sector reform.
Low-capacity, high-threat African states, the focus of this article,
require adaptations of traditional DIB approaches that simultaneously
address the urgent need for quick results and implement more long-term
institutional reforms. An in-depth research study to test this hypothesis
could determine whether this assertion applies throughout the range of
African states or if Niger represents an isolated case.
The low-capacity, high-threat African states environment today. The current
security environment in low-capacity, high-threat African states can
be characterized by transnational threats, a preference for regional
approaches, shared missions by military and police forces, an urgency to
conduct operations, and a rich but complex donor environment.
Transnational nature of threats. Defense planning begins with
identification of the threat. In the case of low-capacity, high-threat
African states, the emerging and most potent threats are transnational.
But many African militaries carry a legacy of their Cold War supporters
and are thus structured for now irrelevant peer-to-peer missions.
Transnational threats are now the norm and can easily be defined as
“wicked problems,” since causes and solutions are often outside the
ability of the state to influence directly.22 Such threats are also embedded
with the population, requiring long-term, sophisticated strategies.
Preference for regional approaches. Particularly in West Africa, the
preferred solution of low-capacity, high-threat African states to counter
transnational threats is often a regional one, which is logical because
transnational threats cross borders. Moreover, synergies can be gained
by sharing intelligence, allowing cross-border pursuit, and filling in each
other’s gaps in capacity. In West Africa, countries have joined forces
numerous times as part of the Economic Community of West African
States. This model has been pursued to address state collapse in Mali,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, as well as political unrest in Côte d’Ivoire with
mixed results.
More recently, regional action has been sponsored and supported
by donors, particularly those in Europe, who have been responsive to
organizing and assisting these efforts. The most recent regional responses
have been the Multinational Joint Task Force, a coalition of military and
security forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria with
the current mission to combat Boko Haram, and the Force Conjointe
du G5 Sahel, a coalition of Sahelian military and security forces from

22     “What’s a Wicked Problem?,” Stony Brook University, June 28, 2019.
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Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger with the current
mission to fight terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking.23
These regional organizations are important for addressing
transnational threats and creating a rudimentary common strategy or
approach. But regional approaches are not a panacea, and significant
challenges remain. Over time, for example, the Force Conjointe du G5
Sahel may develop some level of interoperability. But enduring challenges
for these defense and security forces persist in areas of basic skills, such
as conducting intelligence-driven operations. With or without regional
groups, foreign assistance still remains essential in both sustaining the
current fight and building capacity in local defense and security forces.
Regional efforts are useful for generating foreign support and
demonstrating political will, but ultimately the forces must be generated
by the same defense institutions that currently exist. Too many regional
approaches may also complicate strategic decision-making. Niger, for
example, engages in the Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel, the Multinational
Joint Task Force, and numerous peacekeeping operations, in addition to
its own domestic operations. Without improved decision-making tools
and processes, Niger will be hard-pressed to determine how best to
allocate resources among these competing policy options.
Shared missions by military and police forces. African nations commonly
enable defense and security forces to share missions and operate together.
This practice is often out of the necessity of scarce resources, but it also
reflects the nature of the threats in play—transnational nonstate actors
as opposed to the traditional threat posed by neighboring militaries.
Military and police force collaboration can be both appropriate
and wise. But this approach can be challenging for US agencies to
support, since laws and customs restrict how US agencies can support
different ministries.
The United States has historical concerns over the domestic use
of the military that are not universally shared even though many states
are concerned security forces not become overly militarized. And while
flowing DoD resources to internal security forces has become easier in
recent years, the practice remains the anomaly for the US government.
In the same vein, while the US government is a proponent of interagency
cooperation, it is often not exemplary in practice. Ultimately, the United
States faces hurdles in synchronizing its many programs, even within a
large organization such as the Department of Defense.
Urgency to conduct operations. Low-capacity, low-threat African states
generally fall into one of two categories: postconflict and active conflict.
Postconflict states, such as Liberia following its civil war, require
wholesale reconstruction of their security sector. Defense institution
building can be used to create new defense capabilities. But this approach
is not optimal since rebuilding a defense establishment requires broad
23     “Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram,” Africa-EU Partnership, July
1, 2019; and “G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance,” France Diplomatie, accessed December
10, 2019.
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domestic political support, the lack of which often led to the conflict
in question. In cases such as Guinea, DIB is best used following or in
conjunction with a broad security sector reform program.
Under these conditions, countries are fragile but not generally
under direct external threat, and they have the time and the space to
rebuild in relative peace. But DIB has become the tool of choice for lowcapacity, high-threat African states actively fighting terrorist groups and
insurgencies. Providing frontline defense in West Africa, countries such
as Mali, Niger, and Chad receive considerable foreign assistance. Thus,
their collapse would be detrimental to the region and to US interests.
Defense institution building programs offer significant promise
for these hard-pressed states. But one important challenge exists—
ensuring such militaries are able to conduct operations while learning
new operational concepts and integrating new equipment requirements
without pausing operations. Therefore, DIB programs must design and
implement potentially disruptive institutional reforms while causing
minimal disruption to kinetic operations. This requirement impacts the
scope of the work and the objectives. The march toward the higher
capability cannot degrade the utility of the existing, lesser capability if
the whole enterprise is to survive the current urgent threat. Urgency
thus overtakes some of the reform impulse since change increases risk,
which could become so disruptive it hinders current operations.
Rich donor environment. In the Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel case,
donors made pledges toward the military force of approximately $500
million by February 2018.24 But as history demonstrates, states with a
crowded donor environment often receive a great deal of new equipment
and training without much coordination among benefactors and without
much thought given to sustainment. While training and equipment are
provided, little to no support is given to help the partner integrate,
maintain, or sustain long-term capabilities.
Moreover, a mechanism rarely exists for vetting donated capabilities
against a clearly stated definition of the recipient’s defense needs. As
a result, recipients may be unable to sustain unnecessary or expensive
capabilities. Indeed, donor assistance often takes the place of strategic
decision-making or takes up so many resources in out years that it crowds
out other commitments and funding.

Recommending a New DIB Model

Given the distinctive history and contextual commonalties of lowcapacity, high-threat African states, approaches should be tailored to
these country’s unique environments and international best practices,
not the donor’s norms. The four main principles of such an approach
are presented here with examples from Niger.

24     Agence France-Presse, “EU Doubles Sahel Force Funding Amid Urgent Appeal from
African Leaders,” France 24, accessed December 10, 2019.
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Support Operational Improvements with Institutional Reforms
The aforementioned definition of DIB places repeated emphasis
on strengthening defense institutions that are effective, accountable,
transparent, and subordinate to civilian control; that respect human
rights and the rule of law; and that conform with principles of good
governance. This description suggests the types of activities that fall
under DIB are often lofty institutional reforms, which is consistent
with the historical intent of DIB. The reality of low-capacity, highthreat African states, however, is they must conceptualize, initiate, and
implement such reforms while facing existential crises or engaging in
active combat. Furthermore, since rapid improvement in operational
capability is important, security cooperation planners within the US
government must recognize the necessity of sustaining T&E efforts
until the broader DIB effort creates the partner’s capacity to plan and
to manage that support.
Niger conducts operations on all its borders and hosts DIB teams
concurrently. It must build future capacity while participating in active
combat operations. Focusing solely on institutional reforms that do not
improve operational effectiveness in the short term may be viewed as a
distraction from current operations for a force with little capacity to spare.
Identifying opportunities to apply DIB principles to current operations,
however, is a sweet spot where partners’ operational effectiveness can
be enhanced while applying international best practices to create the
force of the future. Such an approach provides the partner nation with
proof of the value of the process, aids in building institutional tools,
and provides a bridge to long-term efforts such as a new force structure
design, an improved supply chain system, and human resource lifecycle
management.
One possible way to apply the principle described above is to consider
a new partner capability for which employment, maintenance, manning,
or sustainment has not been well thought out. Starting with a specific
capability or system and growing the institutional support a partner
needs to sustain and to manage that capability, rather than undertaking
a wide range of reforms across a number of domains, not only enhances
the partner’s operational effectiveness but also demonstrates how best
to apply institutional reform principles.
In Niger, a DIB team was tasked with mentoring the Nigerien
defense and security forces (FDS) through the capability-based planning
process. Traditionally, capability-based planning uses carefully crafted
scenarios to test the adequacy of a military’s existing capabilities to
perform its missions in light of the country’s most likely future threats. It
then identifies affordable solutions a force can adopt to ensure sufficient
capability to execute missions. As DIB practitioners do, the team
assured operational relevance by adjusting the capability-based planning
methodology in several fundamental ways.
First, since the Nigerien forces operate in a joint manner, the
methodology was used to assess capabilities required by the army, air
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force, gendarmerie, national guard, and national police to execute shared
missions. Second, since Niger is engaged in numerous active operations
and faces a threat unlikely to change significantly in the near future,
planners found value in using current operations to identify capability
gaps rather than expending valuable time developing scenarios that test
the same mission areas.
Third, an abbreviated version of capability-based planning for the
most critical mission areas can be applied in low-capacity, high-threat
African states where, by definition, severe capacity shortages exist.
Many African militaries, for example, view economic development as
an important mission area but resource constraints prevent meaningful
engagements in this area. Thus, scenarios to test this mission area did
not need to be developed.

Engage Military and Police Forces Equally
In many African security sectors, military and police forces are
inextricably linked in operational terms. The US government must
therefore overcome remaining structural impediments that prevent
the Department of Defense from imparting expertise to appropriate
nondefense forces in partner nations. Authorities granted through
section 333 of chapter 16 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act authorize the US military to provide training and equipment to
foreign security forces. Engaging military and police forces is broader
than traditional DIB, and there is an ongoing effort within the Defense
Department to tackle these issues through the lens of institutional
capacity building.25 Institutional capacity building goes beyond DIB, but
does not broach full-scale security sector reform, which is better suited
for countries whose security sectors have already collapsed as a result of
internal conflict.
The Security Governance Initiative is another way the United
States encourages the delivery of critical subject matter expertise where
authorities associated with funding sources have traditionally precluded
such activity. In Niger, the Security Governance Initiative identified
the need for improved planning and resource management capabilities
across the military and the police forces. While the Defense Department
has honed the expertise of DIB practitioners to perform this function
for its military partners, there has been relatively little US government
capacity to provide the same expertise to police partners.
Through authorities granted under Title 22 of the United States
Code, the Security Governance Initiative sponsored a team of planning
and resource management professionals with experience in both the
defense and law enforcement domains to provide expertise to the
military and police services of Niger.26 This activity would have not

25     “Institutional Capacity Building,” DSCA, accessed December 26, 2019.
26     White House, “Fact Sheet: Security Governance Initiative,” Obama White House Archives,
August 6, 2014, accessed December 26, 2019.
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been possible heretofore given legal restrictions barring DoD-funded
DIB teams from engaging with police forces of partner nations.
An important way the DIB team in Niger operationalized the
principle of interministerial engagement was by supporting the Nigerien
government’s desire to institutionalize the FDS concept. A legal decree
created the force out of military and internal security forces that operated
under the authority of the ministers of defense and security, respectively.
The law did not, however, actually provide for an accompanying
structure, bureaucracy, or resources to create the FDS.
Consequently, the force, remained a concept and an institution in
name only. Through the support of the DIB team, Niger identified the
lack of an interministerial institution that could perform inherently joint
functions, such as capability planning, as a key capability gap. Assisting
in the creation of a structure to formalize the institutional concept is
an important way in which the US government engages defense and
internal security forces with equal emphasis.

Embrace the Trend toward Regional Forces
The proliferation of transnational threats requiring cross-border
operations, intelligence sharing, and integrated command and control
structures has prompted many low-capacity, high-threat African states
to move toward regional joint forces over unilateral operations. This
new concept has the potential to change the fundamental way in which
the forces of member countries operate and are managed. Defense
institution building assistance to these countries ought to embrace this
trend, which is likely to continue.
In countries that are members of regional forces such as the
Multinational Joint Task Force or Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel,
traditional DIB areas that could be adjusted to accommodate this
change include joint logistics or supply chains, the development of joint
operational concepts, joint training for cross-border operations, or the
implementation of intelligence-sharing mechanisms. In the long term,
assisting with a force structure analysis that identifies requirements
and allocates resources for units operating in national missions and
multinational missions will be a valuable task.

Enable the New Model
Certain practices serve as key enablers for low-capacity, high-threat
African states to overcome pervasive challenges. In Niger, the following
practices have proven to be critical for the success of the DIB team.
First, a local project coordinator, either a US hire or foreign national
with excellent access to and working relationship with a partners’ senior
leaders, can be a significant force multiplier when local human capital
is limited. This coordinator ensures momentum is maintained between
DIB team visits, facilitating progress. This coordinator also supports the
DIB team by developing a nuanced understanding of the institutional
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structures and greater insights into the political dynamics of the host
nation.
This information is essential for DIB teams to understand how
host nation bureaucracies make decisions and how reforms can be
implemented and institutionalized. Notably, fostering relationships to
acquire such knowledge can be difficult, requiring trust to be built over
time and, therefore, may not be achievable by US-based personnel.
Second, a means to engage the political class is essential to ensuring
a DIB program’s reforms transcend participating institutions and reach
the highest levels of government. Identifying or cultivating change
agents among the political class with the will to support potentially
disruptive reforms is key to ensuring gains are sustained. This effort can
be done through an official memorandum of understanding between the
partners or collaboration with a government-sponsored think tank or
other entity with direct access to the political class. These practices may
not be unique in all countries where DIB teams operate, but they are
key enablers to a successful DIB program in a low-capacity, high-threat
African state.

Conclusion

In aiming to make US partner nation defense sectors more effective,
affordable, and accountable, DIB plays an important role in the US
government’s security assistance toolkit. Originally focused on Eastern
Europe, American DIB programming now has a large footprint in
Africa, which faces a different set of conditions and challenges than highcapacity and low-threat regions. Indeed, many African countries where
DIB is being implemented have long histories of coups and military
misuse, extremely limited capacity, and are either actively combating an
adversary or are highly vulnerable to looming threats.
Based on observations and experiences in Niger, the authors of
this article recommend DIB efforts in low-capacity, high-threat African
states consider the following criteria to ensure the best chance for
success. First, DIB objectives should be designed to support immediate
operational improvements concurrently with institutional reforms.
Second, DIB programs should engage military and police forces with
equal emphasis. Third, DIB programs should support partners’ desires
to develop regional joint forces. Finally, key enablers, such as a fulltime coordinator at the embassy and a high-level memorandum of
understanding, should be utilized to help garner the political will needed
to implement DIB efforts successfully.
Through the Security Governance Initiative, the United States
and Niger have agreed to a program incorporating many of the
recommendations highlighted above. But an in-depth research study to
assess the utility of this approach across a range of low- to high-capacity
and low- to high-threat African states could determine whether this
assertion is accurate or an isolated case. Likewise, ongoing research to
assess the outcomes of this long-term process in Niger or their utility for
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high-threat countries in other regions would be useful. But the country’s
security and defense sector leadership seem genuinely interested in
reforms that will improve their performance in ongoing and future
operations.
Better managed and more accountable security sectors in Africa will
help mitigate threats emanating from the continent and make American
T&E efforts more sustainable and effective. While certainly not a
panacea, the recommendations highlighted here would help current and
future DIB efforts turn these goals into reality.
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ABSTRACT: This article argues for the efficacy of a recently
implemented method for teaching strategic mindedness to
cadets at the Norwegian Military Academy. The method fuses
the Lykke model of military strategy with the Toulmin model of
argumentation, consumes less time than other teaching methods in
the field of strategic thinking, and could be used to educate military
officers in other nations.

I

n 2013, when General Martin E. Dempsey, former chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stipulated “the application of force rarely
produces and, in fact, maybe never produces the outcome we seek,”
he captured a widely shared concern that the West no longer wins wars.1
This critique is often attributed, at least partly, to the inability of military
officers from Western nations to understand the ways military means
can be applied to achieve ends of policy.2 According to General Rupert
Smith, we fail to make the fundamental distinction between “what it is
we expect the use of force or forces to achieve as opposed to do.”3 As
a contribution to this debate, this article offers one of several ways this
challenge is being addressed at the Norwegian Military Academy (NMA),
which is tasked to cultivate junior officers who can think strategically.4
While the term “strategic-minded lieutenants” calls to mind General
Charles C. Krulak’s “strategic corporal,” it is different.5 Krulak refers to
military professionals who, by focusing on the immediate effects of their
actions, create undesired strategic outcomes. In contrast, before taking
action, a strategic-minded lieutenant asks: What am I to achieve? After
evaluating and balancing the ends, alternative ways, available means,
and potential risks, the officer takes appropriate action to achieve a
desired strategic outcome. This competence is relevant for many junior
1     Quoted in Celestino Perez Jr., “Errors in Strategic Thinking: Anti-Politics and Macro Bias,”
Joint Forces Quarterly 81 (2nd Quarter 2016): 10; Adrian R. Lewis, The American Culture of War: A
History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom (New York: Routledge,
2013); and Matthew Morton, “Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future, Parameters 45, no.1
(Spring 2015): 55–67.
2     Harry G. Summer, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Presidio,
1982); and Jason W. Warren, “The Centurion Mindset and the Army’s Strategic Leader Paradigm,”
Parameters 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 28.
3     Quoted in Mats Berdal, “Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in ‘Peace Operations’ in the
1990s,” International Peacekeeping 7, no. 4 (2000): 55.
4     Col. Erlend Bekkestad (commandant, Norwegian Military Academy), presentation of the 2018
educational program, NMA, Oslo, Norway, September 13, 2018.
5     Charles C. Krulak, “Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine,
January 1999.
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officers, including those in Norwegian expeditionary missions in which,
increasingly, captains or majors hold the position of commanding officer.
The article begins by conceptualizing two distinct forms—one
technical and one value-based—of strategic mindedness. These are
based on Norwegian doctrine and on Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s definition
of military strategy, and refined further by broader insights from the
sociology of professions. Second, this article shows how Stephen E.
Toulmin’s widely recognized rhetorical model of argumentation can
be adapted and used as an educational method to develop strategic
mindedness among future military leaders.6 Finally, the scope and utility
of this approach is discussed in the context of research and debate in the
United States on the broader concept of strategic thinking.

Strategic Mindedness

As conceptualized here, the term strategic mindedness is based
on the guidance of Norway’s former chief of defense, General
Sverre Diesen:
Military operations require commanders and staff officers to be: capable of
approaching operational problems in an intellectual and analytical manner,
able to judge the utility of military force and its effects with regard to political
ends, and a leader who can distinguish primary from secondary matters,
and balance short and long-term concerns. Advantages and disadvantages
of alternative courses of actions must be evaluated and weighed before
decisions can be made and transformed into orders.7

The term is further anchored in Lykke’s conception of
military strategy consisting of three components—ends, ways, and
means—that must be balanced in a reasoned manner.8 The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization adds risks as a fourth component.9
Henceforth, all four elements are included when I refer to Lykke’s
understanding of strategy.
Strategic mindedness refers to the cognitive capability of coherently
linking the four components in Lykke’s notion of strategy. This
construct makes the educational task manageable in precommissioning
professional military education (PME) and the competence relevant
for the problems officers will be tasked to solve throughout their
careers as they reach higher levels of command in increasingly complex
environments. As such, strategic mindedness is related to the term
strategic thinking. Although no generally accepted definition of the

6     Stephen Edelston Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1964).
7     Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine (Oslo: Forsvarsstaben, 2007), 3.
8     Antulio J. Echevarria II, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017), 5–6.
9     UK Ministry of Defence, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, Allied Joint Publication
5 (AJP 5) (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Standardization Office, 2019), 3-1–3-2.
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latter term exists, it covers a broader scope of themes we shall revisit.10
Within this conceptual context, strategic mindedness is proposed as
a subfield. While the notion of strategic thinking supports NATO’s
understanding of operational art, strategic mindedness is equally useful
to platoon commanders.
From an educational perspective, the simplicity of Lykke’s
conception is valuable. Yet, it must be elaborated upon to account
for the professional judgments Diesen calls for above, including the
ability to balance long and short-term concerns and evaluate alternative
courses of actions. To this end, scholarship in the sociology of
professions is informative.
Talcott Parsons and Donald A. Schön argue a defining feature
of professions is their responsibility to serve society in politically and
ethically contested domains such as security, health, and education.
In these critically important fields, society has entrusted, respectively,
military and public safety officers, medical doctors, and teachers with
the exclusive mandate to further its common interests.11
To live up to this trust, professions continuously improve
their respective field of knowledge, and professionals—individuals
commissioned to act on behalf of the professions—apply this expertise
in practice adapted to the particularities of specific cases, such as a
firefight or an emergency room. If such cases could be addressed through
standard solutions, society would not need professionals—cases could
be solved by anyone with a bit of training in prescribed procedures.
Yet, medical and military situations, for example, often have casespecific elements of uncertainty and problems that make standard
solutions inappropriate or inapplicable.12 Hence, a central characteristic
of professional expertise is the ability to draw from different fields of
knowledge in order to solve problems where the way to do so is not
provided by standard solutions. This requires judgment that takes
political and ethical concerns, among others, into account.
Aristotle offered the term “practical wisdom” to define such
judgment as a particular form of competence, distinct from the universal
truths of science and the knowledge and application of a technical skill.13
A commander can use science, for instance, to calculate the ballistic
10     Ellen F. Goldman, “Strategic Thinking: Requirements, Developments, and Assessment,” in
Exploring Strategic Thinking: Insights to Assess, Develop, and Retain Army Strategic Thinkers, ed. Heather M.
K. Wolters, Anna P. Grome, and Ryan M. Hinds (Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2013), 32–37.
11     Talcott Parsons, “Professions,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David
L. Sills (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), 12:536–37; and Donald A. Schön, The Reflective
Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 3–4.
12     Harald Grimen and Anders Molander, “Profesjon og Skjønn,” in Profesjonsstudier, ed. Anders
Molander and Lars Inge Terum (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2010), 179.
13     Elizabeth Anne Kinsella and Allan Pitman, eds., Phronesis as Professional Knowledge: Practical
Wisdom in the Professions (Rotterdam: Sense, 2012); Carsten F. Roennfeldt, “Wider Officer Competence:
The Importance of Practical Wisdom and Politics,” Armed Forces & Society 45, no. 1 (January 2019):
59–77; and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 105–7.
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trajectory of his weapon system. Some scholars adapt similar scientific
methods in an effort to apply generally valid social science knowledge
to military operations, such as the 3:1 rule in which one needs three
times as much combat power as the enemy possesses to break through
defensive positions.14 Technical skills are necessary to know how to
carry out decisions, for instance, to ensure military planning proceeds
along established procedural lines and to maneuver troops according to
an operational plan.
In contrast to these two competencies, practical wisdom is necessary
to determine how to achieve a common good in situations when there
are several, often conflicting, objectives. In the context of military
operations, common good should ultimately be understood in terms of
national interest. Practical wisdom is a form of judgment expressed in
actions encompassing political and ethical concerns.
This competency is essential for officers who routinely deal with
what are sometimes referred to as “wicked problems.”15 Moreover, it
seems particularly important for contemporary warfare where military
activities, according to Emile Simpson, “even down to the tactical level,
are required to have effect in highly politicized, kaleidoscopic conflict
environments.”16 In such contexts, combat must achieve political rather
than purely military outcomes. This requires decisions based on values,
as opposed to technical skills driven by a technical rationality.17
This conceptualization of professional judgment provides for two
forms of strategic mindedness relevant for practices that characterize the
military profession. One may be called technical strategic mindedness,
which is driven by a technical rationality and aims to achieve ends in
ways largely informed by the profession’s procedures and established
practices. The other, value-based strategic mindedness, is designed
to achieve a common good in a way that balances potential conflicts
between risks and interests in a reasonable manner.

Strategic-Minded Junior Officers

The NMA, a department of the Norwegian Defence University
College that provides the Norwegian Army’s precommissioning PME,
develops these two forms of strategic mindedness in a variety of ways.
These include informal computer games as Wargame and Hearts of Iron,
everyday chess competitions in the lounge, and more formal classes with
tactical decision games and software-based tactical simulations like Steel
Beasts. Similar cognitive capabilities are also cultivated during exercises
and when cadets learn to plan operations following procedures spelled
out in the Norwegian army’s manual for planning and decision-making.
14     John J. Mearsheimer, “Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics,”
International Security 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989): 54–89.
15     John C. Camillus, “Strategy as a Wicked Problem,” Harvard Business Review (May 2008): 99–106.
16     Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst,
2012), 5.
17     Schön, Reflective Practitioner, 21–24; and Donald A. Schön, Educating the Reflective Practitioner:Toward
a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987), 3–7.
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In addition to such educational approaches, the NMA has developed
a method that draws from the academic field of rhetoric. This may come
across as abstract and irrelevant for a practical profession such as the
military. It is not. This method clarifies how ends, ways, means, and risks
may be coherently connected in a well-reasoned strategy. As Anders
Molander points out, “To reason means to construct arguments,” and he
proposes Toulmin’s rhetorical model for such use.18 Adapting it at NMA,
we have found his model useful as a pedagogical tool to cultivate strategic
mindedness in our future officers because it visualizes the structure of
a strategic argument and spurs cadets to make their reasoning explicit.
While other rhetorical approaches could have been relevant, after
reviewing introductory textbooks on the topic, we chose Toulmin’s
model. It is widely recognized, more practical, and more accommodating
of shared beliefs than ancient rhetorical theories, which largely aim to
formulate strictly logical arguments based on premises that are true
in the sense they are based on empirical data. In contrast, Toulmin
offers an analytical framework to scrutinize the way people construct
well-reasoned arguments in areas where few, if any, scientifically true
premises exist. This is particularly useful for officers whose professional
reasoning relies more on experiences and doctrines than on universal
scientific truths.
An equally influential alternative rhetorical approach with a similar
purpose is that of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, which
focuses on how arguments are constructed differently depending on
the audience.19 But for officers tasked to reason in a variety of national
and international contexts, Toulmin’s model is more suitable since it is
applicable in a general sense. From an educational perspective, the major
weakness with his model is it takes some time to master, although most
cadets grasp it within a week.
Toulmin suggests a reasonable argument consists of a few basic
components and offers this example. Presumably, Harry is a British
subject, since he was born in Bermuda. Unless both his parents were
aliens, a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject on
account of established statutes and legal provisions. Toulmin breaks this
argument down in six components, structured in the following model
in figure 1.20

18     Anders Molander, Discretion in the Welfare State: Social Rights and Professional Judgment (London:
Routledge, 2016), 25.
19     Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 539–41; and Jens E. Kjeldsen, Retorikk i vår tid: En innføring i moderne
retorisk teori (Oslo: Spartacus, 2014), 319–22.
20     Toulmin, Uses of Argument, 102.
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Figure 1. Stephen E. Toulmin’s rhetorical model of argumentation.

Toulmin clarifies the claim “Harry is a British subject” is convincing
because it is sustained with the evidence (datum) “Harry was born
in Bermuda.” This information can sustain the claim because of the
generally shared understanding (warrant) “a man born in Bermuda
will generally be a British subject.” To persuade, one must be able
to substantiate such warrants with backings, referenced here as “the
following statutes and other legal provisions.” The rebuttal highlights
counterarguments, noted here as the possibility “both his parents were
aliens.” By moderating the claim with the qualifier “presumably,” the
argument still comes across as convincing.
The NMA has combined this rhetorical model with Lykke’s
notion of strategy as an educational tool to develop cadets’ strategic
mindedness. It replaces Toulmin’s datum component with “end” and his
claim component with “way.” Cadets use this adapted rhetorical model
to scrutinize historical cases in order to clarify how the commanders
in question may have reasoned to achieve military and political ends
with available means. Drawing from the references included in a syllabus
on the Falkland Islands War (1982), for example, cadets are tasked to
write a paragraph clarifying a British commander’s tactical problem and
solution.21 Findings are then presented in a brief paragraph that might
read as follows:
On 28 May in the early hours of the battle of Goose Green the battalion
commander is killed, and Major Keeble finds himself in command. His
mission objective is to take Goose Green, which eventually comes down to
taking the fortified local village Darwin. Yet his troops are cold, hungry and
exhausted after little sleep, two days of marching and 15 hours of battle.
Instead of using them, he initially envisages to achieve his objective by
bombarding the village.

Next, cadets use the adapted Toulmin model to structure such
historical accounts as a strategic idea. To establish coherence cadets are
free to add information on the way commanders’ may have reasoned
where this is not available. The above-mentioned finding of a tactical
problem and solution was presented as follows in figure 2.
21     Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Book Club Associates,
1983), 284.
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Figure 2. The structure of a technical strategic idea as elaborated by cadets in class.

The rhetorical model connects the military end (here, take Goose
Green) with a way (here, bombardment). This comes across as a
reasonable strategic idea for those who share the underlying assumption
bombarding is an efficient way to take an area. To support this warrant,
cadets refer to the historical example of Nazi forces’ breakthrough of
French defensive lines at Sedan in 1940. Adding other relevant cases and
academic references may further strengthen the strategic idea.
The credibility of the warrant relative to the rebuttal decides whether
the proposed course of action seems reasonable. Although it is rare, if
at all possible, to find historical sources establishing how a commander
actually reasoned to solve tactical problems, this is of little importance
in an educational context where the purpose is to develop cadets’ ability
to connect the strategic components in a manner that makes sense.
To some this use of Toulmin’s model may seem pedantic. Yet,
clarifying the nuts and bolts in a well-reasoned strategic idea helps
cadets gain strategic mindedness. As they fill in text in the model’s
components, cadets make their reasoning explicit for themselves and
for those who give them feedback. It is precisely this visualization that
facilitates learning.
The strategic idea presented in figure 2 above is technical in the sense
the tactical problem and subsequent solutions do not encompass risks
and values beyond winning the firefight. Yet using the same method,
cadets also identify strategic ideas that include broader concerns and
represent a value-based strategic mindset.
To return to the Falklands example, a few hours later Major Chris
Keeble has second thoughts about bombarding Goose Green. Pursuing
humane ends, his strategic reasoning includes the fate of more than
a hundred civilians in the local village.22 He decides to try to save
them and sends a courier to give the local Argentine commander the
ultimatum “surrender your forces” or “take the inevitable consequences,”
simultaneously informing him, “you shall be held responsible for the
fate of any civilians” in Darwin and Goose Green.23
22     Hastings and Jenkins, Battle for the Falklands, 249.
23     John Frost, 2 Para Falklands: The Battalion at War (London: Sphere, 1984), 170–71.
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In an elaborated version of the rhetorical model, this can be spelled
out as a value-based strategic idea. Major Keeble finds a way to combine
two parallel lines of reasoning, which, for simplicity, are only partly
presented in figure 3 with three of Toulmin’s modified components,
end, warrant, and way.

Figure 3. The structure of a value-based strategic idea

In this model, the strategic idea of the ultimatum (Way 2) met the
objective of taking Goose Green as well as the broader end of being
humane. Although Way 2 may illustrate the benefit of a value-based
decision in solving a tactical problem that achieves a specific military
objective without compromising matters of high value, we found no
relevant historical cases to support the model.
This educational method aims to improve the quality of military
leaders’ future decision-making but is clearly no guarantee the decisions
will produce the expected outcomes. As Antulio J. Echevarria II
laconically observes, “A successful military strategy is simply one that
works,” and as any officer knows, friction and chance influence the
outcome of military plans no less than pure reasoning.24 Still, a coherent
plan, backed by well-reasoned judgment, is more likely to achieve its
objectives than one which is incoherent, and it will lend itself to a better
defense in the event of failure.
In addition, Toulmin’s model can support the way Michael Howard
recommends the military profession uses history, not as an arsenal of
successful historical tactical solutions that can be reproduced but as a
way to prepare junior officers for making decisions in the fog of war.25
Once adapted as a mindset, the model sensitizes them to the ways
24     Echevarria, Military Strategy, 110; and Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), bk. 1, chaps. 3 and 7.
25     Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” RUSI Journal 107, no. 1 (February
1962): 4–10.
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officers of the past reasoned to achieve their ends and to factors that
influenced their decisions. As such, it can provide junior officers with a
more profound understanding of their profession’s expertise.
Moreover, Toulmin’s model may also help cadets come to terms
with the character of their profession’s field of knowledge. While both
are professionals in politically and ethically contested domains, why is it
military officers are less capable of predicting the outcome of a course
of action than medical doctors?
With reference to the model Harald Grimen and Anders Molander
suggest, it is because some professions’ expertise is based on weak
warrants.26 Often, medical doctors can reason with warrants based in
the natural sciences since they are solving problems related to the human
body. But officers who ultimately aim to influence human behavior must
reason with warrants derived from the human and social sciences. Here
few, if any, universal truths exist. Hence, military strategy is necessarily
based upon weak warrants since it must be anticipatory about future
human behavior and about options for influencing such behavior by
means of the threat or use of military force.
Consequently, Dempsey’s observation with which the article opens
reiterates the fact that compared to outcomes of decision-making in many
other professions, the judgments of a military officer are fundamentally
less likely to result in desired outcomes. Appreciating they are to become
experts in a field with weak warrants may help cadets to gain the courage
necessary to make decisions with uncertain outcomes and the mental
robustness to live with the consequences.

US Debates on Strategic Mindedness

Lykke’s conception of military strategy, upon which the previously
mentioned educational method rests, has been criticized for inspiring
military strategists to understand “strategy [as] an exercise in meansbased planning.”27 This use of the concept misplaces focus on what
military forces can do. But the approach is useful when one starts by
asking: What is the end? The answer then guides further considerations
with regard to strategy’s three additional components.
In addition, Lykke’s conception forms a minor, although essential
part of the broader term strategic thinking. While contested, few theoretical
propositions for what constitutes strategic thinking are in contradiction
with Lykke’s ends-ways-means-risk logic. A US Army report exploring
how to develop strategic thinkers concluded “strategic thinking in the
military context is a complex and multifaceted construct that encompasses
a wide range of skills, activities, and goals.”28 The report adds that the
term, strategic thinking, is confused by the fact it is used interchangeably
26     Grimen and Molander, “Profesjon og Skjønn,” 183–84.
27     Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter
2016–17): 81.
28     Anna Grome, Beth Crandall, and Cynthia Dominquez, “Exploring Strategic Thinking: A
Synthesis and Way Ahead,” in Wolters, Grome, and Hinds, Exploring Strategic Thinking, 249.
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with related concepts such as critical thinking, creativity, and
conceptual planning.
Moreover, discussions about strategic thinking are often interwoven
with appeals to contextual understanding. For instance, the report
recommends strategic thinkers maintain a systemic and holistic approach
and agrees with Paul K. Van Riper that this requires a solid education in,
among others, system theory, strategic theory, and geopolitics.29 Before
retiring, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster proposed an alternative
bottom-up perspective: “We need to educate our soldiers about the
nature of the microconflicts they are part of and ensure they understand
the social, cultural, and political dynamics at work within the populations
where these wars are fought.”30
In comparison with such wide themes, the scope of the method
offered in this article is limited, but not contradictory. Strategic
mindedness is essential to connect the ends, ways, means, and risks that,
among others, NATO considers of central importance when operations
are designed.31 And while the contexts will change and become more
complex throughout a commander’s career, this cognitive capability may
still be useful to achieve mission objectives.
Although senior defense officials increasingly acknowledge junior
officers must be capable of thinking strategically, this is not reflected
in American PME nor necessarily supported within the rank and file.
As Scott A. Silverstone and Renee Ramsey at West Point hold, “It is
not hard to find Battalion Commanders who bluntly assert they do not
want their junior leaders thinking strategically; they simply want them to
execute their operational tasks with skill and determination.”32
Former US secretary of defense, Robert M. Gates, took a different
view when he argued “officers of lower and lower rank were put in the
position of making decisions of higher and higher degrees of consequence
and complexity.”33 By suggesting contemporary wars like those in Iraq
and Afghanistan should be understood as “captains’ wars,” he implicitly
recognized junior officers must be able think strategically. In the same
vein, the US Department of Defense Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
stipulates, “It’s imperative that we encourage commanders at all levels to
find innovative ways to accomplish the mission.”34 This is also reflected
in a US House of Representatives’ initiative to “sponsor a number of
29     Grome, Crandall, and Dominquez, “Exploring Strategic Thinking,” 249–50; and Paul K. Van
Riper, “The Identification and Education of U.S. Army Strategic Thinkers,” in Wolters, Grome, and
Hinds, Exploring Strategic Thinking, 22–26.
30     Quoted in Andrew Erdman, “How Militaries Learn and Adapt: An Interview with Major
General H. R. McMaster,” McKinsey & Company, April 2013.
31     AJP 5, 3-1–3-2.
32     Scott A. Silverstone and Renee Ramsey, “Who Are We Teaching: Future Second Lieutenants
or Strategic Leaders? Education for Strategic Thinking and Action,” in “International Relations in
Professional Military Education,” ed. William F. Owen, special edition, Infinity Journal (Winter 2016):
10–15.
33     Robert M. Gates, “Secretary of Defense Speech” (speech, United States Military Academy,
West Point, NY, February 25, 2011).
34     US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Innovative Examples: Exercising Mission Command through
Memoranda of Understanding” (white paper, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015), 2.
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junior/company grade officers for PhDs in strategic studies including
history, political science, international relations, and economics at toptier civilian institutions.”35
Few scholars explore how such calls may be implemented at the
junior level in the chain of command, as most literature focuses on the
executive level.36 Nor do the calls seem to be reflected in the curricula of
American PME before its final level. The West Point lecturers observe,
“Education on strategy is first treated deliberately if an officer attends a
Senior Service College (SSC) in later years of a full career, but a relatively
small number of officers in each year group is given this opportunity.”37
Strategic thinking tends to be wrapped in an aura of elitism.
Celestino Perez Jr. takes issue with this military mindset. Along the
lines of McMaster above, Perez advocates officers learn early in their
career how to understand and engage with the microdynamics of local
conflicts and any bottom-up effects on the broader conflict.38 Engaging
with the microdynamics of local conflicts as well as with bottom-up
effects are clearly relevant to PME but take time to learn. Unfortunately,
for that reason alone they may be left out at the precommissioning level to
allocate otherwise limited time to the broad array of other proficiencies
cadets are tasked to gain. In that case, the educational method suggested
in this article can be useful. Although no substitute for strategic thinking
in the broad sense of the term, strategic mindedness will be useful and
only takes a few days to grasp.

Conclusion

Senior officials of defense establishments desire junior military
officers to learn to think strategically. As a contribution to this challenge,
this article has presented one of the NMA’s educational methods to
teach precommissioned officers to approach tasks guided by what they
shall achieve (ends) within the framework of Lykke’s conception of
military strategy. Inspired by insights from the sociology of professions,
a technical and a value-based form of strategic mindedness is proposed.
The former draws from established procedures and practices to find
ways to achieve ends, while the latter requires professional judgment
that identifies ways to achieve ends by balancing these with related risks
and concerns. An adapted version of Toulmin’s rhetorical model serves
to develop such cognitive capabilities. By visualizing the four essential
components of a military strategy (Lykke), the model helps cadets given

35     Quoted in Van Riper, “Identification and Education,” 22.
36     Lynda Liddy, “The Strategic Corporal: Some Requirements in Training and Education,”
Australian Army Journal 2, no. 2 (Autumn 2004): 139–48; Matthew Cavanaugh, “On Strategic
Understanding: Teaching Strategy from the Ground Up,” Military Review 94, no. 4 (July–August
2014): 13–18; and Raymond Millen, “Cultivating Strategic Thinking: The Eisenhower Model,”
Parameters 42, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 56–70; and Daniel H. McCauley, “Rediscovering the Art of
Strategic Thinking: Developing 21st Century Strategic Leaders,” Joint Forces Quarterly 81 (2nd Quarter
2016): 26–33.
37     Silverstone and Ramsey, “Who Are We Teaching.”
38     Perez, “Errors in Strategic Thinking.”
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a task focus on the end and find a reasonable way to achieve it, taking
into consideration available means and risks involved.
The educational approach presented here does not purport to
cover the broad field of strategic thinking but is offered as one of
several methods to learn to think strategically. It is compatible with
many other treatments of the topic in the literature and can be learned
relatively quickly. Hence, Toulmin’s adapted model could be useful if
US precommissioning officer education endeavors to develop strategicminded junior officers.
An increased focus on cultivating strategic-minded junior officers
may improve the chances officers make expedient decisions, but it
cannot prevent fatal decisions. What such a focus can do, however,
is establish a better understanding that unfortunate outcomes are not
necessarily the result of incompetence or carelessness but may reside in
weak warrants that characterize the military field of expertise. Even the
most informed and conscientious military decision offers no guarantee
for success. Understanding this may help officers carry the burden of
their professional responsibility more easily.
Moreover, the ability to reason convincingly may help an officer
whose judgments are being questioned. This is particularly critical in
public debates where the outcome will have implications not only for the
officer’s reputation but also for the armed forces. Thus when unwanted
military incidents make breaking news, a reasonable explanation from
the commanding officer may well be the armed forces’ strongest line of
defense of its most vital asset: society’s trust.
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ABSTRACT: Since the Cold War, the Royal Danish Military Academy
has proven highly adaptable. The officer training curriculum has
responded to significant changes in Denmark’s strategic culture and
today produces lieutenants capable of bearing complex leadership
responsibilities in fluid operating environments.

T

he ideal Danish officer during the Cold War was modeled along
the lines of a citizen soldier—a democratic-minded officer who,
under the threat of nuclear war, was the so-called “insurance
policy not to be used.”1 But today’s first lieutenants are seen as future
strategic enablers, sent abroad to fight wherever and whenever the
United States or United Kingdom calls. Accordingly, the skills and mindset of the young officers need to be radically different from what they
were during the Cold War—during training, they must develop a sense
of strategic mindedness. The Royal Danish Military Academy located at
Frederiksberg Palace in Copenhagen has educated Danish army officers
since 1869. And while the physical place remains the same, the training
has changed noticeably since the end of the Cold War.
In this article, we argue that changes in how a small state like
Denmark views the role of its military—and implicitly, the role of the
officer corps—reflect changes in the country’s strategic environment
and strategic culture. These shifts can be seen in the teaching of young
officer cadets. There is no straight line, however. Rather, intervening
factors at the organizational level as well as a certain time lag between
changes in the strategic environment and changes in the educational
system affect what cadets are taught.
The article proceeds in three sections exploring how changes in the
strategic environment and the strategic culture have affected the role of
the military and thus the ideals behind the training of junior officers.
First, after briefly presenting our theoretical framework, we discuss the
design of Danish officer training during the Cold War with its focus on
securing a democratic mind-set in the young officer corps, following the
post-Second World War ideal of a democratic citizen soldier. Second, the
article presents marked changes made to Danish officer training during
the late 1990s and early 2000s, due to Denmark’s increased focus on
expeditionary forces and the perceived need for a strategic lieutenant

1     Unless otherwise noted, all translations are provided by the authors.
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capable of acting efficiently in a multinational environment far away
from home.
Third, as a result of changes in the strategic environment after 2014,
Denmark is in a situation where it is difficult for Danish politicians
to choose between staying committed to the concept of expeditionary
forces or returning to territorial defense. They seem to have ended up
with a compromise between the two overall strategic outlooks—doing
both with only a modest increase in defense spending. We conclude with
a short discussion on how this has affected officer training and what
possible tensions could arise as a small state like Denmark adapts to
changes in the strategic environment.

Changes in Junior Officer Education

In order to answer how (or if) changes in the strategic environment
have affected the training of junior officers, we must consider the
strategic environment—the context within which foreign and security
policy decisionmakers operate. These decisionmakers find themselves
under constraints from changes in the structure of the international
system and at the regional level, as well as under pressures from different
intervening domestic variables, which may constrain or divert foreign
policy in unexpected ways.2 Changes (or perceptions of change) in
the relative distribution of power in the international system or at the
regional level—the shift from the bipolar order of the Cold War to the
unipolar order of the post-Cold War period to the beginning multipolar
order of post-2014—affect the outlook of states, perhaps especially
small states, and the way foreign policy decisionmakers view the utility
of the use of force.
Policy adaptations may not take effect overnight; in the case of
Denmark, there seems to be a time lag between the mental realization
of change and subsequent shifts in policy. What comes to the fore in our
analysis, however, is an apparent small-state adaptability. This is perhaps
due to the small size of Danish strategic culture, as well as a fair amount
of organizational flexibility within the Danish armed forces, which went
within a short time span from wholesale territorial defense (and in reality
nonuse of armed force) to expeditionary forces involved in missions far
away from the homeland.
Domestic variables also affect foreign and security policy elites’ view
on the utility (and legitimacy) of the use of force. Traditions play a part,
and intervening variables such as values, threat perceptions, national
identity, and history all form the strategic culture of a given state.3
Accordingly, we focus on how strategic culture affects the choices of
decisionmakers trying to adapt to changes in the strategic environment.
Perceptions and choices of decisionmakers seep down the bureaucracy
2     Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of
Grand Strategy Formation,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 1 (2010): 117–43.
3     Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture. (Does Strategic Culture Matter?)”
International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 32–64; and Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and World Politics
After World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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and eventually form military doctrine, training, and overall education—
in our case, officer training. So in a sense, officer training is variable: it
depends on changes in the strategic environment and how these changes
are perceived in the strategic culture.
Changes in officer education happen through direct intervention
by the ministry of defense, the ministry of education, or other
government agencies dealing with defense. Changes also occur through
internalization of the strategic culture mind-set in the officer corps, in
part stemming from public discourse, but also from courses at officer
training institutions and by experiences of officers returning from
deployment. A third path is the influence of teachers and staff on the
chosen curriculum and teaching methods at the military academies.
Taking a closer look at officer training in Denmark, we can
detect changes related to overall shifts in perceptions of the strategic
environment, albeit with a certain time lag. Despite this delay, Denmark
has shown substantial adaptability to changes in the strategic environment
both in the role of the military as an instrument of foreign policy and in
the training of the ideal officer. Surprisingly, Denmark’s shift from being
a foot-dragging member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in
the 1980s to being one of the most eager participants among the smaller
NATO members, happened almost without any tension or constraints.

The Cold War and Its Aftermath

During the Cold War, Denmark found an international position by
adapting to the bipolar condition with realist pragmatism. Issues closely
related to security policy were guided by our NATO membership and
a policy of non-offensive behavior toward the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). On other less security-oriented issues, Denmark
pursued an activist policy of international détente, strengthening the
United Nations and international regulations and working for liberal
egalitarian values derived from its perception of itself as a northern
small state with a unique mix of a capitalist economy and social security
for all citizens.4
The overall threat perception and the Danish way of handling Cold
War confrontations had numerous effects on defense policy and officer
education from the 1960s onward. Military forces were critical in UN
peacekeeping missions throughout the period. But in all other respects,
the military instrument was for nonuse only and did not play a huge
part in Danish foreign policy. It was the insurance policy you hope not
to use. The strategic culture at that time affected the education of young
officers greatly by institutionalizing distinct ideals—the ideal of citizen
soldiers combined with the ideal of antiauthoritarian leadership and
democratic culture also in the military.

4     Anders Wivel, “Still Living in the Shadow of 1864? Danish Foreign Policy and the Origins of
Denmark’s Pragmatic Activism,” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2014, ed. Nanna Hvidt and Hans
Mouritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2014), 131.
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Even the role of the armed forces as a deterrent toward the USSR
was only fully supported by parties belonging to the center-right wing
in parliament and parts of the Social Democratic Party. The rest of the
parties and a large part of the public believed deterrence was adding
to the tensions between the two superpowers and wanted Denmark
instead to enhance dialogue and détente and adopt moralistic stands.
These negative views on power politics had an effect on Denmark’s
relationship to NATO. Thus, the minority governments of the
conservative Prime Minister Poul Schlüter from 1982 to 1993 were
forced by the left-leaning majority to insist upon adding footnotes with
minority views in central NATO papers on the so-called Double-Track
Decision.5 This strongly irritated the United States, which concluded
that Denmark probably would continue to be one of the softer members
of NATO.6 This continued until the mid-1980s.
The citizen-soldier ideal, the central ethos of the Danish
conscription-based army after the Second World War, was also strongly
inspired by the postwar German version of Bürger in Uniform (citizen
in uniform). Ideas echoing both the citizen soldier and the Bürger in
Uniform were almost tailored to the small state anxiety toward power.
This was further enhanced by an understanding that Danish political
values regarding international justice and equality were better served
through international cooperation than through military buildup.7
This small state identity and the dislike and unease concerning
power were given a new dimension during the Cold War, where fear
of outside threats was supplemented with threats from within society.
One of these concerns was the potential nondemocratic mind-set of the
military leadership. Another was the concern that citizens, inspired by
communist thinking, would take up arms against the state. This threat
perception had a direct impact on officer training, primarily on the need
to internalize civic virtues in the officer corps. It also affected the whole
approach to officer-subordinate interactions and how future officers
themselves should be treated at the academy.8
Civilian norms—the strengthening of topics such as psychology
and pedagogy—can be seen as illustrations of the enhancement of
civilian control. Social sciences teaching and the introduction of norms
from society together would shape a less authoritarian culture in the
Army under explicit democratic control all the way into the classroom.
The introduction of the social sciences served no instrumental function
5     NATO, “Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The ‘Double-Track’ Decision
on Theatre Nuclear Forces),” December 12, 1979, Official texts, NATO, last updated November
9, 2010.
6     Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig: Den sikkerhedspolitiske
situation 1945–1991 [Denmark during the Cold War: The security policy situation 1945-1991], vol. 2,
1963-1978 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005).
7     Hans Branner, Danmark i en større verden: Udenrigspolitik efter 1945 [Denmark in a greater world:
Foreign policy after 1945] (Copenhagen: Columbus, 1995); Henning Duus (former teacher, Royal
Danish Army Academy), interview by authors (transcript in Danish), March 7, 2017; and Wivel,
“Shadow of 1864?” 118–22.
8     Ellen Jans (former teacher, Royal Danish Naval Academy), interview by authors (transcript in
Danish), 2017, 1.
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at the time, just as there was no call for tasks requiring a political or
strategic mind-set. It all came down to shaping and securing liberal
democratic values from top to bottom in the military.
Looking at changes in Danish strategic culture from the Cold War
until 2001, it is surprising to see how views from the Cold War period still
had a significant influence on officer training and perceptions regarding
tasks they might have been required to solve in the 1990s. It was still
essential that future officers were democratic citizens first, diplomats
(with arms) second. However, they were never seen as strategic actors.

Instruction in the Social Sciences: 1980–2001

Social science was first introduced at the academy in 1967.9 It
consisted of modern history with a focus on economic, social, and
political development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
idea was to introduce the cadets to the overall lines of the political and
legal systems in Denmark and provide them with a basic understanding
of sociology and macroeconomics. The very wide range of topics is
rather illustrative of the perception at the time—officers build their
character through general insights into the foundations of the state and
the liberal democratic system.
Little in the way of teaching plans, reading lists, and so on has
survived from this period. But in interviews with former teachers,
the following examples of topics and texts are mentioned. In the late
1980s, the focus on the Bürger in Uniform inspired teaching gleaned from
Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations (1957). Samuel E. Finer’s The Man on Horseback: The
Role of the Military in Politics (1962) addressed issues such as the optimal
degree of separation between a civilian government and its army. Other
subjects included questions on whether the military should be entirely
subordinate to the polity and the dangers of military dictatorship.10
In the early 1990s, topics under the heading of political science
included the Danish political system, political ideologies, comparative
political studies, foreign policy, defense policy, and international
relations, thus still highly focused on securing the democratic mindset of officers. Following the changing environment for Danish foreign
policy, knowledge about international relations and international
political theories began to play a more significant role combined with an
understanding of public international law. These insights would build
character and enable the officer to engage in conversations at all levels
of society without losing face, thus giving him or her the confidence to
act as a civil servant.11

9     Betænkning: Befalingsmandsuddannelsen og arbejdsklimaet i Forsvaret, 3. del - Uddannelsen af Forsvarets
befalingsmænd [Report: Officers training and the working climate in the Defence Forces, part 3 – The
training of the Defence Forces officer], Betænkning nr. 516 (Copenhagen: Forsvaret, 1969), 31.
10     Duus, interview, 5.
11     Duus, interview, 5.
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The values and choices that stem from the strategic culture of the
small-state narrative did not change substantially before 2001. What
did change after the Cold War was the possibility that a small state,
such as Denmark, could use military means as an essential resource
in foreign policy.12 Changes in the strategic environment created a
rather exceptional situation. First, the Danish Defence Commission of
1997 stated: “It is the assessment of the commission that Denmark is
currently enjoying a security-geographic location which implies peace
of an almost unprecedented kind. It is also the commission’s assessment
that there will not be a direct conventional military threat to Denmark’s
security over the next ten years.”13
For the left-wing parties, benevolent international developments in
the 1990s meant less skepticism toward the defense forces as such and
a more optimistic view of the military as an instrument for state policy.
As a consequence, officers in the Danish Army were given an additional
role. They were going to be ‘“diplomats in uniform.’”14 Secondly, the
Baltic States came to play a very important part in understanding how
the military could play an important role in nation building as opposed
to warfighting. Tasks for the Danish military in the newly independent
democratic Baltic States had a large influence in how the idea of diplomats
in uniform materialized.
One of the main foreign policy priorities for Denmark during this
period was the integration of the new Baltic States into the European
societies’ mix of market economy and liberal democracy. The Danish
armed forces played a central part in this endeavor by helping to ensure
the Baltic defense agencies came under strict civilian control and
incorporated a democratic non-nationalistic and nonauthoritarian mindset. The example of the Danish citizen soldier here is obvious—these
officers in the mid-1990s were the essential medium of delivery for the
export of Danish core values.
Denmark took the lead in establishing a joint Baltic defense college
in Tartu, Estonia, and led the training and preparation for the joint
Baltic peacekeeping battalion that was to be deployed under the UN flag
in the former Yugoslavia.15 The transition of the role of the military from
an insurance policy not to be used to a valuable asset or tool for foreign
policy happened almost without any tensions or constraints. This can be
attributed to the aforementioned external and internal conditions that
facilitated a very positive interplay between the strategic environment
and the strategic culture.
By the end of the 1990s, the growing focus on the officer as
diplomat and the many deployments of officers in the Yugoslav conflict
12     Wivel, “Shadow of 1864?” 125–27.
13     Forsvarskommissionen, Fremtidens forsvar: Beretning fra Forsvarskommissionen af 1997
(Copenhagen: Danish Defence Commission, 1997), 21.
14     Jans, interview, 1–2.
15     Nikolaj Petersen, “Tilbage til Baltikum: Den nye dimension i dansk udenrigspolitik,” in
Danmark i syv sind: Tusind år i dansk udenrigspolitik, ed. Carsten Due-Nielsen, Ole Feldbæk, and Nikolaj
Petersen (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2000), 165.
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meant international relations became the most important topic of social
sciences teaching. The building of character, the development of civic
virtues, and teaching that focused on civilized behavior and being a
well-spoken, well-informed member of society slowly, but inevitably lost
space in the curriculum.16 In many respects, these values were now more
or less taken for granted. Instead, the attention was on how Danish
core values, which made Danish society stable, prosperous, and secure,
could be exported to other states. Although developing diplomats in
uniform could be seen as a more instrumental approach to the social
sciences teaching compared to the development of the Bürger in Uniform,
it was still radically different from what was to come.

After 9/11: Junior Officers as Strategic Enablers

The pro-US line in Danish foreign policy, developed throughout the
1990s, was markedly enhanced after the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, and energetically promoted by then Prime Minister Anders
Fogh Rasmussen who later became NATO secretary general.17 Thus, the
somewhat foot-dragging Danish response to the use of military force,
which had characterized Danish foreign policy thinking since the end of
the Second World War, was replaced by what some have labeled “super
Atlanticism.” Relations with Washington went from warm in the 1990s
to persistently good after 2001.18
Following the 9/11 attacks, Denmark followed the path of the United
Kingdom and played the part of the loyal ally staunchly supporting the
US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.19 The driving actor here was Prime
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. In a series of speeches and newspaper
comments, he successfully argued, that the need to act decisively
alongside the United States after 9/11 underlined a clear stand against
the former small state mentality from the past—most importantly the
Danish government’s initial cooperation with Nazi Germany during the
occupation in the Second World War and the Danish footnote policy in
NATO in the 1980s.20 “The cooperation with the USA is not a policy
of adaptation. It is a natural cooperation with a like-minded friend,
partner and ally, which celebrates the same principles and values, as we

16     Jans, interview, 2.
17     Anders Wivel, “Between Paradise and Power: Denmark’s Transatlantic Dilemma,” Security
Dialogue 36, no. 3 (September 2005): 417–21.
18     Hans Mouritzen, “Denmark’s Super Atlanticism,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 5, no.
2 (2007): 155–67; and Anders Henriksen and Jens Ringsmose, Hvad fik Danmark ud af det? Irak,
Afghanistan og forholdet til Washington, DIIS Report 2011:14 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for
International Studies, 2011).
19     Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, “Size and Reputation – Why the USA Has Valued
Its ‘Special Relationships’ with Denmark and the UK Differently since 9/11,” Journal of Transatlantic
Studies 13, no. 2 (2015): 135–53.
20     Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “60 året for 29. august 1943” [60 Years for 29 August 1943],
Taler Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Statsministeriet, August 29, 2003; and Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
“Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussens (V) nytårstale 1. Januar 2002” [Prime Minister Anders Fogh
Rasmussen’s New Years speech 1 January 2002], danmarkshistorien Aarhus Universitet (website),
January 1, 2002.
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do: Democracy, freedom of speech, market economy and respect for
human rights.”21
A further enabling factor of this change was the absence of a direct
military threat to Danish territory. A report from the Danish Defence
Commission of 2003 argued the “direct conventional threat toward
Danish territory has disappeared in the foreseeable future.”22 After
having lived on the frontline of a possible nuclear war between NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces during the Cold War, the very absence of the
threat of nuclear destruction enhanced the public’s acceptance of the use
of military force.
From the early 2000s, the Danish armed forces acting as an
expeditionary force used as a foreign policy tool of the Danish state
in order to underpin the special relationship with the one power that
could guarantee Danish national security (through NATO)—the United
States. Furthermore, it supported the hope for a liberal world order of
democracies and human rights. Danish participation in the US-led
intervention in Iraq, the result of a very small majority in parliament,
briefly looked like a constraint to the Danish policy of military activism.
But, in the end the liberal values behind the military missions in both
Afghanistan and Iraq helped pave the way for a broad political consensus
and public support for the utility of military force and implicitly, a more
strategic role for officers.

Instruction in the Social Sciences: 2001–2014

The change from territorial defense toward an expeditionary force
had a marked effect on officer training, albeit with a certain time lag.
Thus, even though the need for changes in the syllabus was mounting
due to changes in the strategic environment, it was not until the shock of
9/11 that the Royal Danish Defence College launched an overall revision
of officer training on account of the “changed basic conditions.”23
Major General Karsten J. Møller, then Commandant of the Royal
Danish Defence College, outlined three overall developments that in
his perception had changed the nature of war in the twenty-first century
and, therefore, the basic conditions of officer training: 1) the end of
the Cold War and the end of bipolarity; 2) the change of the nature
of war from interstate wars toward intrastate wars (new wars); and 3)
globalization, which meant “no states or regions can allow themselves
to ignore basic problems and conflicts in remote parts of the world.”24

21     Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussens tale ved Forsvarsakademiets
årsdag fredag den 31. oktober 2003” (speech, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, October
31, 2003).
22     Forsvarskommissionen, De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarspolitik (Copenhagen:
Danish Defence Commission, August 2003), 10.
23     Karsten Jakob Møller, “Den videregående officersuddannelse i det 21. århundrede: War
Studies eller krigsvidenskab som kernelement?” [The 21st century higher education officer:
War Studies or war science as the key element?] (working paper, Royal Danish Defence College,
Copenhagen, April 2007), 23.
24     Møller, 3.
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At the 175th birthday of the Royal Danish Defence College in 2005,
Møller described the role of the Danish officer as “warrior, diplomat and
business leader.”25 With this revision of the overall education, the role of
Danish officers changed from the notion of “citizens in uniform”—that
it was hoped would never have to be used in war but who had special
responsibilities as guardians of the democratic state—to a new, more
instrumental role with specific skills and with a practical and immediate
use—Danish officers were to lead troops at war.
The international combat mission that arguably had the most
substantial effect in changing the outlook of the Danish military (army)
was the deployment to Afghanistan as part of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). Denmark first sent special forces in late 2001,
and in 2002, deployed around 200 regular soldiers alongside German,
Dutch, and Austrian forces in the German-led battlegroup in Kabul,
Feyzabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif in the northern, more peaceful part of
Afghanistan. When NATO took over ISAF in 2003, and in 2005 decided
to widen the area of operations to the southern and less peaceful parts of
Afghanistan, Denmark took on new responsibilities.
First, at the beginning of 2006 Denmark increased its deployed
forces to 360, then to 640 (2007), and finally to 750 (2008) as part of a
British-led battlegroup deployed to the Helmand province in the southern
part of Afghanistan. Here the mission went from peacekeeping to peace
enforcement and included some of the roughest fighting Danish forces
had participated in since the war in 1864 against Prussia and Austria.
This fighting resulted in a casualty figure of 44 dead and 214 wounded
(from 2002 on). Considering the size of the Danish population, this was
the highest casualty rate among the participating NATO countries.26
To justify this, the Danish government argued NATO’s mission was
progressing and things were getting better in Afghanistan. “The buildup
of democracy has been forwarded. Women’s rights and possibilities are
greatly improved, and equal rights are inscribed in the constitution.”27
Also, the Danish government assigned great weight to education,
another important issue among Danish voters. Essentially, the Danish
Army was on a mission to do good in the world. The increased focus
on democracy, education, and women’s rights affected the demands on
the military. To translate these political goals into results on the ground,
Danish officers had to focus on nation building, capacity building in
weak states, and human rights, and they had to have a more advanced
understanding of international law, culture, and Islam, while at the same
time fighting (or learning to fight) a counterinsurgency.
When then Lieutenant Colonel Mads Rahbek took over the post
as head of the officers’ primary training (chief of basic training) at the
25     Møller, 3.
26     Forsvarsministeriet, “Faldne og sårede” [Dead and Wounded], Forsvarsministeriet
Personalestyrelse, accessed October 31, 2014, last updated August 20, 2019.
27     Folketinget, “B 161 Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om styrkelse af det danske bidrag til den
internationale sikkerhedsstyrke ISAF i Afghanistan” [Law B 161 on the Danish Participation in
Afghanistan], Folketinget, October 5, 2007.
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Royal Danish Military Academy in 2008, after having been deployed
to the Helmand province in Afghanistan in the second half of 2007
on Danish ISAF team 4, he had a clear idea of what was expected of
future young officers and why. One of the changes Rahbek made was
to introduce scenarios with staff operations synthesizing most of the
courses that were taught at the academy, to make the scenarios as real
as possible.
One of the scenarios, a five-week integrated course at the end of
the curriculum and taught for several years was a “deployment” to
the Helmand province. Here the cadets were faced with constantly
changing problems and tasks, requiring them to understand the area’s
history and hone the ability to collect knowledge of different conflicts
in the deployment area and on its borders. Cadets had to plan patrols,
incorporating knowledge of physical resilience and training, tactics,
leadership, and cultural studies as well as taking into account the mental
strain these patrols would have on their men. As Mads Rahbek argues,
“The basic training in tactics at platoon leader level was the prerequisite
for solving problems at staff operations, but now there were also so
unbelievably many more stakeholders involved as well as available assets
at the platoon leader level which he had to be able to handle.”28
Essentially, the task was to train strategically minded officers. As
Major Thomas Munch, commanding officer for class Storrud from 2009
to 2012, argued, “everything became more serious. It was absolutely
clear a large percentage [of the cadets] would join high-risk missions. We
experienced a marked rise in professionalism.”29
The new officer training at the academy included cultural studies.
The importance of culture studies for officers gradually became
obvious after the first missions in Iraq, but more so after the missions to
Helmand. Battle assessment reports from the Helmand province led the
Army Command to press for changes in officer education. At the Royal
Danish Military Academy, leadership concluded that a lack of cultural
sensitivity in the Danish officer corps could hamper missions in the
future. Therefore cultural studies were included in the syllabus as an
integral part of understanding international society, the way other states
function, and as part of political science classes on weak states.
It was also seen as a necessary precondition for establishing contact
with the local population in a mission area. As Rahbek argues, the
rationale for teaching cadets cultural studies and political science was
for them “to understand the context within which the international
operation’s tasks were to be solved.” This signaled a marked shift in
Danish officers’ training. During the 1980s and 1990s a subject such as
cultural studies or religion would have been taught for the purpose of
building character so young officers would be educated and polite; now

28     Mads Rahbek, interview by authors (transcription in Danish), May 2018.
29     Thomas Munch, interview by authors (transcription in Danish), July 5, 2018.
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it was on the syllabus due to its instrumental function—cultural studies
was deemed necessary because it could help win wars.30
Changes in officer training were further reinforced by domestic
reforms in the overall Danish education system, which required new
academic abilities in officer education. The pressure for reform resulted
from an enquiry from the Danish Evaluation Institute, commissioned
by the Danish Ministry of Defence in 2002–3 to evaluate Danish
officer training. As part of the process, all of the institutes and officer
academies were asked to conduct a guided self-evaluation of the purpose
and methods of the training in question. The description provided by
the Royal Danish Military Academy of officer training was that it should
produce a junior officer capable of being “a military leader ( fører) of a
tactical unit” as well as “a business leader of a military workplace” and
“act in an international environment.”31 Gone, or at least significantly
reduced, was the influence of the idea of citizens in uniform.

New Strategic Outlooks

Five years after the annexation of Crimea, with continuous tensions
between Russia and its neighbors, growing public awareness of Russian
influence campaigns in Europe and the United States, and in a situation
where NATO is reinventing deterrence measures on its eastern borders
close to Denmark, the training of first lieutenants is once again in a
process of reform. Consequently, we have seen changes at the Royal
Danish Military Academy, proving once more its ability to readily adapt
to the strategic environment.
In tactics, focus has shifted from stabilization operations to
preparations for conventional warfare. In leadership, discussions on how
to change the mind-set of officers to make them more risk-taking and
less sensitive to losses fill the hallways. Cultural awareness classes have
been removed from the curriculum. Teachers are asking themselves,
What are the core competencies required by officers in the near future?
Danish strategic culture is not on the verge of returning to a time of
pacifism or power evasiveness, shying away from using military forces
as a political instrument as in the 1970s and 1980s. Nor are we seeing a
return to more simple tasks for officers—being exclusively devoted to
territorial defense and international peacekeeping missions where the
conflicting parties are duly separated. There is a general agreement that
complex conflicts are here to stay, globalization has seriously challenged
the sovereign state, and the ongoing struggles are taking place among
the people.
Even the “deployable deterrence” of Russia will call for strategically
minded officers who can mitigate false information, apply digital assets
with care, interface with strategic partners—military and civilian alike,
and who are sensitive to the political as well as strategic consequences
30     Rahbek, interview.
31     Danmarks Evalueringsinstitut (EVA), Forsvarets linieofficersuddannelser, Selvevalueringsrapport,
Bilag 4 (Copenhagen: EVA, 2003), 4:2. Also see p. 32.
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of their own behavior and that of their men and women in the local
community.32 Today’s missions may not have the same close connection
to liberal values or so clearly reflect Danish core values as was the case
in both the Baltic States in the 1990s or the mission in Afghanistan. But
they still have broad support in the public as well as in parliament. The
positive perception of the utility of force and of officers as a tool for a
more secure and safe world is well established in Danish strategic culture
after many years of an activist international foreign policy.

Conclusion

Officer training is not a timeless and unchangeable effort. Rather, it
shifts over time according to changes in the strategic environment and
in the strategic culture—at least in the Danish case. Thus, the very idea
of an officer’s role (the ideal officer) is dependent upon how the armed
forces view what type of threats and missions, it should prepare for.
This is dependent on how foreign and security policymakers view the
strategic environment and the utility of force—an assessment which is
formed within the country’s strategic culture.
During the Cold War, the Danish armed forces were seen as the
“insurance policy you hoped not to use,” and their role was mainly as a
deterrent of the Warsaw Pact, together with other NATO forces. The
officer’s role was modeled along the lines of the citizen soldier, a soldier
one hoped never to use in actual combat. The secondary role of the
officers was to serve as guardians against internal antidemocratic forces,
be they right or left wing. After the Cold War, the Danish officer’s role
changed slowly through the 1990s, when the Danish armed forces
helped establish and form new defense forces in the newly independent
Baltic States. The mission there was essentially a nation-building project,
and the role of the Danish officer was broadened to also encompass the
role as a diplomat in uniform. However, the citizen soldier ideal was still
intact, and the involvement in the Baltic States was primarily the export
of core national values.
After the shock of 9/11 when Denmark chose to support the US-led
war on terror, the Danish officer’s role changed again. Gone was the
idea of the officer as a guardian of democracy (a citizen soldier). Instead,
a new, more instrumental officer’s role with specific skills and with
practical and immediate use in mind emerged. From 2001 on, Danish
officers were to be trained to serve as warriors, diplomats, and business
leaders (organizational leaders). The first role—leading soldiers in
battle—was clearly the one that received the most focus. The combat
missions in Afghanistan rapidly changed from peacekeeping to peace
enforcement.
Alongside the warfighting role, the Danish officers also had to use
their diplomatic skills among the ISAF partners, as well as use their
knowledge from the newly implemented cultural awareness classes to
32     Jakobsen and Ringsmose, “Size and Reputation.”
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conduct outreach programs and civil-military cooperation projects to
benefit the local population. Danish officers became strategic enablers.
For more than a decade, the Royal Danish Military Academy had
clear goals and missions. The hard missions in Afghanistan and Iraq
meant education and related activities served a direct and necessary
purpose—building nations, strengthening institutions, and providing
security—thus enabling local populations to build better lives. Clear
goals and an almost existential demand for education and development
of needed competencies for the young officers is gone, replaced by
uncertainty and unpredictability. To prepare the strategic-minded
lieutenant for an uncertain world, it seems essential to develop cadets
who can make sound judgments and who are sensitive to values and
perceptions across a range of stakeholders. These skills require a solid
understanding of international relations as well as diplomatic skills and
the ability to behave correctly among people with other values and
manners.
Moreover, good judgment must derive from knowledge of and
commitment to fundamental values and ideas that our liberal societies are
built on. Thus, some requirements at the Royal Danish Military Academy
from the Cold War period focused on developing citizen soldiers may
find their way back into the curricula. As Western liberal values are
contested in a more multipolar world, it becomes highly important to
ensure officer’s values and judgments rest on these principles. To sum
up, the tasks of the strategically minded lieutenant in the (near) future
could look like this—military leader, diplomat, and democrat, ready for
an uncertain world.
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Commentary and Reply
On “Civil-Military Relations and Today’s
Policy Environment”
George J. Fust
This commentary responds to Thomas N. Garner’s article “Civil-Military Relations and
Today’s Policy Environment” published in the Winter 2018–19 issue of Parameters (vol.
48, no. 4).

T

homas Garner, my peer and former United States Military
Academy Department of Social Science alumnus, offers
commentary suggesting it is the military’s responsibility to bridge
the civil-military divide.1 He also places the blame for this divide squarely
on the military. This is an unfair assertion and a one-sided argument
replete with faulty logic and fallacies. The author leverages select readings
from the syllabus for an American politics course taught to all cadets at
the United States Military Academy. Several key readings are missing from
his approach. More importantly, he fails to address the contemporary
literature that offers a holistic framework for assessing who is really at
fault for the civil-military divide.
The material he failed to highlight also offers alternative perspectives
on how to resolve this friction point. The civil-military divide is not an
existential threat as Garner suggests. The beauty of the western civilmilitary relations system he describes is its stability. Scholars and pundits
offer commentary on the fringes of civil-military relations theory and
often portray unhealthy civil-military interactions to be direr than they
really are. Garner’s article is one such example.
To begin, Garner asserts: “The problem is that civilian trust in the
military institution is becoming meaningless because of the public’s
lack of understanding of the military and the military’s acceptance of
that trust as confirmation of its efforts. Therefore, the onus is on the
military to be far more critical of itself than the public.”2 No evidence
for this assertion is given. It also does not take into account the current
oversight from the media and Congress.3 One only needs to watch the
latest congressional committee grilling of academy superintendents over
sexual assault reform to understand.4
Another possibility not taken into consideration is the military could
be doing the right thing. The military services have been transparent
in recent years regarding senior leader misconduct. This effort has
continued despite trends suggesting no change in behavioral trends.
1     Thomas N. Garner, “Civil-Military Relations and Today’s Policy Environment,” Parameters 48,
no. 4 (Winter 2018–19): 5–9.
2     Garner, “Civil Military Relations,” 7.
3     Frank Jones, “A Strategic Congress Emerges: National Security and the 116th Congress,” War
Room US Army War College, August 12, 2019.
4     “Sexual Assault at Military Service Academies,” C-SPAN, February 13, 2019.
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Should the services highlight failures simply to highlight them? The
public has a tendency to weigh in when reform is required. Retired
senior leaders also demonstrate their willingness to police other leaders
or criticize them when required. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Retired General Martin E. Dempsey, is well-known for calling out the
negative behaviors of other general officers.5 In short, Garner’s premise
that the military does not have adequate self-criticism is unfounded.
The second main argument Garner makes is the military has not
earned the trust bestowed on it but merely receives it as a result of a
lack of “meaningful connection” between the military and society.6
Civil-military relations theory does not make a distinction about types
of trust or how it is generated. A 1962 classic work by Samuel E. Finer,
The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, explains the
foundation of healthy civil-military relations require society to trust and
respect the military.7 Is it possible to have unearned trust? If perception
is what Garner meant, he is still off base. Eric Nordlinger theorizes in
Soldiers in Politics, when public perception of the military is high, good
civil-military relations can occur.8 Again, he draws no distinction on the
efficacy of the perception because perception is reality.
The counterargument to Garner’s “lack of meaningful connections”
is an easy one. Connections between society and the military are
constantly on display. Debates over flag burning or kneeling at football
games are two contemporary examples that highlight ongoing debates
involving society and the military. If anything, the military has become
uncomfortable with the amount of connections being made to it.9
Politicians, notably the sitting president, routinely invoke the military
and draw it into the political realm.10 There is no lack of conversation
today surrounding the military and its role in society.
If one does not buy into this counterargument, another approach
can be employed. Perhaps it is not the soldier who has lost touch, but
society. Soldiers are reminded of their oath to serve. They are reminded
of the cost when wavng goodbye to family members on a tarmac.
They know why they serve. It is society that needs the reminder. The
“meaningful connection” is the social contract, otherwise known in our
system as the Constitution. Montesquieu and the Federalist outline our
representative democracy. The citizens elect someone to speak on their
behalf and represent their interests. These representatives must maintain
an understanding of the military. They provide the oversight required
for healthy civil-military relations. As previously indicated, Congress is
currently performing this function.

5     Martin Dempsey, “Keep Your Politics Private, My Fellow Generals and Admirals,” Defense
One, August 1, 2016.
6     Garner, “Civil Military Relations,” 7.
7     Samuel Edward Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York:
Praeger, 1962).
8     Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1977), 127–32.
9     Alex Horton, “Pentagon Tells White House: Keep Politics Away from the Military,” Washington
Post, June 2, 2019; and James Stavridis, “Ret. Admiral: President Trump’s Actions Are Making Many
Military Leaders Uncomfortable,” Time, April 16, 2018.
10     Robert Burns, Lolita Baldor, and Darlene Superville, “Trump Touts July 4 Military ‘Salute;’
Critics See Politics,” Military Times, July 2, 2019.
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Garner’s core argument is the “civil-military rift is the military’s to
close because of the concept of the military profession’s responsibility
to society enumerated by Huntington.”11 This misinterpretation
of Huntington is only plausible because Garner does not offer any
supporting evidence or consider any alternatives. The glaring mistake
is the military has made the relationship with American society work.
In 2019, it was the most trusted institution!12 The history of US civilmilitary relations began with a near coup. George Washington resolved
this mutiny with his famous Newburgh Address and established our
military’s culture of subservience to the civilian government.
Russell Weigley outlined the establishment of the military’s unique
culture from its earliest beginnings, through the Civil War era, to modern
day. He suggested America sent its military into the frontier so it would
not be a threat to society. This fostered a unique culture “of discipline,
virtue, responsibility” within the military but also contributed to its
resentment of society.13 The military saw itself as the keeper of virtue
and honor, which is often referred to as the starting point for the cause
of the divide—resentment. A contemporary analysis by Mara Karlin
argues, “The gap in civilian and military experiences . . . since 9/11 has
led to persuasive, persistent, and unrealistic myths that have eroded faith
in civilian leadership of defense policy.”14 Despite the evidence of a gap,
the US military is not a threat to the society it protects. Nor is there any
indication it will be anytime soon.
Garner criticizes the military for not “conducting outreach,
discussing shared values, and engaging in public discussions.”15 His
recommendations—to have military families leave their garrisons and
move into civilian communities and to have military personnel write
critically of the profession—are already a common occurrence. He fails
to highlight any of the military’s current efforts to connect with society.
The military’s public affairs branch and most major commands have
public engagement as a priority effort. Most units have partnerships with
their local community. They host air shows, fun runs, Fourth of July
celebrations, and vehicle demonstrations. The military funds hundreds
of ROTC programs simply to have a presence in higher education, even
if they are cost-prohibitive. National Football League commercials and
pre-game shows are filled with military linkages. The Army and the Air
Force fund and facilitate World Class Athlete Programs (for athletes
training for the Olympics), which allows these athletes to serve as
ambassadors for the military. A legislative liaison office for each branch
exists in the Pentagon and at every combatant command. What more
can be done?
Garner’s article along with this commentary serves as evidence
that military officers engage in public debate. Garner criticizes
servicemembers for not closing an apparent civil-military gap. He
11     Garner, “Civil Military Relations,” 7.
12     Gallup, “Confidence in Institutions,” poll, accessed August 13, 2019.
13     Russell F. Weigley, “The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective,
Colonial Times to the Present,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National
Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard Kohns (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 215.
14     Mara Karlin and Alice Friend, “Military Worship Hurts U.S. Democracy: Battlefield Experience
Shouldn’t Trump the Outsider Benefits of Civilian Leadership,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2018.
15     Garner, “Civil Military Relations,” 8.
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believes “the majority of the professional force cannot remain silent.”16
If they did speak, what would they say? What more can be said beyond
the weak critique offered by Garner? Few constraints prevent members
of the military from criticizing their branch. Perhaps they are too busy
upholding their end of the social contract to make time for corrections
on the margin. Perhaps most of them adhere to the professional ethic
espoused by Huntington. Perhaps they abide by the discipline required
to maintain good order and the trust of society.
The military should have some degree of separation from society.
This is the functional imperative of which Huntington spoke.17 It is
what makes the western model of civil-military relations stronger over
time. Garner suggests the degree of separation is too great. He suggests
military families are too isolated on their posts. This is a convenient
point often used to explain the gap but lacks merit. Military installations
are an integral component of the ecosystem they belong to.
Look at the arguments anytime base realignment and closure is
mentioned.18 No elected representative wants to lose the economic
benefits military bases provide. They employ civilians both on and
off the installation, which suggests daily interactions between military
members and civilians. Military spouses enroll their children in swim
lessons off post, they shop at local stores, they fill their gas tanks, they
join civic groups, they meet people at local parks, and they join church
groups. All these activities help close the civil-military gap. Military
bases are necessary for the functioning of the military. The idea they are
islands unattached to society is not supported by reality.
The US military has earned the trust of its citizens. It is not a threat
to the society it protects. Under a Hobbesian notion, the social contract
has been fulfilled. The people have given up some liberties in exchange
for security. Under a Lockean concept, the military has secured the
inalienable rights of life, liberty, and property, so much so that the
country is the most sought-after place to immigrate to. Ask any citizen
of any country with a history of coups if their military has earned their
trust. The US military has protected this nation at great personal cost.
So who is ultimately at fault if a civil-military gap exists? Garner
says it best in his closing thoughts, “The gap may well be a failure
in civic responsibility on the part of the citizen.”19 Declining social
capital is a possible cause for the civil-military divide.20 The average
American doesn’t talk to her or his neighbor, what makes us think he
or she cares what the military is doing? Even if the military were to
implement Garner’s suggestions, the citizenry would be required to
listen and digest the military’s transparency. Unless this transparency
is splashed across social media, it is unlikely to be consumed but will
invariably lower trust. The military cannot mobilize society to care.21 It
16     Garner, “Civil Military Relations,” 8.
17     Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 16.
18     “Base Realignment and Closure,” RAND Corporation, accessed August 13, 2019.
19     Garner, “Civil-Military Relations,” 8.
20     Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2001).
21     Steven J. Rosenstone and John Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America
(New York: Macmillan, 1993), 399–415.
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can, however, continue to execute its duty and keep society safe enough
to have these discussions.
The civil-military divide is not a growing existential threat to
American democracy. A gap has existed since the nation’s founding and
is an inherent part of the US system. The strength and commitment of
civilian control results “from the active and sustained commitment of
both civilians and military professionals to an idea that had proven itself
in good times and bad.”22 The military has not forgotten this idea. The
same cannot be said of civilians.

The Author Replies
Thomas N. Garner

I

am happy my commentary on civil-military relations in Parameters is
eliciting discourse. George Fust states my article is “an unfair assertion
and a one-sided argument replete with faulty logic and fallacies.” I am
happy to take criticism on any logical fallacies for which I am guilty.
But he merely makes the statement without elaborating or providing
evidence for any specific fallacies I may have committed. After correctly
identifying my core argument—that it is the military’s responsibility to
close the civil-military divide with society—Fust goes on to argue against
positions I do not hold, the very definition of the straw-man fallacy.
Since it is difficult for me to defend arguments I did not make, I will
instead expand upon the points in my article for clarity and address some
of the specific points Fust makes about my work.
I will begin where I ended my article, with the example from
Richard Kohn.23 I agree with Kohn there is a professional duty to teach
and shape relationships in any profession, with no such expectation for
those who are served to be students of any particular profession. In my
argument, I focused on the military’s relationship to the society writ
large, not the military’s relationship to its civilian political leadership.24
Kohn’s sentiment is reflected in specific literature on the subject in the
idea professions hold “authority.”25 Ernest Greenwood lays out that the
relationship between a professional and a client is predominately based
on that professional’s authority or extensive education in the “systematic
theory of his discipline.”26
Because clients lack the expertise or training of the professional,
they are hindered in their ability to understand that profession, appraise
the quality of service received, or question a professional’s judgment
on his or her subject of expertise. The professional’s authority is the
22     David Trask, “Democracy and Defense: Civilian Control of the Military in the United States,”
Issues of Democracy 2, no 3 (1997): 18.
23     Richard H. Kohn, “Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security,”
in American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and
Don. M. Snider (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 287.
24     Garner, “Civil-Military Relations,” 6–8.
25     Earnest Greenwood, “Attributes of a Profession,” Social Work 2, no. 3 (July 1957): 45.
26     Greenwood, “Attributes of a Profession,” 47.
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“principal source of the client’s faith” in the professional relationship.27
Even in Huntington’s work, the military’s “responsibility” suggests the
ultimate client of every profession, including the military, is society;
professions are understood to make meaningful contributions to society.
Therefore, military officers have a responsibly to serve society to their
fullest capacities without money being the sole motivation.28 I believe
that in order to serve society in this way, military officers should not
expect society to learn about the military profession and then blame
the average citizen for their ignorance. Ultimately, this is why patients
go to doctors, clients go to lawyers, and parishioners go to clergy—for
their expertise. Why then is there a different expectation for the military
profession, as Fust opines?
The common argument against this assertion is there is a difference
in the social contract that applies to the military given the unique
relationship of civilians and the military in America. The simple answer
to this is society changed the terms of that contract with the all-volunteer
force implemented in 1973 as a result of the Gate’s Commission.
Bernard Boëne writes that the current all-volunteer military is “in
danger of lacking legitimacy and support.”29 Neither I nor Boëne argue
the military lacks legitimacy or support, but this is certainly a possibility
in the all-volunteer era. Boëne states the American Cold War military
was “an ‘institutional’ armed force which was functionally and, in part,
structurally and culturally divergent from large-scale civil organizations,
but enjoyed effective social and cultural links to society through the
mechanism of selective conscription.”30
Additionally, Boëne notes that before the 1950s one would find
“an armed force of civilians in uniform” during World War II that
is “highly representative, [and] highly legitimate.”31 We have done
exactly what Michael Sandel argues: “Turning military service into a
commodity—a task we hire people to perform—corrupts the civic ideals
that should govern it.”32 To this end and again to address one of Fust’s
points directly, the issue is not the military’s relationship to its civilian
political superiors, it is more of an issue concerning the relationship of
the military to the society at large, which it serves.
Fust states I suggest the civil-military divide my article discusses
is an “existential threat” “on the fringes of theory.” This claim is a red
herring. I never suggested the divide is a threat or existential. It is also
not on the fringes of theory, as I very carefully used existing theory to
argue my points: “there is reason to worry that Americans are proud
of their military not because of involvement with it or reflection about
what makes it good, but simply because it is theirs.”33 It should also be
noted that I feel this most recent civil-military dilemma I highlight does

27     Greenwood, “Attributes of a Profession,” 48.
28     Huntington, Soldier and the State, 9.
29     Bernard Boëne, “How ‘Unique’ Should the Military Be? A Review of Representative
Literature & Outline of a Synthetic Formulation,” European Journal of Sociology 31, no. 1 (1990): 10.
30     Boëne, “How ‘Unique’?,” 10.
31     Boëne, “How ‘Unique’?,” 10.
32     Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2009), 86.
33     Garner, “Civil-Military Relations,” 6.
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not replace Huntington’s, Feaver’s, or Janowitz’s conception; it merely
adds to it.
Fust also states I failed to address contemporary theory which offers
a “holistic framework,” but he fails to address what contemporary theory
or material I am excluding. A brief look at my cited sources in the article
shows I drew from scholars such as Richard Kohn, Peter Feaver, Morris
Janowitz, Samuel Huntington, Suzanne Nielsen, and Michael Sandel. I
also cited studies and commentaries by Bruce Drake, James Fallows, Mark
Thompson, the Pew Research Center, David Barno, and Nora Bensahel.
This set of authors covers a range of theoretical viewpoints and opinion.
Fust claims I offered no evidence to support my argument of the
disparity between the public’s trust and their lack of understanding
about the military. My footnotes citing the Pew Research Center, Mark
Thompson, and Bruce Drake clearly indicate “that American society (71
percent of the public) and the US military (84 percent of veterans) are
coming no closer to developing a shared understanding of each other or
the military’s problems.”34
Nonetheless, Fust and I actually agree on a number of points. I agree
with the argument and assertion that “perhaps it is not the soldier who has
lost touch, but society.” Further, I agree with his points on the continued
success of civil-military relations as this relates to political leaders and the
military, as well as with his argument about the military not being a threat
to society. I address and move well past these arguments on page 6 of my
article because I agree with both points.
I agree with Fust’s question concerning the military’s silence about
key issues: “if they did speak, what would they say?” Unfortunately, recent
articles in major news publications including those he cited do not show
any indication to the public, or the military at large, that there is a coherent
strategic message anyone in military service can champion to further a
positive dialogue.
Finally, I agree military installations are “an integral component of the
ecosystem” to which they belong. I am a product of this ecosystem; I am a
child of military parents who enrolled me in swimming lessons off of the
military post. But Fust’s assertion and implication that I hold the “idea that
[military bases] are islands unattached to society [that] is not supported by
reality” is both hyperbole and borders on ad hominem. These community
ties often do not extend beyond the community where the base is situated.
These ties do not reach the American people at large—those not living
immediately outside a military base—and this fact is concerning to me.
To conclude, I appreciate the dialogue my article elicited. I do not
claim to have all the answers. But I am trying to learn, so I appreciate
Fust’s thoughts on the topic. In the end, I am endeavoring to live up to
the professional responsibility in Huntington’s work where officers are
custodians of expert knowledge and contribute to it through scholarship
and study.35
34     “War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era: Executive Summary,” Pew Research Center, October
5, 2011; Mark Thompson, “An Army Apart: The Widening Military-Civilian Gap,” Time, November
10, 2011; and Bruce Drake, “On Memorial Day, Public Pride in Veterans, But at a Distance,” Pew
Research Center, May 24, 2013.
35     Huntington, Soldier and the State, 8–10.
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Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents
Edited by Eli Berman and David A. Lake
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

P

roxy Wars represents a deliverable study produced through the
Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative research
project Deterrence with Proxies, funded through the Office of Naval
Research (ix). As a result, the work is very structured, follows a scientific
methodology, and is extremely well referenced. This represents both a
blessing—specific policy implications and research findings are evident—
and a curse—lack of ease of reading and an overly academic approach.
The work is edited by two professors from the University of
California, San Diego—Eli Berman and David Lake, an economist and
a political scientist, respectively—with eleven contributors participating
in the work. Of these contributors, five are professors, four are postdoctoral researchers, and two are PhD candidates. The contributors are
also primarily trained as economists and political scientists. As expected,
given the backgrounds of the editors and the contributors, the work
follows a rational-actor and cost-benefit approach. This is embodied in
the use of a principal-agent framework: “Our framework for analyzing
conditions and strategies for indirect control consists of two players”
(11). This framework results in a theory-driven 2-player game approach
with the principal having five options in its interactions with the agent.
Various conditionals and contract options then modify this principalagent framework of interaction. The intent of this modeling is to address
the following goals:

Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2019
354 pages
$29.95

One goal is to determine when it makes sense for a principal—a superior
power—to engage in indirect control to deal with issues of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counternarcotics operations, three areas where
private actors within fragile states threaten global order and the interests of
other states. In that sense, we test the limits of this strategic approach to
transnational threats. A second goal, when indirect control makes sense, is
to investigate how to manage that relationship successfully, at a minimum
cost to the principal. (3)

This edited work contains a list of tables and figures,
acknowledgements, an introduction, ten chapters, a conclusion,
references, contributor information, and an index. Individual chapter
case studies focus on the following: chapter 1: South Korea, 1950–53
(by Julia Macdonald), chapter 2: Denmark, 1940–45 (by Brandon
Merrell), chapter 3: Colombia, 1990–2010 (by Abigail Vaughn), chapter
4: Lebanon and Gaza, 1975–2017 (by Matthew Nanes), chapter 5: El
Salvador, 1979–1992 (by Ryan Baker), chapter 6: Pakistan, 2001–11 (by
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Clara Suong), chapter 7: Israel-Palestinian Authority, 1993–2017 (by
Alexei Abrahams), chapter 8: Yemen, 2001–11 (by Ben Brewer), and
chapter 9: Iraq, 2003–11 (by David Lake), with a final chapter focusing
on the case study policy implications for the United States (by Stephen
Biddle). The latter contributor is well known to US Army War College
audiences as he once held the Elihu Root chair of military studies at the
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI).
The reviewer found the front and back elements of the work—
introduction, policy implications for the United States (Chapter 10),
and the conclusion—to be the most interesting and useful components.
Unless the reader has an interest in a specific country of interest, after
a while, the case studies proved to be redundant. They utilized similar
formats and functioned as a data set subjected to interpretative analysis
by the individual contributors. These are termed “analytic narratives”
tied to a single theory with cross-case and over-time comparisons utilized
(23–24). As a result they were scientifically employed to validate or
invalidate components of the model used in the work and its theoretical
(basic, comparative static, and capacity-building) H1–H12 predictions
(Table 0.1, 16).
The main findings of the work are summed up in the concluding
two chapters. Stephen Biddle’s policy implications chapter provides
best practice when relying on proxies—focus on incentives rather
than punishments—and addresses doctrinal assumptions of interest
alignment and various perceptions of conditionality. He then provides a
listing of eleven policy implications derived from theory and case study
analysis (284). These include: “structure civilian aid with options for
increases if proxies comply with US preferences, and decreases if they
do not” and “seek proxies, whose interests align as closely as possible
with those of the United States” (284). The conclusion, provided by
Eli Berman and David Lake, provides a master table that summarizes
the case studies, highlights primary Hn changes over time, and offers
conclusions (with descriptions of anomalous behavior) (table C.1, 290).
The overall project findings follow:
1. Proxy relationships work well in suppressing political violence when
proxies are appropriately incentivized (six or seven of nine cases), but
provide disappointing results when incentives are lacking, inconsistent,
or absent (two or three of nine).
2. The United States is surprisingly inconsistent in applying incentives,
which accounts for both of the unambiguous disappointments (Yemen
and Iraq).
The analytical narrative method seems to provide enough
discipline to yield conclusions, at least in the fortunate cases where
the qualitative data are consistently predicted by theory (301).
Additionally, a surprising and disturbing finding came out of this
study, namely “local agents, when not appropriately incentivized,
often use foreign military assistance to shore up the opposite of
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inclusive governance: a patron security service that threatens political
rivals” (302).
Contemporary works in this genre of study are Michael A. Innes’
Making Sense of Proxy Wars (2012), Andrew Mumford’s Proxy Warfare
(2013), and Geraint Hughes’ My Enemy’s Enemy (2012), as well as the
more recent works—Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli’s Surrogate
Warfare (2019) and Tyrone L. Groh’s Proxy War (2019). While most of
these books are more engaging reads than Proxy Wars, this work does
have greater scientific rigor to it. It will have immediate interest to the
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute community as well
as those professionals interested in the activities of violent nonstate
actors and transnational organized criminals. Still, for other audiences,
focusing only on the front and back elements of the work, with some case
study analysis for data grounding, likely represents the best approach to
reading it.

White House Warriors: How the National Security
Council Transformed the American Way of War
By John Gans
Reviewed by Jesse B. Burnette, master of science candidate, US Naval
Postgraduate School

New York: Liveright
Publishing Corporation,
2019
272 pages
$28.95

T

hose who lead the many to guide the decision-making of a few
now have a newly defined shoreline to follow. Dr. Jon Gans’s White
House Warriors sheds new light on the White House’s often-unmentioned,
yet steadfast neighbors in the executive office building—the National
Security Council (NSC). Following Gans’s tribute to the men and women
of the NSC, Gans concludes, the NSC’s history is replete with both
successes and failures. The great insight this history offers is that the
NSC best serves both the president and the nation with the rightsized
job; that is to say, better national security policy and process is a function
of smaller writs, not bigger staffs.
Gans is eminently qualified to write this authoritative account
of the American premier coordinating and policy body. The author’s
eclectic background as a public servant has brought him to the highest
steps of government. His key career highlights include serving as chief
speechwriter to Defense Secretary Ash Carter, assistant to Treasury
Secretary Jack Lew, and key postings with Defense Secretary Chuck
Hagel, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and US Senator Hillary
Clinton. In what began as a doctoral dissertation at the Johns Hopkins
University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Gans amassed
numerous hours of personal interviews with senior NSC staffers—
Morton H. Halperin, Philip A. Dur, Richard N. Haass, Alexander
Vershbow, Meghan O’Sullivan, and Douglas Lute—to augment his
considerable firsthand documents.
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Gans’s succinct but thoroughly documented 72-year history of the
NSC, written in the form of a political thriller, performs three functions
for the reader. First, Gans charts the origins of the NSC from its beta
form in the Second World War, to the opening of the Cold War, through
subsequent changes, to the present. Second, through this comparative
history, Gans reveals how each commander in chief—from Presidents
Truman to Trump—tailored the NSC to fit preconceived predilections
for running the country within the broad guidelines of the National
Defense Act of 1947. In doing so, Gans captures the NSC’s coordinating
role: responsible to the president and facilitating policy formulation, but
without overseeing the execution of the policies it helps to create. Third,
Gans tells the largely muted story of the leaders of the national security
council staff from Sidney Souers, who served as executive secretary for
the NSC (before the creation of the position of national security advisor
in 1953) in the Truman Administration, to national security advisor
John Bolton who served during the present administration.
White House Warriors, however, does not adequately describe the
American pre-NSC foreign policy procedures and institutions—
specifically those of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.
More on this pre-NSC period would have provided the reader with an
enhanced comparative sense of the genesis and utility of the NSC and
thereby bolstered his conclusions.
White House Warriors provides an easily digestible and nonpartisan
account of how some of NSC staffers fared better than others and how
some national security advisors, many of whom were senior military
officers, shaped enduring processes that guided the United States through
its most perilous journeys. If the future mirrors the past, Gans’s White
House Warriors will be a useful handbook prefacing any senior officer’s
tour of duty at the NSC.

The Fighters: Americans in Combat in Afghanistan and Iraq
By C. J. Chivers
Reviewed by MAJ Nathan K. Finney, East and Southeast Asia planner for the US
Army Pacific

W

hile reading The Fighters, the overwhelming emotions I experienced
were gut-wrenching frustration and anxiety. This reaction was not
the result of a failure on the part of the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist,
C. J. Chivers, but rather, it reflects how well he captured his subject—the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as seen through the men and women who
lived those conflicts. Notably Chivers recognized, “National failures and
individual experiences, while inextricably linked, are distinct” (24).
My negative emotions stem from a place similar to that of the
individuals covered by Chivers’ reporting in the book. Of course
experiences vary, but it is clear many of those Chivers covers in The Fighters
were disappointed in the approach taken by our country toward the wars

New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2018
400 pages
$28.00
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in Afghanistan and Iraq and the utter failure of those conflicts—despite
all the sacrifices and good intentions poured into both—to achieve
any kind of positive result, whether for the United States, our coalition
partners, or the local people themselves.
While such negative emotions might typically lead to a negative view
of the book, this could not be further from the truth. No other book I
have read so tangibly enables the reader to understand the broad scope
of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, while also describing what
those wars were like to the individuals who fought in them, covering
the entirety of the conflicts to date, from the initial air-based attacks on
the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001 to the effects the wars had
on the Taliban mujahedin (the fighters) into late 2016.
As a veteran of both Afghanistan and Iraq, I find it difficult to read
about these particular conflicts, let alone see movies depicting them.
Part of this reluctance is a desire to avoid reliving tough times I had
while deployed. In addition, my war is personal—another’s depiction
of the wars never matches my own, leading to my own frustration or
nitpicking them.
Instead of trying to understand my experiences through the eyes
of my contemporaries, I find it more useful to read accounts and stories
written of previous conflicts. One author in particular, Karl Marlantes,
has allowed me to live vicariously through his stories without having
to relive my own. In both Matterhorn and What It Is Like to Go to War,
Marlantes weaves his own experiences in Vietnam as an infantry
officer into gritty detail educating those unfamiliar with war, while
also allowing those all too familiar with it to safely compare their own
experiences to his.
Admittedly, The Fighters and Marlantes’ books are extremely different.
For instance, the former is written by a noncombatant and told through
the eyes of others, while the latter provides essentially autobiographical
accounts (or a fictional narrative based on personal experiences) of a
participant in the war. However, the focus on war from the tactical
perspective—on the individuals having fought and died, as well as
on those at the home front supporting those men and women—and
how they viewed their successes and failures within those conflicts is
common to both Marlantes’ and Chivers’ books. This focus makes their
audiences tangibly feel the subject at hand. It allows them to understand
“truth” at the ground level, through which they have a better perspective
to view and analyze the larger whole.
From my perspective, the lessons and implications are more
important. This is especially true in The Fighters. First among these
lessons is the professionalism of the men and women fighting for the
American people. Whether the war was going well or poorly, Chivers
ably covers the reactions by our men and women in uniform. They
signed up to serve, and serve they did, to the best of their ability.
As Marine Corps Lieutenant Jarrod Neff felt after all his trials and
tribulations to take Marja, Afghanistan and its subsequent abandonment
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by US forces, “they fought hard and looked out for each other. As he
saw it that was all a grunt could do. Higher-ups had failed. They had
not. He was proud” (340). And even though “there was no clear end
to any of it, and few people had expectations otherwise,” the men and
women Chivers covers—the men and women I served with—keep
going back to Afghanistan and Iraq to serve their nation where they
are needed (340).
In the epilogue to The Fighters, Chivers not only closes the loop on
the men and women he covers in the rest of the book, allowing some
closure to his readers, he also covers the implications of our endless wars
and their effect on individuals. In the end, most of the men and women
Chivers covered “wanted then, and still want now, to connect their
battlefield service to something greater than a memory reel of gunfights,
explosions, and grievous wounds” (19). Few of us have done so. And in
the end, most of those who served in Afghanistan and Iraq are left to
divorce our service from our country to prevent our disillusionment,
because as sergeant first class Leo Kryszewski felt, “after all the violence
and close calls, he had learned to separate his personal service from the
larger march of American foreign policy” (344).
The Fighters is a tale of service, professionalism, and dedication. It
is also a tale of frustration, disillusionment, and failure. And while you
may feel gut-wrenching frustration and anxiety by reading this book, it
should absolutely help guide your reflection and analysis of the endless
wars of multiple American generations. Bravo to Chivers for covering
the essence of recent wars in this book as well as in his numerous
newspaper and magazine articles.

Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense
Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity
By Thomas-Durell Young
Reviewed by Pierre Jolicoeur, associate professor and director, Department of
Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada

T

o each generation its great project. For our grandparents and greatgrandparents, it was the World Wars; for our parents, the Cold War
and decolonization. Thomas-Durrell Young’s Anatomy of Post-Communist
European Defense Institutions describes the great test of our generation—
the struggle to integrate nations formerly captive to communism within
Euro-Atlantic security institutions.
The end of the Cold War has provided a wealth of opportunities
for academics to bridge the gap between scholarly pursuits and Western
governments’ programmatic objectives. Thus, scholars like Young

London: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2017
312 pages
$114.00

TOC

Book Reviews: Defense Studies 119
have also become technicians of security sector reform and defense
institution building.
“This is the first time such a broad analysis of all these countries’
defense institutions has been assembled in one work in order to provide
an analysis and to enable a comparative understanding and appreciation
of the status of their development,” writes Young (11). Most practitioners
of defense transition have, at some time or other, penned an article or
two about our experiences in the field. But nowhere will one find a
better structured and defended argument as to what went wrong in our
Western support of transition democracies, and how to fix it.
The premise of Anatomy is that Western support methods and
principles have failed—a generation since the Cold War came to an
end—to support post-Communist states’ defense transition effectively.
Consequently, we have new NATO allies whose political, structural,
and operational reliability remain doubtful, even more so the further
east one travels.
Anatomy begins with a description of the basic command and
management philosophy that provides the overarching legacy of
defense institutions in former Warsaw Pact, Soviet, and Yugoslav
Republics. Chapter 2 proceeds with a critique of Western defense concepts
and the pursuit of merely technical interoperability. Anatomy posits the
Western model is the ideal to which every new NATO member aspires.
This critique is then followed by an exploration of relationship
management between Western countries’ advisors and their counterparts
in recipient countries. The sobering conclusion of this section is that it
is far better to speak plainly about shortcomings (whether the audience
is the defense cooperation agency at home or the national representative
of a transition country) than to “sugarcoat” partial achievements as
great victories.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 discuss the situation in former Warsaw
Pact countries, the former Soviet Republics, and former Yugoslavia,
respectively. There, the arguments may appear anecdotal and
repetitive. But the book’s audience is chiefly policymakers and students
of defense diplomacy. Therefore, Young’s anecdotes are precious
indicators that allow him to diagnose a “pathology” of legacy defense
management behavior that perpetuates the old ways and makes
institutions unchangeable (11).
If one only has time to read part of this important contribution,
the reader should focus on chapters 7 and 8, which provide a vigorous
critique of Western and NATO responses to central and eastern
European defense management pathologies. Anatomy suggests “honest
defense” as an antidote to lackluster defense institution and capacity
building (203). In essence, it suggests speaking truth to power about the
challenges and pitfalls of supporting transitioning defense institutions.
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Built on a rigorous and logical structure and supported by expert
analysis, Anatomy succeeds at giving a clear picture of the overall
capability of our new allies at fulfilling their respective roles within
the Alliance. This picture is clear but not pretty. The implications
are extremely worrisome, and this is why Young’s Anatomy is such an
important contribution to the field of defense studies.
Anatomy does not suffer from major faults, though it seems at
times to act as a catharsis for the author. This is understandable.
When one spends their best years supporting transition, one would be
justified in expecting results. Frustration at the lack of progress would
be even more justifiable. The incomplete transition has many causes,
including the advisors’ Pyle-like naive enthusiasm that democracy and
all that follows is genuinely desired. Current reporting on democratic
retreat in Hungary, parlous minority rights in the Baltic states,
and corruption in Ukraine are but a few indicators of the persisting
malaise of transition. It remains to be seen whether honest defense is a
sufficient remedy.
Honest defense should be supplemented by new subjects of
instruction in our staff colleges. Anatomy would serve as the ideal
textbook and keystone for a course on providing policy advice,
defense and security cooperation program management, and defense
diplomacy and institution-building management. Young’s Anatomy
provides an invaluable contribution to the field of post-Soviet studies,
public administration, and development studies. And after 25 years
of only relative success in defense transition, it is not an exaggeration
to say dedicated academic programs should be designed with Young’s
experience in mind to prepare the next generation of advisors and
security sector reform technicians.
The West won the Cold War by staying true to its principles while
the chasm between deeds and words grew ever deeper in the Soviet
camp. Anatomy suggests the post-Cold War is not over. The adversary
is not Communist ideology, but rather the legacy of that ideology. We
have taken too much time to recognize that the philosophy, psychology,
and ethics of entire nations have been transformed by their totalitarian
experience.
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Landpower in the Long War, Projecting Force After 9/11
Edited by Jason W. Warren, foreword by Daniel P. Bolger
Reviewed by Matthew D. Morton, contributing author to The U.S. Army in the
Iraq War, Vol.1 and Vol.2, and author of Men on Iron Ponies, The Death and
Rebirth of the U.S. Cavalry

Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2019
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D

rawn from papers presented at the United States Army War
College during a symposium on landpower, editor Jason Warren
has assembled diverse views of a broad topic. That said, Daniel Bolger’s
foreword and the editor’s own introduction provide a general common
denominator unifying the collection—landpower still matters. Seeking to
do more than recount nearly two decades of campaigning in Afghanistan
and Iraq, the essays deliver justification (some better than others) for
reflection on the importance of landpower.
Following the foreword and his own introduction, Warren organized
the eighteen essays under five broad subject headings: the strategic
underpinnings of US landpower, the projection of US landpower, other
purveyors of landpower, the US Army as a landpower institution, and
landpower’s influence on society. Even with undeniably entreating
chapter titles such as James DiCrocco’s “Reading Manila, Thinking about
Wiesbaden: Current Parallels to Pre-World War II Unpreparedness,”
this review will be limited to samplings from each of the five broad
subject headings.
Addressing the strategic underpinnings of landpower, Peter
Mansoor builds on the first chapter’s recognition that many of the
assumptions about the nature of war in Iraq in 2003 were wrong. His
essay, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Strategic Thought in the
U.S. Military, 1991–2003,” demolishes the concept of “‘rapid, decisive
operations’” underpinning Secretary Rumsfeld’s vision of war versus its
reality (32). This essay is important in the context of the Army’s current
efforts to reorient on peer competitors. Joel Hillison’s compact essay
with rich endnotes offers strong evidence that landpower must confront
“deviant globalization” allowing nonstate actors to increase their
relative strength through speed and mobility. Hillison’s prescription for
moving beyond tactical and operational outcomes to “desired political
outcomes” will resonate in the corridors of professional military
education (PME) (44, 57).
The projecting landpower section begins with a strong
acknowledgment by Frank Sobchak that the decision to invade Iraq in
2003 may very well be “deemed the worst foreign policy decision in the
history of the Republic” (86). Sobchak clinically moves through many
subsequent decisions that have led to a seemingly unending commitment
of US forces in Iraq. In the following chapter, Gregory Roberts reveals
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a similar inability to balance ends, ways, and means in Afghanistan.
A lack of strategic clarity about the very broad goal of “a state of
perpetual prevention . . . to avert further attacks on the homeland” was
compounded in the early days by an administration eschewing nation
building and the United States outsourced the task to an international
coalition (107). Eighteen years later, the United States still struggles to
define a realistic end state for its campaign in Afghanistan.
In the third section related to other purveyors of landpower,
William Waddell’s excellent essay on Airpower offers a concise
explanation of effects-based operations. Iraq, just as in 1991, offered
the perfect venue to demonstrate the concept until it didn’t. Low-tech
insurgents “[were] an ‘effect’ for which no one had really planned” (163).
The US Air Force supports but cannot really lead in the wars that have
emerged, thus possibly explaining the attraction of a return to peer
competition and space.
The real strength of Edward Gutiérrez’s essay on the interaction
between the intelligence community and the military lies in its message
about ethics and leadership. The application of hard power—landpower
surely meets this threshold—must be done so with “justice and reason”
by leaders with humility (172). Ibrahim Al-Marashi’s “ISIS’s Projection
of landpower in Iraq” is not to be missed, offering a wonderful example
of the extent of unintended consequences, as unemployed Iraqi officers
sought a means of redress for US decisions in 2003.
Looking at the US Army as an institution in the fourth section,
John Bonin’s “On Headquarters: Use and Abuse of Army Operational
Headquarters (and Contracting) from 2001 to 2015” could be
simplified further—penny-wise, pound-foolish. Sadly, despite instances
in the recent past where a failure to resource command and control
commensurate with the task at hand has had horrific results, headquarters
remain less than sexy compared to other bright shiny initiatives. Fighting
peer competitors will mean much more than advanced technology and
new concepts. Someone will have to lead the fight, and more importantly,
someone else should be trying to answer the critical question, “what
next?” while the current fight is still unfolding.
The last two essays speak to how war influences societies for good
and for bad. Jackie Whitt offers one of the few rays of hope from the last
eighteen years. Anyone who has attended a naturalization ceremony in
an active theater of war won’t be surprised to learn 110,000 noncitizens
took the path of service to citizenship, even with the path narrowing
dramatically in 2017 through policy change. The crucible of land combat
offered women the right to choose combat arms. Lawrence Tritle’s
“Post-Traumatic Stress (Disorder) in the Post-9/11 World” describes
the human cost of applying landpower. His creative linkage between
football and combat to propel advances in medical science is fascinating.
Despite the cost, the is a wonderful resource. The explanation of past
events will offer new students of landpower foundational knowledge
rather than tribal lore. Graduate students and officers at senior service
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colleges can mine detailed endnotes to start their own research on
related topics. Instructors can use succinct reading assignments to foster
Socratic dialogue. At times the editing was uneven with too much “vice”
and “leveraging” used in the military vernacular. And the shadow cast
by Rumsfeld in many chapters begs for further exploration. Still, while
few will need or want to read this book cover to cover, those who do will
be rewarded with new perspectives.
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Military History
Lords of the Desert: The Battle between the United States
and Great Britain for Supremacy in the Modern Middle East
By James Barr
Reviewed by Dr. Christopher J. Bolan, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College

J

ames Barr offers an exquisitely researched account of the largely
forgotten or misremembered history of the rivalry in the Middle East
between a declining Great Britain and rising United States from 1942
until the British departure from the Persian Gulf in 1971.
This is James Barr’s third major book examining the history of
Western Great Power engagement in the Middle East. Setting the Desert on
Fire focuses on T. E. Lawrence and the British war effort in the Arabian
Peninsula during World War I (2007). A Line in the Sand explores the
competition between Britain and France in the Middle East during
the interwar period and World War II (2011). This newest contribution
to the historical literature is a natural progression of his earlier
academic work.
Historians will relish the fresh insights offered into the detailed
strategic and tactical machinations of the United States and Great Britain
during this period. Barr takes full advantage of recently declassified
archives in both London and Washington to knit together a compelling
and engaging narrative of the behind-the-scenes diplomacy and spy craft
reflecting the different strategic perspectives and diverging regional
interests of these erstwhile allies.
These tales of outright competition and covert efforts to undermine
one another’s interests will come as a shock to casual observers of today’s
global politics who understandably (if unwisely) assume that the alliance
between Britain and the United States is an enduring and permanent
feature of the international security landscape.
Barr is undoubtedly a talented storyteller fully capable of painting
events with vibrant color that will entertain the average reader, but
the book also represents a genuine contribution to the scholarship
examining the history of Western engagement in the modern Middle
East. Beyond these freshly unearthed details contained in memoirs
and diplomatic papers, Barr’s strongest contribution is his ability to
narrate these details within a broader strategic context as seen from
Washington and London.
In Barr’s assessment, the US-UK rivalry in the region was grounded
in differing strategic traditions and rationales. British interests in the
Middle East had long been driven by the need to secure commercial and
military access to colonial possessions in India. In the post-World War II

New York: Basic Books,
2018
464 pages
$22.99

TOC

Book Reviews: Military History

125

era, British strategies came to be dominated more narrowly by the need
for oil. “British companies’ domination of Middle Eastern oil production
generated vital revenues for the Crown, improved Britain’s perennially
poor balance of payments, and enabled the country to defend itself in
the event of war with Soviet Russia” (3). British interests in the region
were therefore considered enduring, vital, and not subject to negotiation
or substantial compromise.
Barr suggests that American interests in the region had historically
been quite minimal, were largely driven by commercial considerations,
and were consequently “more realistic and flexible” (4). This allowed
Washington to look upon the region with a distant and fresh set of eyes,
enabling US policymakers to navigate more nimbly the political and
economic transformations sweeping the region.
Barr’s wide-ranging account covers the most significant crises in
the US-UK competition for influence in chronological order employing
short, easily digestible chapters. This logical progression allows
the reader to trace the evolution of American and British tensions
throughout the region.
Barr’s narrative smartly covers the intense commercial and political
competition for access to Saudi oil in the immediate aftermath of
World War II, the founding of Israel in 1948, the 1953 coup in Iran, the
Suez Crisis of 1956, as well various intra-Arab rivalries that animated
multiple regime changes and conflict in Syria, Iraq, Oman, and Yemen
into the 1960s.
Navigating the book for insights into particular issues or events
might be problematic for readers not deeply familiar with the history of
the region. While several of the chapters are clearly titled (for example,
“The Jewish Problem,” “Fight for Palestine,” “Baghdad Pact” and “The
Suez Miscalculation”), others are more opaquely named (for example,
“Sheep’s Eyes,” “Eggs in One Basket,” “The Man in the Arena”).
Nonetheless, the book will certainly yield careful readers important
insights, the most obvious a reinforcement of the nineteenth century
British statesman Lord Palmerston’s admonition that “We have no
eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are
eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
The breadth and strength of America’s global alliance structure
created in the aftermath of World War II have been the envy of countries
around the world. But the historical narrative of this book reminds us
that even alliances forged in the crucible of war should not be taken
for granted. Global and regional alliances require constant tending to
overcome the tendency of narrow divergent interests to drive wedges
between even the closest of partners.
Perhaps most saliently, Barr recounts an anecdote that poses the
most fundamental question for contemporary US policymakers and
military strategists. In 1953, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
completed a tour through the Middle East that included meetings with
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national leaders in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan.
At nearly every turn he encountered “‘an intense distrust and dislike for
the British’” and ultimately concluded that British troops based in the
region had become “‘more a factor of instability . . . than stability’” (215).
It has now been nearly 20 years since the US military intervened
in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Yet the region today remains a
primary source of global terrorism, continues to suffer broadly from
authoritarian political repression, and is being ravaged by multiple
ongoing civil wars and insurgencies. US policymakers should wonder
whether leaders in Arab capitals, Europe, or elsewhere might now be
drawing a similar conclusion regarding the presence of US forces in
the region.

Fighting Means Killing: Civil War Soldiers
and the Nature of Combat
By Jonathan M. Steplyk
Reviewed by Phillip Cuccia, former academic engagement director, Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, current volunteer adjunct professor, US
Army War College

J

onathan M. Steplyk’s book Fighting Means Killing: Civil War Soldiers
and the Nature of Combat, a historical analysis, is truly a tour de force
regarding individual soldiers’ thoughts, reflections, and attitudes toward
killing another human being during the American Civil War (1861–65).
Steplyk thoroughly analyzes what the soldiers in blue and gray wrote
on this topic during and after the war in their diaries, letters home,
and reflections.
Steplyk’s abundant sources are mostly firsthand primary accounts
from Civil War soldiers who killed—or chose not to kill—and
authoritative secondary sources. He compares and contrasts his findings
about the nature of killing in the Civil War with what other researchers
discovered while studying the same topic in other wars. The impressive,
thorough analysis makes the book quite engaging for the reader
attracted to detail.
Although many Civil War works address the subject of killing in
combat, not one makes that topic the focal point of the study; hence,
Steplyk’s book is unique. It offers much insight to the Civil War historical
community and to those studying the psychology of killing in battle.
Steplyk did not dive deeply into the aspect of what today would be
termed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of killing in combat.
The omission may not only be from scarce documentation on the topic
during the Civil War but also because it falls outside of the scope of this
important work regarding cultural and military history.
The book opens with the reactions of the North and South to the
first reported bloodshed of the war: the killing of Colonel Elmer E.
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Ellsworth when he took down a large Confederate flag atop the Marshall
House hotel in Alexandria, Virginia. The insightful and profound
analysis continues in the remaining chapters.
Steplyk methodically walks the reader through a gamut of feelings,
attitudes, and emotions toward killing by looking at the recruits’
backgrounds before the war in relation to guns, marksmanship, and
hunting; by analyzing how a soldier felt during his first battle; and
by relating how soldiers described killing in letters home and in their
diaries with such expressions as “good execution,” “deliberate aim,” and
“murderous fire” (89).
Steplyk’s insightful analysis of the phraseology in soldiers’ accounts
of battle is aided by his use of contemporary dictionaries, which clarify
word usage of the time. The author also discusses hand-to-hand
combat and why Civil War soldiers engaged in this type of fighting
so infrequently. He concludes that bayonet instruction, when given,
was meant to keep soldiers busy as much as it was to improve their
fighting skills.
Some historians claim a unique characteristic of this brother-againstbrother conflict was the soldier’s preference to use clubbed muskets
rather than bayonets in close combat. Steplyk, however, states that his
research did not uncover any examples of Union or Confederate soldiers
explicitly stating that they preferred fighting with clubbed muskets or
that it was more bearable than bayonet fighting.
Steplyk next addresses the topic of sharpshooters as hunters
of men and the common soldiers’ attitudes toward these marksmen.
He debunks the notion that most soldiers expressed hatred toward
sharpshooters, an idea that was perpetuated by relying on Robert Stiles
and Frank Wilkeson’s battle accounts used in Earl Hess’s The Union
Soldier in Battle (1997) and Bruce Catton’s A Stillness at Appomattox (1953).
Steplyk concludes that antipathy toward sharpshooters was not the
norm. He supports that conclusion with the observation that there was a
lack of atrocities committed against sharpshooters during the Civil War
compared with numerous twentieth-century conflicts, especially World
War II, after which many combat troops acknowledged that snipers
were not taken prisoner but killed outright.
The author then addresses murder and mercy with an in-depth study
spanning the spectrum between these two extremes. He differentiates
between murder and killing both within the context of the Civil War and
with the religious mores of that time. Most readers would agree with his
description of unlawful killing on the battlefield as murder and normal
battlefield killing as morally permissible. His treatment of the topic is
profound and could prove to be therapeutic for one who has been in a
situation where they were faced with killing in battle.
Even when Steplyk is dissecting, scrutinizing, and evaluating the
soldiers’ accounts of their actions on the battlefield, he does it objectively,
without moralizing or lecturing. He shows that mercy on the battlefield
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was inextricably tied to providing comfort to wounded enemy soldiers
and to the complexities involved with the act of surrender during the
heat of battle. His descriptions of soldiers surrendering immediately
after discharging their weapons present an example of moral dilemmas
soldiers were faced with during the Civil War which are timeless on the
battlefield as soldiers today face similar situations.
Steplyk disagrees with modern historians who suggest soldiers
declining to shoot at one another on the picket line were evading or
compromising a duty to kill the enemy. He provides sound contemporary
military reasoning for his rationale. He takes an academic look at how
and why soldiers were able to set up unofficial truces to trade and
fraternize with their enemy, and moments later, after returning to their
respective sides, try to kill each other.
The concluding chapter deals with the influence of race and hate
in the context of combat. Steplyk recounts how Confederate policies
toward slavery led to the dehumanizing of black soldiers, consequently,
a lack of mercy toward them. The book ends with the assassination of
President Abraham Lincoln and an examination of that murder’s effects
on the nation and its attitudes toward reconciliation.
Steplyk’s research and writing in Fighting Means Killing contribute
greatly to our collective understanding of the Civil War. His judicious
use of philosophy, psychology, and religion, in addition to a thorough
historical approach on both the social and military side, make for a
well-rounded treatment of the subject. Junior as well as senior leaders
of the defense community will find the analysis in this book helpful
in understanding the psychology of killing in combat. Those that have
engaged in combat will perhaps find reading this book therapeutic and
thought-provoking. Steplyk’s work fills a big gap with this thorough
analysis of the attitudes of Civil War soldiers toward killing in combat.
It will likely be the authoritative source on this subject for decades
to come.

How to Think about War: An Ancient Guide to Foreign Policy
By Thucydides, edited by Johanna Hanink
Reviewed by MAJ Kerney M. Perlik, US Army aviation officer and assistant
professor of international relations and international security studies at the US
Military Academy at West Point

C

asually citing Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War in
discussions of modern political and military strategy has become
an intellectual status symbol among foreign policy and military elites.
Interpretations of Thucydides’s benchmark historic account have
become almost biblical: debates about strict versus loose interpretation
follow each major translation of the text or the argument that invokes
one of Thucydides’s self-purported timeless lessons.
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The challenge with choosing the context in which to apply
Thucydides’s lessons is that devotees simplify and warp the lessons
of the Peloponnesian War to suit their specific purposes. Many draw
limited conclusions like fear, honor, and interest as enduring motives
for war or the classical realist conclusion that “might makes right” in
foreign policy. Authors across disciplines, including political scientists
like David A. Welch and Richard Ned Lebow, have even criticized this
tendency to abridge or misinterpret Thucydides’s complex History as a
disservice to the ancient historian and modern political scientist.
Entering into this apparent zero-sum intellectual battlefield is
Johanna Hanink’s innovative translation of selected speeches from
Thucydides. She states her approach of providing the full text, an
introduction, and a direct translation for 6 speeches, out of more than
140, makes the key speeches and dialogue “fresh and approachable”
(xviii). She also believes the concise version of Thucydides allows
readers to bypass political bias and determine for themselves whether
the lessons of Athens and Sparta apply to contemporary cases in
foreign policy.
Without the luxury of spending much time on a single work,
faculty in survey courses often choose one of two ways to teach
Thucydides: leave it out entirely or offer up the “Melian Dialogue” or
“Pericles’ Funeral Oration” as the sole representation of a far richer,
more complicated history. The latter approach is like teaching a history
of World War II by presenting Pearl Harbor as the only worthwhile
historical lesson. With How to Think about War, students at least see key
speeches set chronologically and in contrast to one another, avoiding
an entirely one-dimensional takeaway: The “Mytilenean Debate” versus
the “Melian Dialogue,” Pericles’s cautionary but idealistic “First War
Speech” compared to “The Sicilian Debate” that marks the beginning
of the end for the Athenian empire.
The author’s commitment to linguistic authenticity serves students
and teachers of the classics and students in survey courses on international
relations or foreign policy also benefit. Military leaders, foreign policy
advisors, and policymakers who do not have time to delve into a full
translation can use this book to assess the intrigue and the enduring
appeal of Thucydides, Such self-taught students may miss the richness of
lessons gleaned from the whole book but gain more than the oft-quoted
realist refrain: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what
they must.”
Readers come away with Hanink’s slightly different translation of
the famed excerpt from the “Melian Dialogue”—“Those in positions of
power do what their power permits, while the weak have no choice but to
accept it.” The irony of that ode to power politics in direct contrast to the
subsequent debate on the Sicilian expedition, in which Athens’ bloated
sense of power and status is deflated in a crushing defeat precipitated by
strategic overreach, is also recognized (xlviii).
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Hanink’s contribution fills a few gaps in our collective understanding
of Thucydides, but not without shortcomings. First, the subtitle An
Ancient Guide to Foreign Policy is a bit of a misnomer. In the conversation
surrounding Thucydides, scholars often hesitate to frame History of the
Peloponnesian War as having any singular purpose, leaving that conclusion
instead to the interaction between reader and ancient author.
Although one of the author’s expressed motives is to highlight the
roles of individual leaders by translating speeches and not Thucydides’s
commentary, she omits speeches from key characters whom she
introduces, like the Athenian General Nicias who is represented only
in the Sicilian expedition debate. But without Nicias’s letter to Athens
from Sicily in 414 BC or his final speeches to his beleaguered troops
on the eve of their imminent defeat in Syracuse, the reader misses the
tragedy of a military leader who cannot detach himself and his men
from a hopeless battle he initially opposed. Another example of a missed
opportunity is not including any of the speeches or debates from book
one, where the peripheral conflict between Corcyra and Corinth sets in
motion the direct great-power conflict between Athens and Sparta.
Still, Hanink’s translation provides a worthwhile addition to the
ongoing dialogue inspired by Thucydides. There is plenty of room to
criticize the choices for this abridged version of an ancient classic, but the
truth is Hanink provides a much more skilled “fresh and approachable”
presentation of Thucydides than many of us would accomplish (xviii).
She also offers a critical piece of advice for those who proselytize
the virtues of Athenian power and democracy as the model of a great
power in wartime: “The reader who turns to these speeches in search
of practical ancient wisdom is strongly encouraged to do so with the
ultimate fate of Thucydides’s Athens in mind” (liv). For any student of
war, it is prudent to know how the story ends before sharing its lessons.

Major General George H. Sharpe and the Creation of
American Military Intelligence in the Civil War
By Peter G. Tsouras
Reviewed by Rev. Wylie W. Johnson, DMin, Pastor, the Springfield Baptist
Church and Law Enforcement Chaplain in Delaware County, PA

P

eter Tsouras’ well researched volume is an excellent development
of the largely untold story of America’s first intelligence service—
the Bureau of Military Information (BMI) and its unsung genius, Major
General George H. Sharpe. It is an important follow-on companion to
Fishel’s The Secret War for the Union (1996).
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2018
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This volume follows the life of Sharpe from birth through his final
years. Wrapped around the man, the bulk of the book is the incredible
story of inventing an intelligence service in stride while fully engaged in
the eastern campaign of the Civil War. This concept and creation of a
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Union Army intelligence service was at the direction of Major General
Joseph Hooker, who found himself as the Commander of the Army of
the Potomac when Lincoln relieved Major General George B. McClellan
in January 1863.
Joe Hooker was the godfather of modern American Military intelligence.
Although he faded from center stage after Chancellorsville, the military
intelligence structure he created soldiered on to tip the scales of victory
in the Union’s favor at the decisive battle of Gettysburg that followed days
after his relief. That structure went on to play a vital role in the subsequent
victory of the Army of the Potomac. (36, 37)

Hooker’s prescient choice for his new intelligence service was
Colonel George H. Sharpe, a Kingston, New York lawyer who had
raised the 120th New York Regiment and brought it to the conflict.
Hooker’s transformational innovation was to develop a staff section for
the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and reporting on enemy strength
and potential intent, logistics, morale, weaponry, depots, as well as the
intervening terrain.
Upon Hooker’s direction to begin shaping an intelligence staff
section, Sharpe immediately began to gather key individuals as he
developed the first all-source military intelligence unit in the US Army.
Sharpe carefully and consistently developed principles of action and
understanding, directing competent persons to gather raw information,
analyze and test the data, and develop true military intelligence estimates.
There was nothing comparable in the southern force. And despite
many institutional barriers, Sharpe’s BMI gathered reports from spies,
cavalry scouts, signal stations reading Confederate wigwag messages, the
(short-lived) Balloon Corps, interrogations of deserters and prisoners,
southern newspapers, and freed or runaway slaves.
By careful, all-source analysis and record keeping, Sharpe was able
to discard or verify information and develop very precise Confederate
order of battle reports. Unlike the wild and imaginary estimates of
McClellan, Sharpe’s estimates were rarely off by more than seven or
eight percent. And crucially, Sharpe was usually able to pinpoint the
location and strength of key opponents on the battlefield.
Almost immediately, Sharpe was able to provide Hooker with decisive
intelligence—regarded as the best intelligence effort crafted during the
Civil War—for a battle plan, which featured a double envelopment of
Lee’s Army (the battle of Chancellorsville), accompanied by an end-run
cavalry operation, with the goal of cutting off the Confederate logistics
source, leaving the southern army without supply.
Unfortunately for Union forces, the incompetent cavalry
commander, Brigadier General George Stoneman, failed to carry out
his assignment; Confederate Lieutenant General Robert E. Lee reacted
immediately to the crisis situation; and Hooker lost his nerve against
lesser forces. But Sharpe’s BMI provided intelligence leading Hooker
(soon to be relieved by Major General George G. Meade) to move the
Union Forces north in response to Lee’s aggressive northern march.
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The Union Army, greatly troubled by senior jealousies over rank and
privilege, regarded Sharpe’s innovation as meddlesome and unimportant.
Meade was usually of the mind to disregard Sharpe’s reports and return
to a more familiar way of processing intelligence, even resorting to
interrogating prisoners and deserters himself.
When Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant arrived in the Eastern
theater, he retained Meade as the Commander of the Army of the
Potomac. Later, Grant brought the BMI and Sharpe into his personal
staff. The two eventually became close associates, and their friendship
continued long after the war years.
The closing chapters detail personal and political events in Sharpe’s
life after he returned to Kingston, New York. While of some interest,
the real value of this book is the unveiling of the Union’s secrets.
Unfortunately, Sharpe never wrote an autobiography or a history
of the BMI, and much is lost to history as the national archives are
incomplete. Sharpe was a true spymaster, taking most of his secrets to the
grave (important for the wellbeing of his spies and scouts still living in
the south).
Tragically, the BMI was quickly disbanded following the end of the
war. The Army established the Military Intelligence Division (MID)
much later in 1883. Although the Army reorganized the MID into
the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) during World War II, military
intelligence continued to be a bit player in the grand scheme of things
until the MIS itself was reorganized in 1962 as the Army Intelligence
and Security Branch.
This biography names individuals, long lost to history, who made
significant achievements—key innovations and decisions—in the
gathering and development of military intelligence, highlighting that no
commander works in isolation. The book contains extensive appendices,
clear photographs, helpful maps, and is fairly readable. While there are a
few annoying typos (including a misspelling of Sharpe’s name), the book
is an important resource in understanding the second half of the eastern
campaign of the Civil War and will likely appeal to those currently
involved in intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination efforts.

The Hall of Mirrors: War and Warfare in the Twentieth Century
By Jim Storr
Reviewed by David Ulbrich, associate professor and program director of the
Master of Arts in the history and military history programs at Norwich University

J

im Storr’s Hall of Mirrors makes for a fascinating, yet frustrating, read.
He analyzes warfare during the twentieth century to glean lessons
from “the largely human processes by which war is waged” (vii). He uses
British military history as the focal point because he is a retired British
Army officer and because British forces were engaged in conflicts for
most of the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries.
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Storr surveys the “course and conduct” of these conflicts, with
the former being “largely a result of the strategy,” and the latter being
“largely a matter of campaigns and tactics, [which were] informed in
places by strategic decisions” (xii). The title points to why reflections
among wars are distorted by context, bias, culture, and other factors.
Storr’s arguments are refreshingly opinionated, though not without
some content flaws and research gaps.
Chapter 1 starts in the early 1900s with brief overviews of the Boer
War and the Philippine-American War. Storr then devotes three chapters
to the First World War, where he finds imbalances in every belligerent
nation’s activities between grand strategy and strategy on one hand and
operations and tactics on the other. This unevenness resulted in the
bloodbaths of trench warfare. The evolution of maneuver warfare forms
the pivot point between the bloodbath during the first three years and
the more successful advances in 1918, as evinced by British Field Marshal
Douglas Haig’s experiments with tactical and operational remedies for
the problems of trench warfare.
Chapter 5 on the interwar years serves as an interlude when nations
struggled to develop new weapons systems and doctrines that could
reduce the defensive monopoly on firepower in the First World War and
increase the mobility of assault forces in future conflicts. Summarized
best by Storr, the three chapters on the Second World War provide the
most attention to strategic bombing and ground campaigns in Eastern
Europe, mentioning the Pacific War intermittently:
The Second World War was won strategically because America entered the
war. Operationally, the war against Germany was won when Germany was
overrun. That happened because of the destruction of Army Group Centre
and Overload, both in 1944. It was not, nor appreciably shortened, by
bombing. Japan was not defeated by atomic bombs. They merely hastened
its end. Operationally, Japan was largely defeated by a highly effective series
of amphibious campaigns. (140)

In chapters 9 and 10 on the Cold War, Storr astutely points to the
conundrums of fighting limited wars in an era when dominant ideologies
and the ever-present threat of nuclear weapons made the dangers of total
wars very real. He argues winning wars was not possible in a traditional,
conventional sense because nations could not align grand strategy,
strategy, operations, and tactics. These chapters on the Cold War stand
as the most valuable in the book.
The last five chapters shift from a chronological to a thematic
approach. Storr examines the changes in military technology, again
focusing primarily on ground and air operations. He correctly asserts,
“The strongest logical and statistical correlations between battlefield
phenomena are not those between weapons effect and damage . . . but
between movement and changing behavior” (192; emphasis added).
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Later, he explains why “good” and “bad” counterinsurgency
practices hinge on the quality of communications, political systems,
infrastructure, security, and stability, as well as on the proportionality
of military force relative to collateral damage. Storr then takes a hard
look at the morality and utility of strategic bombing, neither of which,
he believes, justify the expense in resources or lives. Instead, he makes
the useful suggestion that reconnaissance, raiding, and surveillance
represent the ideal roles for aircraft. He concludes the book by applying
theories of probability, agency, anthropology, and sociology to warfare.
Hall of Mirrors is not a monograph that includes scholarly conventions
like endnotes and annotations, but rather a thought piece with minimal
citations. This is not a judgment of the book’s value in and of itself,
but rather a statement of fact. Authors need not pass academic litmus
tests for their books to be valuable to readers. Nevertheless, such a
structure, where arguments cannot be quickly corroborated in the
text or endnotes, leaves Storr open to questions and criticisms. His
acknowledged Anglocentric focus and preponderance of British sources
prove frustrating because he did not incorporate some important British
and American scholarship into his book.
The abovementioned quote about the outcome of the Second World
War illustrates some of Storr’s historical oversights and historiographical
omissions. His coverage of strategic bombing does not adequately
address the nuanced debates about the efficacy of the bombing campaign.
His analysis could have been enriched by consulting works by Robin
Higham, Alfred Mierzejewski, Tami Davis Biddle, Gian Gentile, John
Buckley, and Robert Pape.
Elsewhere, neither Robert Doughty nor Eugenia Kiesling appears
in Storr’s bibliography despite their influential interpretations of France’s
military in the interwar period and the 1940 defeat. In sections on the
same period in the Pacific, Storr does not reference Edward Miller,
David Evans, Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Alvin Coox.
Turning to cultural factors affecting warfare, Storr’s examination of
the Eastern Front does not integrate books by Omer Bartov, Wolfram
Wette, Christopher Browning, or Geoffrey Megargee that reveal why
racial ideology so profoundly affected German decisions and actions at
all levels of warfare.
Similar prejudiced worldviews affected the course and conduct
of the Pacific War in horrific ways, but the works of Gerald Horne,
Yuki Tanaka, and John Dower are missing from the bibliography. The
dearth of cultural studies of warfare is especially marked in light of
Storr’s recurring connections of warfare with the human condition and
human agency.
These caveats notwithstanding, Hall of Mirrors stands as a useful
study because of the patterns of conflicts illuminated by Jim Storr. This
synthetic survey will provide fodder for discussions among uniformed
personnel and civilian academics alike.
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